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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS IN FINANCIAL FRAGILITY AND REGULATIONS
Lin Shen
Itay Goldstein
This dissertation studies financial fragility caused by coordination failure and discusses
plausible regulations to alleviate coordination problems and enhance social welfare. It
consists of two chapters.
In the first chapter, “Capital Flows in the Financial System and Supply of Credit,” I study
how capital flows in the financial system affect the coordination problem among banks in
supplying credit to the real economy. When credit contraction raises concerns about an
economic recession, the economy can end up in a self-fulfilling credit freeze that banks
abstain from lending for fear that others would withhold lending. I show that capital flows
across banks can alleviate the self-fulfilling credit freeze problem because banks that are
prone to supply credit can borrow from other banks to extend more credit to the real
economy. However, when the interest rates for interbank capital flows are low, they signal
dim economic prospects and deter credit supply by banks. As a result, the economy can
get stuck in an equilibrium with low interest rates. In such equilibrium, freezing interbank
capital flows and real credit crunch co-exist and reinforce each other through a vicious
feedback loop. This is consistent with the observations in the shallow post-crisis recoverylow
real interest rates, contraction in wholesale funding markets, low credit growth, and sluggish
economic growth. My model suggests that regulations addressing counter-party risks can
be a remedy to prevent capital flows in the financial system from freezing, which breaks the
vicious feedback loop and stabilizes the real credit market. This paper develops a model
to study how capital flows in the financial system affect the coordination problem among
banks in supplying credit to the real economy.
iv
In the second chapter, “Intervention with Screening in Global Games,” joint with Junyuan
Zou, we propose a novel intervention program to reduce coordination failure. Compared
with conventional government-guarantee type programs, such as demand deposit insurance,
ours incur a lower cost of implementation and suffers less from moral hazard problems. The
proposed program effectively screens agents based on their heterogeneous beliefs of the
coordination results. In equilibrium, only a small mass of “pivotal agents” self-select to
participate in the program. However, the effect is amplified by strategic complementarities,
and coordination failure can be significantly reduced. We demonstrate the generality of
the proposed program with applications in panic-based bank runs, debt rollover problems,
self-fulfilling market freezes, and underinvestment problems in the real economy.
v
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CHAPTER 1 : Capital Flows in the Financial System and the Supply of Credit
Lin Shen1
1.1. Introduction
In the aftermath of the 2007–2008 financial crisis, financial institutions worldwide, especially
those in Europe, have displayed considerable reluctance to supply credit to the real economy,
which is perceived as a key contributing factor to the sluggish economic recovery.2 Indeed,
such credit contraction can slow firms’ investment, households’ consumption, and economic
activities, resulting in a sluggish economy that, in turn, reduces the profits from lending
and deters financial institutions (referred to as banks hereafter) from extending credit to the
real economy. Therefore, banks may abstain from lending in fear that other banks would
withhold lending, and the ensuing aggregate credit contraction impedes economic growth.
This gives rise to a so-called self-fulfilling credit freeze, during which banks withdraw real
credit supply en masse (Bebchuk and Goldstein, 2011).
The reasoning behind the self-fulfilling credit freeze highlights the strategic interactions
among banks in supplying credit to the real economy. However, it overlooks the intercon-
nectedness of banks in the financial system. In the modern market-based financial system,
capital actively flows across banks in various wholesale funding markets, such as interbank
loan markets and securitized asset markets.3 The capital flows in the financial system may
1I am deeply indebted to my advisors Itay Goldstein, Doron Levit, Christian Opp, and Guillermo Ordoñez
for their guidance and support. I am also thankful to Franklin Allen, Philip Bond, Vincent Glode, Deeksha
Gupta, Daniel Kim, John Kuong, Tim Landvoigt, Nikolai Roussanov, Michael Schwert, Chaojun Wang,
Liyan Yang, Yao Zeng, and seminar participants at Boston University, the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York, INSEAD, Johns Hopkins University, McGill University, Rice University, the University of Maryland,
University of Southern California, University of Toronto, University of Washington, the University of Utah,
the Wharton School, the Young Economist Symposium 2018, and the INSEAD-Wharton Doctoral Consor-
tium 2018 for their helpful comments.
2In a 2016 policy address (Praet, 2016), Peter Praet, a member of the Executive Board of the European
Central Bank (ECB), claimed that the “episode inevitably set back the recovery: banks in large parts of
the eurozone became less willing and capable of keeping credit flowing to the real economy.” In a 2014
speech (Cœuré, 2014), his colleague, Benôıt Cœuré, also emphasized the “vicious circle of low growth, low
investment and low credit.”
3Capital flows in this paper broadly refer to wholesale funding markets that facilitate resource reallocation
within the financial system, including long-term interbank loans (Craig and Ma, 2017), term Fed Funds (Kuo
et al., 2014), asset-backed securities (ABS) (Loutskina and Strahan, 2009; Stein, 2010; Loutskina, 2011), and
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affect the real credit supply process via two opposing channels. On the one hand, they can
potentially alleviate the credit freeze problem, because banks willing to extend credit can
borrow from others and thus supply more credit to the real economy. On the other hand,
the process itself also reveals information. In particular, interest rates for interbank capital
flows can aggregate information possessed by individual banks and reflect the aggregate
economic prospects. Low interest rates may discourage banks from supplying credit, be-
cause low interest rates “signal that the economy’s long-run growth prospects are dim,” as
Stanley Fischer, the former vice chairman of the Federal Reserve, stated in a 2016 speech
(Fischer, 2016).
In view of the two opposing forces, in aggregate, do capital flows in the financial system
dampen or improve the supply of credit to the real economy? To answer this question, I
build a model featuring resource reallocation and information revelation and analyze their
interactions in channeling capital from “Wall Street” to “Main Street.” A key result of the
model is that the possibility of interbank capital flows can destabilize the financial system
and hamper the aggregate real credit supply. Specifically, when interest rates are low,
negative information about economic prospects raises banks concerns about counterparty
risks and deters banks from lending to one another. In essence, negative information blocks
flow of capital and undermines resource reallocation in the financial system. As a result,
the economy can get stuck in an equilibrium characterized by low interest rates. In such
equilibrium, freezing interbank capital flows and real credit crunches coexist and reinforce
each other in a vicious feedback loop.
This result has major policy implications. Specifically, in the wake of the latest financial
crisis, policy makers have implemented stress tests and tighter regulations in general, to
address counterparty risks and secure the soundness of the financial system in adverse
economic conditions.4 However, opponents argue that regulatory overreach may restrict
so forth. The notion is broader than overnight interbank lending, which serves the role of liquidity insurance
(Bhattacharya et al., 1985; Allen and Gale, 2000; Freixas et al., 2000).
4For example, in the United States, the Federal Reserve conducts annual Dodd-Frank Act stress testing
(DFAST), and, in Europe, the European Central Bank (ECB) conducts European-wide stress tests.
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banks from extending credit and eventually hinder economic growth. The paper contributes
to the policy debate by highlighting a new channel through which financial regulations
addressing counterparty risks help stabilize the credit market. That is, such regulations can
reduce coordination failure in the credit supply process, i.e., self-fulfilling credit freezes. In
particular, in times of low interest rates, such regulations maintain active capital flows in
the financial system, which also relieves banks concerns about aggregate credit contraction
and incentivizes them to supply credit to the real economy.
Following Bebchuk and Goldstein (2011), I begin with a benchmark model without inter-
bank capital flows using the global-games methodology, a canonical framework for analyzing
coordination problems. In the benchmark model, banks receive heterogeneous private sig-
nals about macroeconomic fundamentals and independently decide how much credit to
supply to the real economy. When economic fundamentals are weak, a massive credit con-
traction occurs, because banks abstain from lending for fear that insufficient credit supply
by other banks impedes economic growth. Although heterogeneous private information
naturally motivates trading among agents (banks, in this paper), most existing papers on
coordination problems abstract from the possibility of trading and assume that agents make
isolated decisions.
A distinct feature in my model is that I introduce a market for banks to borrow or lend
capital (referred to as the interbank capital market, hereafter). In particular, the interbank
capital market plays two roles in the real credit supply process. First, optimistic banks with
positive private signals about the macroeconomic fundamentals can borrow from pessimistic
banks with negative private signals and extend more credit to the real economy.5 Hence, the
interbank capital market performs an allocative role in the financial system by channeling
the capital of the pessimistic banks to the optimistic banks and eventually to the real
economy. Second, the market-clearing rate (referred to as the interest rate, hereafter)
5The structure of the interbank capital market is similar to that in Geanakoplos (2010). Following the
same structure, Che and Sethi (2014) analyze CDS market for corporate bonds. This paper endogenizes the
belief heterogeneity in Geanakoplos (2010) based on the banks’ trading behaviors in the interbank capital
market.
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reveals the average borrowing demand in the interbank capital market. Observing the
interest rate, banks can infer other banks’ private information, their willingness to supply
credit, and overall economic prospects. In this sense, the interbank capital market also
plays an informative role in shaping banks’ beliefs about economic prospects and affecting
banks’ willingness to supply credit.
I then analyze the aggregate effect of the allocative role and the informative role of the
interbank capital market in two cases: one with loose regulations and severe concerns of
counterparty risks and the other with tight regulations easing the concerns of counterparty
risks.
In the former case, the interbank capital market is underregulated such that borrowing
banks may take on excessive leverage and default in economic recessions. In this case,
capital flows in the financial system dampen the real credit supply, because the economy
can stay trapped in a vicious feedback loop between an interbank capital market freeze
and a real credit freeze. The intuition of the feedback loop is as follows. When few banks
demand borrowing from others, the interbank capital market freezes with a low market-
clearing interest rate. Because banks borrow from others in order to extend more credit
to the real economy, in the financial system, a low interest rate reflects a low average
willingness to supply credit. A low willingness to supply credit, on the one hand, indicates
aggregate credit contraction, which impedes economic growth; on the other hand, it reveals
that banks receive negative private signals about economic fundamentals. Hence, observing
the low interest rate, banks become pessimistic about economic prospects, and many banks
withhold real credit supply. To make matters worse, because of concerns of counterparty
risks, these banks also refuse to lend to the remaining optimistic banks, thereby inhibiting
the allocative role of the interbank capital market. With many banks being pessimistic and
holding onto their capital, the real credit supply also freezes. Finally, the real credit freeze
leads to an economic recession, in which banks earn low profits on their credit supply. Low
profitability, in turn, justifies the low borrowing demand in the interbank capital market
4
and the low interest rate.
In the latter case, when tight financial regulations, such as stress tests, prevent excessive
leverage-taking by banks and ease concerns about counterparty risks in the interbank capital
market, the vicious feedback loop can be prevented. This occurs via the following process.
In the absence of counterparty risks, pessimistic banks always have the incentive to lend
to other banks even when the interest rate is low and economic prospects are dim. In
other words, such regulations maintain an active allocative role for the interbank capital
market in channeling capital to the real economy. Moreover, compared with the former
case, banks become less pessimistic when they observe a low interest rate, because they
know that the interbank capital market keeps channeling capital to the optimistic banks
and eventually to the real economy. In other words, the negative informative role of the
interbank capital market is also limited. In aggregate, more banks demand borrowing from
others, rejuvenating the interbank capital market. At the same time, these banks actively
supply credit, defrosting the aggregate real credit crunch.
Overall, this paper not only makes a theoretical contribution but also derives empirical
and policy implications. Theoretically, it contributes to the global-games framework by
analyzing how agents’ trading behaviors affect the coordination outcomes through the in-
teraction of resource reallocation and information revelation. In addition to the theoretical
contribution, my model provides empirical implications consistent with the observations in
the shallow post-crisis recovery: low interest rates, contraction in the volume of interbank
capital flows, low credit growth, and sluggish economic growth. Moreover, it provides a gen-
eral framework for studying how regulations in financial markets can mitigate coordination
problems among market participants.
Besides the regulations that address the counterparty risks in the interbank capital mar-
ket, I provide two other applications of the model. First, I demonstrate that short-selling
constraints can help stabilize asset markets vulnerable to fire sales. Second, I illustrate
that the ban on naked credit default swaps (CDS) on sovereign debt improves the sovereign
5
stability when self-fulfilling debt runs are possible.6 These two applications convey a com-
mon message: even when economic fundamentals are relatively strong, regulations should
prevent aggressive bets against the market (short selling and speculation with naked CDS)
and maintain market participants’ confidence, especially in adverse scenarios, because crises
can be self-fulfilling for two reasons. First, aggressive bets against the market directly im-
pose downward pressures on the financial markets. Second, the price of trading among
market participants reveals the severity of the negative bets and overall pessimism, further
encouraging market participants to short the market.
Literature Review This paper relates to several strands of literature. First, it speaks to
the literature on financial fragility associated with interbank capital markets and highlights
a new source of fragility posed by the interbank capital market in the context of self-
fulfilling credit freezes. Previous literature has shown that the interbank capital market
can intensify the fragility of the financial system through network effects (Allen and Gale,
2000),7 the moral hazard problems of bank managers (Brusco and Castiglionesi, 2007),
liquidity hoarding (Acharya and Skeie, 2011; Heider et al., 2015), and resource misallocation
(Boissay, 2011; Boissay et al., 2016; Boissay and Cooper, 2016). Through a different lens,
this paper incorporates the coordination problem in banks’ credit supply decisions and
illustrates how interbank capital markets can destabilize the real credit market through a
vicious feedback loop. The paper most closely related to mine is Liu (2016), who examines
the feedback between interbank capital markets with low liquidity and panic-based bank
runs on financial institutions. However, my paper considers the coordination issue among
financial institutions rather than depositors. More importantly, Liu (2016) assumes away
counterparty risks in the interbank capital markets, whereas my paper emphasizes that
addressing counterparty risks can be a remedy to the interbank capital market freeze.
Second, this paper builds on the literature that studies the positive externalities of bank
6Since December 1, 2011, the European Parliament has banned naked CDS on debt for sovereign nations
to fight the eurozone crises. See European Commission (2011) for details.
7See Hüser (2015) for a survey of the interbank network literature. Castiglionesi and Eboli (2018) provide
a rationale for sparse and centralized interbank networks.
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lending on the aggregate credit supply to the real economy. I incorporate the interconnected
feature of the financial system and analyze the effect of interbank capital flows on banks’
real lending decisions. Extant papers indicate that the positive externalities of bank lending
can stem from two channels. First, bank lending stimulates real economic activities and
increases the profits of lending for the whole banking sector. Firms’ investment, households’
consumption, and economic activities in general are interdependent; therefore, economic
underdevelopment can result from a coordination failure among economic agents (Diamond,
1982; Bulow et al., 1985; Kiyotaki, 1988; Cooper and John, 1988; Schaal and Taschereau-
Dumouchel, 2015). Because economic activities depend on access to credit, Bebchuk and
Goldstein (2011) argue that banks have more incentive to lend if they believe others extend
credit to support the growth of the economy.8 Second, bank lending generates information
externalities (Nakamura et al., 1993; Pagano and Jappelli, 1993). Specifically, bank lending
helps develop borrowers’ credit history, reduces information asymmetry between banks and
borrowers, and, therefore, eases borrowers’ access to credit.9 My paper shows that interbank
capital flows can also freeze and aggravate banks’ coordination problems caused by the
externalities in bank lending.
Finally, this paper follows the literature on global games pioneered by Carlsson and Van Damme
(1993) in terms of modeling techniques and analyzes how allowing agents to trade may af-
fect the coordination results.10 The research closest to mine in this respect was conducted
by Angeletos and Werning (2006) and Hellwig et al. (2006), among others.11 These papers
demonstrate that financial markets can restore equilibrium multiplicity in global games, be-
cause they reveal public information and synchronize agents’ beliefs. The interbank capital
market in my paper also plays a similar informative role. However, in addition to that,
8See Hertzberg et al. (2011) and Giannetti and Saidi (2017) for empirical evidence.
9See Brown et al. (2009) and Doblas-Madrid and Minetti (2013) for empirical evidence.
10See Morris and Shin (2003) for a review of global games. Applications of global games include, but are
not limited to, bank runs (Rochet and Vives, 2004; Goldstein and Pauzner, 2005), currency attacks (Morris
and Shin, 1998), credit freezes (Bebchuk and Goldstein, 2011), debt rollovers (Morris and Shin, 2004; He
and Xiong, 2012), and political revolutions (Edmond, 2013).
11Angeletos et al. (2006) show that if a government has information about economy fundamentals, gov-
ernment intervention itself serves as a public signal for weak fundamentals and dampens the effectiveness of
the intervention.
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my paper highlights an allocative role of the interbank capital market and analyzes the
interactions of the two roles in affecting the coordination outcome. More importantly, my
paper suggests that when tight regulations secure an active allocative role of the interbank
capital market, they can also boost banks’ confidence and mitigate the negative informative
role.
Outline of the paper The rest of the paper is arranged as follows. Section 2 describes
the benchmark model of the credit market and demonstrates the possibility of a self-fulfilling
credit market freeze. Section 3 introduces an interbank capital market to the baseline model.
Section 4 discusses the case in which the interbank capital market is underregulated and
risky. Section 5 illustrates how regulations removing counterparty risks can stabilize the
credit market. Section 6 discuses two other applications of the model. Finally, section 7
concludes.
1.2. Self-Fulfilling Credit Market Freeze
In this section, following Bebchuk and Goldstein (2011), I introduce a benchmark model of a
credit market and illustrate how the strategic complementarities in banks’ lending decisions
can lead to a self-fulfilling credit market freeze.
It has been widely recognized in the macro literature that an underdeveloped economy
can result from a coordination failure of interdependent economic agents (Diamond, 1982;
Kiyotaki, 1988; Cooper and John, 1988; Schaal and Taschereau-Dumouchel, 2015). This
interdependence can stem from various channels. A firm’s success directly depends on the
success of other firms in the same supply chain. For firms without direct business relation-
ships, a firm’s success can generate more income for its employees and raise the demand
for other firms’ products.12 Access to credit is crucial for firms’ investment and success, so
the positive spillover effect among the operating firms leads to strategic complementarities
12Chodorow-Reich (2013) find that credit contraction accounts for between one-third and one-half of the
employment decline at small and medium-sized firms in the year following the Lehman bankruptcy.Huber
(2018) provides evidence that the lending cut by a large German bank affected firms, through lower aggregate
demand and agglomeration spillovers in counties exposed to the lending cut.
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in banks’ lending decisions. Specifically, one bank is more willing to lend if it expects that
other banks are supplying credit to support the success of other firms. In general, economic
activities are interdependent, and the prosperity of an economy relies on access to credit for
all economic participants. Therefore, bank lending in this paper is not limited to firm loans
but also includes consumer credit, mortgage, etc.13 In the benchmark model, self-fulfilling
credit freezes can result from banks abstaining from lending for fear that other banks are
withdrawing lending.
1.2.1. The Model
A mass one of ex-ante identical banks are indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. The banks are risk neutral,
and each has 1 unit of capital. They simultaneously make lending decisions ai ≥ 0 to maxi-
mize their expected profits. In the benchmark model without interbank capital markets, the
budget constraint of bank i is simply ai ≤ 1; that is, the maximum credit that bank i can
supply is its endowed capital. For each unit of capital received, an operating firm makes an
investment that generates a return of Rh if successful and Rl if not, where Rh > 1 > Rl. To
focus on the supply of credit in the economy, I assume the mass of operating firms is greater
than 1, and, therefore, banks can extract all the surplus from extending credit.14 Hence,
banks’ profits from lending represent the productivity of the economy. Besides risky lending
to the real sector, banks have access to a safe storage technology that is unproductive and
generates a return normalized to 1. The safe storage technology can be interpreted as the
excess reserves held by banks.
To incorporate the strategic complementarities of banks’ lending decisions, I assume the
operating firms’ investments are successful when a sufficient amount of firms receive credit
and invest. As a result, banks’ lending is profitable when a sufficient amount of credit is
supplied to the real economy. Specifically, the payoff of a bank that lends out ai units of
13Gilchrist et al. (2018) show that a reduction in the supply of home mortgage loans has detrimental real
effects on economic activities.
14As long as banks’ profits from real credit supply are positively correlated with the productivity of the
operating firms, all results in this paper remain qualitatively robust.
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capital and puts 1− ai into storage is as follows:
ui(ai) =
 Rhai + 1− ai if A ≥ 1− θ (Expansion),Rlai + 1− ai if A < 1− θ (Resession),
where A =
∫ 1
0 aidi is the aggregate amount of lending in the economy, and θ stands for the
fundamentals of the economy. To facilitate discussion, I say the economy is in an expansion
if A ≥ 1−θ and in a recession if A < 1−θ. In an economic expansion, the productivity of the
real economy is high, and banks’ credit supply is profitable. The strategic complementarities
in banks’ lending decisions come from the fact that when other banks supply more credit
resulting in a high A, the economy is more likely to be in an expansion, which incentivizes
each bank to lend. When the fundamentals θ are high, a few firms receiving credit is
sufficient for the economy to be in an expansion.
Without information friction, when θ ∈ [0, 1), all banks lending to full capacity (ai = 1)
and all banks holding on to their capital (ai = 0) are both equilibria. However, all banks
lending to full capacity is strictly more efficient than the other equilibrium. Therefore, as
shown in the upper panel of Figure 1, the first-best outcome is that all banks coordinate to
lend when θ ≥ 0 and abstain from lending when θ < 0.
The global-games framework is useful for connecting the coordination outcome to the un-
derlying fundamentals of the economy. More importantly, the framework realistically char-
acterizes the information and belief structure that no agent (bank in my model) has perfect
information about the fundamentals of the economy. Instead, each agent observes a noisy
private signal about the fundamentals of the economy. Therefore, the global-games frame-
work highlights the strategic interactions of agents with heterogeneous private information.
The information structure of the model follows the standard global-games setup. The
economic fundamentals θ ∈ R are drawn from an improper prior and are not directly
observable to the banks when they make lending decisions. Instead, each bank receives a
10
noisy signal about the fundamentals si = θ + σsεi, where εi
i.i.d.∼N (0, 1). Note that two
dominance regions always exist: (−∞, s) and (s̄,∞), defined as
Pr (θ ≥ 1|si = s̄) = Pr (θ ≥ 0|si = s) =
1−Rl
Rh −Rl
.
With the most pessimistic belief that A = 0, a bank is indifferent between lending or not
when it receives signal s̄. Therefore, a bank’s dominant strategy when si > s̄ is ai = 1.
Similarly, with the most optimistic belief that A = 1, a bank is indifferent between lending
or not when it observes signal s. Hence, when si < s, ai = 0 is the dominant strategy.
1.2.2. Equilibrium Analysis
Proposition 1 characterizes the equilibrium. Following the standard results in global games,
there exists a unique equilibrium in which all agents follow a threshold strategy. Banks are
risk neutral, so they either supply zero credit or the maximum credit bounded by their
endowed capital.
Proposition 1 There is a unique Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in which all banks follow the
same strategy that
ai(si) =
 1, if si ≥ s
∗
0,
0, if si < s
∗
0,
where s∗0 =
1−Rl
Rh−Rl + σsΦ
−1
(
1−Rl
Rh−Rl
)
.
With the continuum of banks, based on the realization of fundamentals θ, we can determine
the distribution of banks’ private signals and apply the law of large numbers to calculate
the aggregate lending A and predict the coordination outcomes. As θ increases, more banks
receive high signals that lie above the threshold and result in a higher aggregate lending A.
Therefore, there also exists a fundamental threshold above which abundant credit supply
supports an economic expansion and below which a shortage of credit leads to an economic
11
recession. In particular, the fundamental threshold is given by
θ∗0 =
1−Rl
Rh −Rl
.
Figure 1 compares the coordination outcome in the ideal first-best case and in the equi-
librium of the benchmark model. In the middle region where θ ∈ [0, θ∗0), if all banks were
0 θ
Recession ExpansionFirst Best
0 θ∗0 θ
Recession ExpansionBenchmark
Figure 1: Coordination Outcome (Benchmark)
to lend to the maximum capacity, there would be sufficient credit supplied to support the
growth of the real economy as shown in the first-best case. However, a lot of banks receive
low private signals and form self-fulfilling beliefs that the economy is likely to be in a reces-
sion with insufficient credit supply. As a result, they rationally choose not to extend credit,
which indeed leads to an economic recession caused by the shortage of credit supply.
1.3. Interbank Capital Market
The heterogeneous private signals of banks naturally generate heterogeneity in beliefs and
the incentive to trade among banks. In this section, I introduce the structure of the inter-
bank capital market that allows banks to trade based on their heterogeneous beliefs. As
mentioned in the introduction, the interbank capital market not only plays an allocative role
in channeling capital within the financial system but also an informative role in revealing
public information and shaping banks’ beliefs through the market-clearing interest rate.
1.3.1. Capital Flows in the Financial System
In the interbank capital market, banks can borrow from or lend to one another. Let xi > 0
denote the amount of capital that bank i borrows. If xi < 0, it means that bank i lends
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out |xi| units of capital. For the rest of the paper I will refer to bank i’s lending decision to
operating firms ai as the real lending decision, and xi as the interbank borrowing decision.
For each unit of capital borrowed in the interbank capital market, borrowers promise to
repay r after the realization of the coordination outcomes, that is, whether the economy is
in an expansion or in a recession. Conditional on the nominal interest rate r, banks submit
their demand schedules. In equilibrium, the market-clearing condition of the interbank
capital market endogenously determines the interest rate r. Because banks’ profit from the
real credit supply represents the productivity of the real economy and their demand for
borrowing is driven by the incentive to extend more credit to the real economy, the interest
rate r indicates banks’ average expectations about the productivity of the real economy.
Therefore, the market-clearing interest rate r is effectively the “equilibrium” real interest
rate, which reflects the marginal productivity of the real economy.15
When the economy is in a recession, banks suffer losses from supplying credit to the real
economy and may default on their interbank liabilities. In this model, banks are protected
by limited liabilities, and there is no deadweight loss associated with bankruptcy.16 If a
bank does not have enough capital to repay its interbank liabilities, it defaults and depletes
all available capital to its lender(s). As a result, lending banks in the interbank capital
market may suffer from counterparty credit risks.
To address the counterparty risks, banks are subject to the following regulatory constraint:
Rlai + 1 + xi − ai ≥ crxi.
Specifically, the regulatory constraint can be interpreted as the stress test on banks to make
sure that they can withstand recessions. The left-hand side of the inequality represents bank
15See Barsky et al. (2014), Laubach and Williams (2016), and Holston et al. (2017) for estimates of the
“equilibrium” real interest rate.
16I make this assumption to isolate the benefit of strict regulations in reducing coordination failure in
the financial system. Otherwise, strict regulations would generate an additional benefit in preventing the
deadweight loss of bankruptcy.
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i’s total capital in a recession. In a recession, banks earn a return of Rl for their risky lending
to the real economy and a return of 1 for their investment in the safe storage. The right-
hand side represents the capital required to pass the stress test, which is proportional to its
interbank liability rxi by a factor of c. In other words, the regulatory constraint ensures
that in recessions, borrowing banks maintain enough capital to cover at least c fraction of
their liabilities.17 Hence, parameter c represents the regulatory stringency. The regulatory
constraint effectively puts an upper limit on the leverage that each bank can take. As stated
in Lemma 1 below, borrowing banks always take on the maximum leverage.
Lemma 1 The regulatory constraint binds for all borrowing banks in the interbank capital
market, and lending banks expect to receive promised return r in expansions (A ≥ 1 − θ)
and cr in recessions (A < 1− θ).
Intuitively, if a bank borrows in the interbank capital market, the bank must believe that it
is profitable to extend credit at the interest rate. In this sense, the market-clearing interest
rate reflects the average belief of banks about the productivity of the real economy. What is
unique about this model is that in equilibrium the interest rate itself affects banks’ incentive
to engage in credit supply activities and the real productivity. Banks are risk neutral, and
their investment technologies have a constant return to scale, so borrowing banks always
borrow to the maximum. When c = 1, the interbank capital market lending is completely
risk-free, and no bank defaults, even in economic recessions.18 If c < 1, borrowing banks
take on excessive leverage and default in recessions. In this case, the interbank capital
market is underregulated and risky.
The regulatory constraint may appear restrictive, because it does not allow banks to trade at
different interest rates conditional on the leverage of the borrowing banks, which represents
the riskiness of interbank lending. Appendix A.1.1 addresses this concern by extending the
17In the main text, I restrict attention to c ∈ [c, 1]. Appendix A.1.4 analyzes the case in which c > 1, that
is, that case with excessive regulations.
18 Appendix A.1.4 analyzes the case with excessive regulations, c > 1. Compared with the case in which
c = 1, although each bank borrows less, in terms of aggregate credit supply, they are equivalent.
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model to allow banks to post collaterals to reduce the riskiness of interbank lending and
charge different interest rates conditional on the riskiness. I show that when interest rates
are low, banks bilaterally agree not to post collateral and solely rely on the regulations to
contain the counterparty risks.
To summarize the payoff structure, if bank i borrows xi units of capital in the interbank
capital market, makes ai units of loans to the operating firms, and stores the rest of its
capital 1 + xi − ai in the safe storage, its payoff is
ui(ai, xi) =
 Rhai − rxi + 1 + xi − ai if A ≥ 1− θ (Expansion),Rlai − crxi + 1 + xi − ai if A < 1− θ (Recession).
1.3.2. Information Structure
Like in the benchmark model without interbank capital market, the fundamentals θ follow
an improper prior, and each bank receives a private signal si = θ + σsεi, where εi
i.i.d.∼
N (0, 1). In addition, banks can make inferences based on the market-clearing interest rate
r. Specifically, bank i forms its belief about the probability of an expansion π(si, r) =
Pr(A ≥ 1 − θ|si, r) based on its private signal si and the market-clearing interest rate r.
Given the its belief π, bank i then optimally chooses real lending a(π, r) and interbank
borrowing x(π, r) to maximize its expected payoff as follows,
max
{ai,xi}
E(ui(ai, xi)|π) = πi(Rhai − rxi) + (1− π)(Rlai − crxi) + 1 + xi − ai
s.t. ai ≤ 1 + xi (Budget Constraint)
ai ≥ 0 (Short-Selling Constraint)
Rlai + 1 + xi − ai ≥ crxi (Regulatory Constraint).
Without any frictions, the Law of Large Numbers implies that the interbank capital market
rate r perfectly aggregates banks’ private information and fully reveals the current funda-
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mentals θ. In particular, I denote the aggregate demand in the interbank capital market by
D(θ, r). The functional form of D(θ, r) will be characterized later in the equilibrium anal-
ysis, and a unique solution θ = z(r) to D(z(r), r) = 0 will be solved. Therefore, observing
the interest rate r, banks can back out the fundamentals θ = z(r) from the market-clearing
condition. To preserve the belief heterogeneity and provide banks with an incentive to
trade, I introduce noise to banks’ interpretation of the public information contained in r in
the following form:
θ = z(r) + σpεpi,
where εpi ∼ N (0, 1) is the interpretation noise of bank i and is independent of εi’s. That
is, absent other information, observing an interest rate r, banks believe fundamentals θ ∼
N (z(r), σ2p). Banks are aware of this interpretation noise and therefore don’t solely rely
on the public information when forming beliefs. Hence, they put nonzero weight on their
private information and form heterogeneous beliefs in equilibrium. In fact, Appendix A.1.2
demonstrates that the interpretation noise can be micro-founded by the noisy demand
of capital in the financial system. Although they are equivalent in terms of equilibrium
implications, the noisy demand of capital is mathematically more complicated. Therefore, I
proceed with the interpretation noise in the main text. Moreover, for the rest of the paper,
I will focus on the limit when the interpretation noise vanishes, that is, σp → 0. This is
when banks extract precise information from the interest rate r, or the noisy demand of
capital in the financial system goes to zero.
1.3.3. Time line
The time line of the model with capital flows in the financial system is as follows. After
the realization of fundamentals θ, bank i receives its private signal si. Conditional on the
interest rate r and its private signal si, bank i forms its belief about the probability of an
economic expansion π(si, r). Based on its belief, bank i submits a demand schedule xi(π, r)
to indicate its demand of capital when the interest rate is r. Given the demand schedule of
all banks, interest rate r∗(θ) is determined to clear the interbank capital market. Following
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that, bank i makes real lending ai(π, r) to the real economy, and the aggregate credit supply
A is realized. Depending on the relationship between the aggregate credit supply A and
the threshold 1−θ, the coordination outcome is realized, that is, whether the economy is in
an expansion or in a recession. Finally, the return from real credit supply is realized, and
payoffs from trading across banks are settled.
1.4. Risky Interbank Capital Market
This section analyzes the case in which the financial system is underregulated (c < 1). As a
result, borrowing banks take on excessive leverage and default in economic recessions, and,
hence, the interbank capital market is risky. I solve the model in two steps. First, I analyze
banks’ optimal portfolio choice given their beliefs and discuss the allocative role of the
interbank capital market. Second, given banks’ portfolio choice, I write the market-clearing
condition of the interbank capital market and illustrate the informative role by analyzing
the information content of the interest rate r, which endogenously shapes banks’ beliefs.
1.4.1. The Allocative Role
In this subsection, given banks’ beliefs, I analyze their optimal real lending a(π, r) and their
optimal demand for borrowing from other banks x(π, r) and discuss the allocative role of
the interbank capital market in the credit supply process.
If the interest rate r ≤ r = Rh−Rlc(Rh−1)+1−Rl , no banks find it profitable to lend to other banks.
Specifically, compared with the safe storage, the pessimistic banks find the interest rate r
too low to justify for the counterparty risks. If r ≥ Rh, it’s too costly for banks to borrow,
resulting in zero demand in the interbank capital market. In both cases, the interbank
capital market cannot clear. Therefore, I restrict attention to r ∈ (r,Rh).
Figure 2 summarizes the optimal portfolio choices. The figure shows that the portfolio
choice analysis can be further decomposed into two cases.
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1
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(
r, 1c
)
Figure 2: Portfolio Choice (Risky Interbank Capital Market)
If the interest rate is high, when r ∈
[
1
c , Rh
)
(subfigure a),19 banks’ optimal portfolio choices
given their beliefs are
a(π, r) =
cr
cr −Rl
and x(π, r) =
Rl
cr −Rl
, if π > π∗2(r), (1.1)
a(π, r) ∈
[
0,
cr
cr −Rl
]
and x(π, r) = a(π, r)− 1, if π = π∗2(r), (1.2)
a(π, r) = 0 and x(π, r) = −1, if π < π∗2(r), (1.3)
where the belief cutoff π∗2(r) =
cr−Rl
Rh−Rl−r(1−c) . In this case, even in economic recessions
when the borrowing banks default on their interbank obligations, the lending banks still
earn a return of cr ≥ 1 for the interbank lending. Hence, lending in the interbank capital
market always generates positive returns and strictly dominates the storage technology. I
say the interbank lending is guaranteed in this case. As a result, pessimistic banks with
π < π∗(r) optimally lend out all their endowed capital in the interbank capital market.
Meanwhile, optimistic banks with π > π∗(r) find it optimal to take on maximum leverage
and supply all available capital to the real economy, including their endowed capital and the
capital borrowed in the interbank capital market. Therefore, the interbank capital market
is playing an active allocative role in the sense that it channels the capital of the pessimistic
banks to the optimistic banks, who then supply all capital in the financial system to the real
19Note that I restrict the regulatory stringency, c ∈
(
1
Rh
, 1
)
, to analyze the general case with a guaranteed
region and a nonguaranteed region. In fact, if c ∈
(
r
Rh
, 1
Rh
)
, the guaranteed region disappears; however,
the equilibrium implications in Proposition 2 still hold. If c < r
Rh
, the counterparty risks are so prominent
that the interbank capital market melts completely.
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economy. In fact, the interbank capital market improves not only the capital allocation but
also the risk allocation within the financial system. Specifically, optimistic banks that are
more willing to bear the risks from real credit supply take on leverage and retain more risks
compared with pessimistic banks. In other words, the interbank capital market effectively
transfers risks from pessimistic banks to optimistic banks. The key mechanism for the risk
transfer is the fact that the risky real credit supply guarantees a safe return of Rl regardless
of the state of the economy. This enables optimistic banks to pledge the safe return from
their endowed capital to borrow from pessimistic banks.
If the interest rate is low, when r ∈
(
r, 1c
)
(subfigure b), banks’ optimal portfolio choices
given their beliefs are
a(π, r) =
cr
cr −Rl
and x(π, r) =
Rl
cr −Rl
, if π > π∗2(r), (1.4)
a(π, r) ∈
[
0,
cr
cr −Rl
]
and x(π, r) = a(π, r)− 1, if π = π∗2(r), (1.5)
a(π, r) = 0 and x(π, r) = −1, if π ∈ (π∗1(r), π∗2(r)), (1.6)
a(π, r) = 0 and x(π, r) ∈ [−1, 0], if π = π∗1(r), (1.7)
a(π, r) = 0 and x(π, r) = 0, if π < π∗1(r), (1.8)
where π∗1(r) =
r−1−c
1−c and π
∗
2(r) =
cr−Rl
Rh−Rl−r(1−c) . In contrast with the previous case with a
high interest rate, in recessions when the borrowing banks default, the lending banks can
only recover cr < 1. In this case, interbank lending is not guaranteed, and the counterparty
risks significantly undermine the allocative role of the interbank capital market in the credit
supply process. Concerns about counterparty risks are subjective to banks’ beliefs of the
probability of an economic recession. To the most pessimistic banks that believe in a
high probability of an economic recession, the low interest rate does not compensate for
counterparty risks. As a result, they optimally choose to use the safe storage technology
and not to participate in the interbank capital market. In aggregate, only the capital
endowed to the banks with medium beliefs is channeled through interbank capital market
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to the real economy. Moreover, as the interest rate r decreases, the lending banks expect to
recover less in an economic recession, and concerns about counterparty risks becomes more
salient. When the interest rate r reaches it lower bound r, the two belief cutoffs converge,
that is, π∗1(r) = π
∗
2(r), and no banks are willing to lend in the interbank capital market.
1.4.2. The Informative Role
In this subsection, I analyze the information conveyed by the market-clearing interest rate r
and discuss the informative role of the interbank capital market in the credit supply process.
Given the optimal portfolio choices by banks, we can write the market-clearing condition
as follows:
D(θ, r) =
∫ +∞
−∞
x(π(θ + σsεs, r))φ(εs)dεs = 0.
In more detail, throughout the paper, I restrict attention to monotone equilibrium in which
banks’ belief function π(si, r) strictly increases in the private signal si. The formal equilib-
rium definition will be introduced in Section 1.4.3. Therefore, substituting in the optimal
portfolio choice by banks, the market-clearing condition can be expressed as
D(θ, r) =
Rl
rc−Rl
(
1− Φ
(
s∗2(r)− θ
σs
))
−
(
Φ
(
s∗2(r)− θ
σs
)
− Φ
(
s∗1(r)− θ
σs
))
= 0,
where s∗1(r) and s
∗
2(r) are the signal cutoffs such that banks form the cutoff beliefs, that is,
π(s∗1(r), r) = π
∗
1(r) and π(s
∗
2(r), r) = π
∗
2(r), and Φ is the cumulative distribution function of
a standard normal variable. When r ∈ [1c , Rh), all pessimistic banks lend in the interbank
capital market, and π∗1(r) = 0, which implies s
∗
1(r) = −∞.
The aggregate demand D(θ, r) strictly increases in θ. Therefore, banks can extract the
perfect information about the realization of the fundamentals θ = z(r), which is the unique
solution to D(z(r), r) = 0. As mentioned before, to preserve the belief heterogeneity, I
assume that banks make noisy inferences and receive the following noisy signal:
θ = z(r) + σpεpi.
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Appendix A.1.2 shows that the interpretation noise can be micro-founded by the noisy
demand of capital in the interbank capital market.
To understand the intuition behind the informative role of the interbank capital market,
one can go through a bank’s inference process when the bank observes a drop in the market-
clearing interest rate r. First, the regulatory constraint relaxes, and each bank can borrow
more in the interbank capital market, that is, Rlrc−Rl increases. Meanwhile, each lending bank
still lends 1 unit of capital. Therefore, for the market to clear, the mass of banks demand
borrowing relative to lending must decrease. In addition, as r drops, it becomes cheaper to
borrow and less profitable to lend in the interbank capital market, reflected by a decrease
in π∗2(r). However, even when borrowing becomes more attractive relative to lending, fewer
banks demand borrowing relative to lending in the interbank capital market. Hence, banks
must be holding, on average, more pessimistic beliefs about economic prospects.
To summarize, when the interest rate r is low, even with the cheap financing opportunities,
very few banks demand borrowing, which indicates that banks, on average, are less willing
to extend credit to the real economy. Because of the strategic complementarities, all banks
observing a low interest rate r become more pessimistic, and it can be verified in equilibrium
that the belief function π(si, r) indeed decreases in r.
Below, I sketch the steps necessary to characterize the belief function π(si, r). After bank i
observes its private signal si and the interest rate r, it updates its belief about the posterior
distribution of fundamentals θ according to Bayes’ rule, which gives a posterior p.d.f. as
follows:
f(θ|si, r) ∝ φ
(
si − θ
σs
)
φ
(
z(r)− θ
σp
)
∀r ∈ (r,Rh).
Therefore, the posterior distribution of θ is a normal distribution with mean µ(si, r) =
δsi + (1− δ)z(r) and variance σ2 = δσ2s , where δ =
σ2p
σ2s+σ
2
p
is the relative informativeness of
the private signal.
Given the realization of fundamentals θ, banks know the distribution of private signals si’s.
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Hence, given the interest rate r, banks can infer the belief distributions and the aggregate
credit supply to the real sector as follows:
A(θ, r) =
∫ ∞
−∞
a(π(θ + σsεs, r))φ(ε)dε.
Because A(θ, r) increases in θ, there exists a unique fundamental threshold θ∗(r) above
which there is sufficient credit to support the economic growth, that is, A(θ∗(r), r) =
1 − θ∗(r). Finally, banks form their own beliefs by estimating the probability of economic
recessions, π(si, r) =
∫∞
θ∗(r) f(θ|si, r)dθ. The belief function π(si, r) and the fundamental
threshold θ∗(r) should be consistent and therefore are simultaneously determined in equi-
librium.
1.4.3. Interbank Capital Market Freeze and Fragility
In this section, I characterize the equilibrium and illustrate how the two roles of the inter-
bank capital market interact and their interaction increases the fragility of the real credit
market. Using the elements from previous analyses, here I introduce the formal definition
of monotone equilibrium in the model:
Definition 1 A monotone equilibrium is characterized by banks’ strategy {a(π, r), x(π, r)},
a belief function π(si, r), a fundamental threshold function θ
∗(r), an information revelation
function z(r), and a market-clearing interest rate function r∗(θ) such that
1. (Profit maximizing) {a(π, r), x(π, r)} solves the portfolio choice problem;
2. (Bayesian updating) π(si, r) satisfies Bayes’ rule such that
π(si, r) =
∫ ∞
θ∗(r)
f(θ|si, r)dθ ∀r ∈ (r,Rh);
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3. (Fundamental cutoff) the aggregate credit supply at θ∗(r) satisfies
A(θ∗(r), r) =
∫ +∞
−∞
a(π(θ∗(r) + σsεs, r), r)φ(εs)dε = 1− θ∗(r) ∀r ∈ (r,Rh);
4. (Information revelation) z(r) satisfies
D(z(r), r) =
∫ +∞
−∞
x(π(z(r) + σsεs, r), r)φ(εs)dεs = 0 ∀r ∈ (r,Rh);
5. (Market clearing) r∗(θ) is selected from the correspondence R̂(θ) ≡ {r : z(r) = θ}.
As discussed in the previous analyses, banks’ strategy is uniquely characterized in equa-
tions 1.1–1.8. Moreover, because the information revelation function z(r) is the unique
solution to the market-clearing condition, following the analyses in section 1.4.2, we can
also uniquely characterize the belief function π(si, r) and the fundamental threshold θ
∗(r).
Lemma 2 below summarizes the uniqueness of these elements in the equilibrium. However,
the interest rate function r∗(θ) is not unique, and the multiplicity of r∗(θ) also gives rise to
the equilibrium multiplicity.
Lemma 2 Banks’ strategy {a(π, r), x(π, r)}, the belief function π(si, r), the fundamental
threshold function θ∗(r), and the information revelation function z(r) are unique.
In the proof of Lemma 2, I provide the unique solution to π(si, r), θ
∗(r), and z(r). Given
the uniqueness of other elements in the equilibrium, each monotone equilibrium can be
uniquely characterized by the interest rate function r∗(θ).
As mentioned before, I focus on the limiting case in which the interpretation noise vanishes,
that is, σp → 0. In the limit, banks’ inference about the public information is precise
or, equivalently, the demand noise in the interbank capital market vanishes. Appendix
A.1.3 briefly discusses the equilibrium implications for when the noise in the public signal
is nonnegligible (σp > 0) and demonstrates that the model is smooth in σp such that the
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equilibrium implications hold in general. Proposition 2 summarizes the market-clearing
interest rate function and the coordination outcome given the realization of fundamentals
θ. To simplify the notation, I denote the interest rate in the limit as r̂(θ) = lim
σp→0
r∗(θ).
Proposition 2 In the limit of vanishing interpretation noise, that is, σp → 0,
1. for any θ ≥ 1, r̂(θ) = Rh, and the economy is in an expansion;
2. for any θ ∈ (0, 1), r̂(θ) ∈ {Rh, r}, the economy is in an expansion if r̂(θ) = Rh, and
the economy is in a recession if r̂(θ) = r;
3. for any θ ≤ 0, r̂(θ) = r, and the economy is in a recession.
Appendix A.1.7 provides the proof. Figure 3 visualizes the equilibrium coordination out-
come and compares it with the benchmark case. When the macroeconomic fundamentals
θ ≥ 1, there is no coordination concern, because the dominating strategy for banks is to
supply all the endowed capital to the real economy. In the limit when σp → 0, banks receive
precise public signals about the fundamentals of the economy. Hence, there exists a unique
equilibrium in which banks actively extend credit and the economy is in an expansion. Be-
cause banks hold optimistic beliefs about the economic outlook, high borrowing demand in
the interbank capital market drives up the interest rate. Similarly, when the fundamentals
θ ≤ 0, the dominating strategy for banks is to invest the endowed capital in the safe storage.
With precise information about the fundamentals, in the unique equilibrium, banks abstain
from lending, and the economy enters a recession. Meanwhile, that banks do not have an
incentive to borrow from other banks results in a low interest rate in equilibrium.
θ∗0 θ
Recession ExpansionBenchmark
0 1 θ
Recession ExpansionRisky ICM
Figure 3: Coordination Outcome (Risky Interbank Capital Market)
The most interesting case occurs when the macroeconomic fundamentals θ ∈ (0, 1). The
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comparison of the two panels in Figure 3 indicates that the risky interbank capital market
introduces fragility to the real credit supply and economic growth. Specifically, in the
shaded area, when θ ∈ (θ∗0, 1), the risky interbank capital market opens up the possibility of
an economic recession caused by a shortage of credit supply. The main mechanism behind
the fragility and the equilibrium multiplicity when θ ∈ (0, 1) is the feedback loop between
the interbank capital market and the real credit market.
In particular, if the demand of capital within the financial system is low, the interbank
capital market freezes, resulting in a low market-clearing interest rate. As explained in the
previous section on the informative role of the interbank capital market, a low interest rate
implies overall pessimism about the productivity in the real economy and low willingness to
extend credit. Therefore, the low interest rate depresses banks’ beliefs and discourages them
from extending credit to the real economy. In addition, concerns about counterparty risks
prevent the most pessimistic banks from lending in the interbank capital market, which
dampens the allocative role of the interbank capital market. When the interest rate is low,
very few banks find it sufficient to compensate for the counterparty risks associated with
lending to other banks. Hence, the interbank capital market only channels very limited
capital endowed to these lending banks to the real economy. Together, the two effects
explain how a freezing interbank capital market causes the real credit supply to also freeze.
Next, consider the other direction in the feedback loop. If the real credit market freezes,
which restrains the investment by firms, consumption by households and economic activities
in general, the economy results in a recession with low return on banks’ credit supply. The
low return on bank lending justifies banks’ incentive to invest their capital in the safe storage
and not participate in the interbank capital market. Therefore, a freeze in the real credit
market reinforces the interbank capital market freeze. As a result, the economy is trapped
in an equilibrium with almost all banks holding onto their capital. No capital flows within
the financial system, and no capital flows out to the real economy.
Similarly, when the interest rate is high, there exists a “good” feedback loop. Intuitively,
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a high borrowing demand of capital within the financial system generates a high interest
rate. In terms of the informative role of the interbank capital market, the high interest
rate implies overall optimism about aggregate credit supply and economic outlook, which
directly incentivizes banks to extend credit to the real economy. Moreover, the high interest
rate also encourages banks to lend to other banks in spite of the counterparty risks. Hence,
the interbank capital market plays an active allocative role in channeling funds to the real
economy. Together, the two effects invigorate the real credit market. At the same time,
the active real credit market promotes economic growth, which generates a high return
on banks’ real credit supply and justifies banks’ soaring demand in the interbank capital
market. Hence, in this equilibrium, the economy expands with capital actively flowing both
within the financial system and out to the real economy.
1.5. Risk-Free Interbank Capital Market
This section analyzes the case in which financial regulations are strict enough (c = 1) to
ensure that interbank lending is risk-free.20 By comparing it to the case with risky inter-
bank capital market, I first discuss how financial regulations separately affect the allocative
role and the informative role of the interbank capital market. Following this discussion, I
evaluate the aggregate effect of strengthening financial regulations and illustrate how they
can be a remedy to stabilize the real credit market.
1.5.1. The Allocative Role
Based on their heterogeneous beliefs about the probability of an economic expansion, banks
make their optimal portfolio choices. If the interest rate r < 1, lending in the interbank
capital market generates negative returns and is strictly dominated by the safe storage
technology. Therefore, banks are not willing to lend to others within the financial system.
If r ≥ Rh, it’s too costly for banks to lever up, and no banks demand borrowing from other
banks. In both cases, the interbank capital market cannot clear. Hence, I restrict attention
20Appendix A.1.4 analyzes the case with excessive regulations (c > 1) and demonstrates that the equilib-
rium implications are the same in the limit when the noise on the public signal vanishes (σp → 0).
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to the two nontrivial cases, r ∈ (1, Rh) and r = 1, summarized in Figure 4.
a = 1
r−Rl
, x = Rl
r−Rl
a = 0, x = 1
π∗(r) = r−Rl
Rh−Rl
π
(a) r ∈ (1, Rh)
a = 1
1−Rl
, x ≥ Rl
1−Rl
a = 0, x ≥ −1
π∗(1) = 1−Rl
Rh−Rl
π
(b) r = 1
Figure 4: Portfolio Choice (Risk-Free Interbank Capital Market)
If the interest rate is high, when r ∈ (1, Rh), the optimal portfolio choices are essentially
the same as those in the risky interbank capital market case in which interbank lending is
guaranteed. Pessimistic banks lend their endowed capital to other banks, because interbank
lending is safe and generates a higher return compared with the safe storage. Optimistic
banks absorb capital from pessimistic banks and supply all available capital to the real
economy. Therefore, in aggregate, the interbank capital market plays an active allocative
role in channeling the capital held by pessimistic banks to optimistic banks. Moreover, the
risk-free interbank capital market maximizes the risk transfer between the two groups of
banks. Optimistic banks effectively hold the risky portion of real lending and pass on the
risk-free portion, that is, the guaranteed return of firm loans, Rl, to pessimistic banks.
The sharp contrast to the risky interbank capital market case arises when the interest rate
is low. Without worrying about counterparty risks, even the most pessimistic banks are
willing to lend to other banks. Specifically, if r = 1, pessimistic banks are indifferent between
lending to other banks and investing in the safe storage. Similarly, because borrowing from
other banks is costless, optimistic banks can borrow to infinity, as long as they invest their
excessive borrowing in the safe storage to fulfill the regulatory constraint. In aggregate, the
interbank capital market still performs a positive allocative role in reallocating capital to
optimistic banks willing to provide credit to the real economy, although it is possible that not
all capital endowed to pessimistic banks is channeled to optimistic banks. This is because
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strict financial regulations maximize the risk transfer between the two groups of banks
regardless of the interest rate. In comparison, when the financial system is underregulated,
the risk transfer diminishes as the interest rate falls, as more banks find the interest rate
too low to compensate for the counterparty risks. In the extreme, when interest rate gets
close to its lower bound, r, the interbank capital market freezes completely.
1.5.2. The Informative Role
Given the optimal portfolio choice by banks, we can write the market-clearing condition
of the interbank capital market and discuss the information content of the market-clearing
interest rate r. The aggregate demand in the interbank capital market is given by
D(θ, r) =
Rl
r −Rl
(
1− Φ
(
s∗(r)− θ
σs
))
− Φ
(
s∗(r)− θ
σs
)
if r ∈ (1, Rh),
D(θ, r) ≥ Rl
r −Rl
(
1− Φ
(
s∗(r)− θ
σs
))
− Φ
(
s∗(r)− θ
σs
)
if r = 1,
where s∗(r) is the signal cutoff endogenously defined by π(s∗(r), r) = π∗(r). Note that
when the interest rate r ∈ (1, Rh), because D(θ, r) strictly increases in θ, there exists a
unique solution θ = z(r) such that D(z(r), r) = 0. However, when r = 1, a continuum of
fundamentals θ solves the market-clearing condition, D(θ, 1) = 0. With a small abuse of
notation, I denote z(1) = max{θ : D(θ, 1) = 0} or, equivalently,
Rl
r −Rl
(
1− Φ
(
s∗(r)− z(1)
σs
))
− Φ
(
s∗(r)− z(1)
σs
)
= 0.
For all θ < z(1), the market can clear at r = 1. As mentioned before, banks make noisy
interpretations of the public information contained in r as follows:
θ = z(r) + σpεp if r ∈ (1, Rh), (1.9)
θ ≤ z(1) + σpεp if r = 1, , (1.10)
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where
z(r) = s∗(r)− σsΦ−1
(
Rl
r
)
.
r = 1 conveys a vague signal that clusters the bad fundamentals θ with the good ones
because of the indeterminacy in banks portfolio choices. Specifically, when economic fun-
damentals θ decline, more banks receive low private signals, and fewer banks receive high
private signals. Hence, more banks are willing to lend to others in the financial system,
whereas fewer banks are willing to borrow. However, the interbank capital market can still
clear at r = 1, because each lending bank is willing to lend less, and each borrowing bank
is willing to borrow more in the interbank capital market.
According to Bayes’ rule, we can determine the posterior distribution of fundamentalsθ
given a bank’s private signal si and the public signal r. When r ∈ (1, Rh), like in the risky
interbank capital market case, the posterior distribution of θ is N (µ(si, r), σ2), a normal
distribution with mean µ(si, r) = δsi + (1 − δ)z(r) and variance σ2 = δσ2s . Because a low
interest rate reflects a meager demand of interbank borrowing and a greater reluctance to
extend credit to the real economy, in equilibrium, a lower interest rate r depresses banks’
beliefs π(si, r).
In stark contrast to the case with risky interbank capital market, when the interest rate
declines to its lower bound r = 1, the posterior p.d.f. of fundamentals θ is
f(θ|si, r = 1) ∝ φ
(
si − θ
σs
)
Φ
(
z(1)− θ
σp
)
,
which is strictly first-order stochastic dominated by N (µ(si, 1), σ2). When σp → 0, the
posterior distribution of θ converges to a truncated normal distribution, N (si, σs), truncated
from above at z(1). As a result, banks’ belief function is discontinuous at r = 1, that is,
lim
r→1+
π(si, r) > π(si, 1). In other words, observing the vague signal r = 1, banks form not
only inaccurate beliefs but also pessimistic ones about economic prospects.
Although r = 1 conveys worse information than a higher interest rate, the discontinuity
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in the information content works in favor of aggregate credit supply and economic growth
compared with the risky interbank capital market case. Intuitively, in the risky interbank
capital market case, the low interest rate r = r precisely informs banks that the current
interbank capital market freezes completely. Banks are not optimistic enough to borrow
in the interbank capital market even with the cheap financing opportunity, and banks are
not lending because of the concern of counterparty risks. Because banks are not optimistic
enough to supply credit to the real economy, the low interest rate also precisely indicates a
freezing real credit market. In comparison, when the interbank capital market is risk-free,
the imprecise information conveyed by r = 1 only indicates the possibility that interbank
capital flows are inactive, and not all capital endowed to the pessimistic banks is channeled
through interbank capital market to the real economy. As a result, banks’ beliefs are not
as pessimistic as those in the risky interbank capital market case, thanks to strict financial
regulations.
1.5.3. Financial Regulations and Stabilities
Definition 1 of the monotone equilibrium still applies but with slight modifications. In par-
ticular, as explained in section 1.5.2, the definition of the information revelation function
z(r) is modified to accommodate the discontinuity at r = 1 and the possibility that a contin-
uum of fundamentals θ can clear at r = 1. Hence, in definition 1, the fourth condition that
governs z(r) is modified such that z(r) = max{θ : D(θ, r) = 0}. Accordingly, the interest
rate correspondence is modified as R̂(θ) ≡ {r : z(r) = θ if r ∈ (1, Rh), and θ < z(r) if r = 1}.
Like in the risky interbank capital market case, although other elements in the equilibrium
can be uniquely characterized, there exists a continuum of market-clearing interest rate
functions r∗(θ) that gives rise to the multiplicity of equilibrium. Proposition 3 characterizes
the fundamental threshold function in the limit:
Proposition 3 In the limit of vanishing interpretation noise, the fundamental threshold
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function θ∗(r) is given by
lim
σp→0
θ∗(r) =
 0 if r ∈ (1, Rh),1−Rl
Rh−Rl if r = 1.
When r ∈ (1, Rh), all banks’ budget constraints hold. Hence, pessimistic banks lend all
available capital to optimistic banks, which then lend their endowed capital and that bor-
rowed in the interbank capital market to the real economy. Because the aggregate lending
A = 1, there is sufficient lending to support economic expansions as long as θ ≥ 0.
When r = 1, two forces counterplay on each other. On one hand, the interbank capital
market channels capital to optimistic banks and uniformly scales up the real credit supply
by each optimistic bank. On the other hand, as analyzed in section 1.5.2, r = 1 uniformly
truncates the distribution of fundamentalsθ from above, which depresses banks’ confidence
and reduces their incentive to lend to the real sector. In aggregate, the two forces cancel
out, and the fundamental threshold is the same as that in the benchmark model θ∗0. The
interbank capital market has no effect on the aggregate coordination results when r = 1.
Technically, Appendix A.1.8 shows that the Laplacian property still holds with an interest
rate of r = 1.
Proposition 4 summarizes the interest rate and the coordination outcome for all realizations
of fundamentals θ. Like in the risky interbank capital market case, I focus on the limit of
vanishing interpretation noise and denote r̂(θ) = lim
σp→0
r∗(θ). Appendix A.1.3 discusses the
nonlimiting case and demonstrates the generality of the equilibrium results.
Proposition 4 In the limit of vanishing noise on the public signal, that is, σp → 0
1. for any θ > θ̄, r̂(θ) = Rh, and the economy is in an expansion;
2. for any θ ∈ [θ∗0, θ̄], r̂(θ) ∈ {Rh, 1}, and the economy is in an expansion regardless of
the interest rate;
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3. for any θ ∈ (0, θ∗0), r̂(θ) ∈ {Rh, 1}, the economy is in an expansion if r̂(θ) = Rh, and
the economy is in a recession if r̂(θ) = 1;
4. for any θ ≤ 0, r̂(θ) = 1, and the economy is in a recession;
where θ∗0 =
1−Rl
Rh−Rl and θ̄ = θ
∗
0 + σs[Φ
−1 (Rl + (1−Rl)θ∗0)− Φ−1(Rl)] > θ∗0.
Appendix A.1.7 provides the proof. Figure 5 visualizes the comparison of the coordination
outcome in the risky interbank capital market case and in the risk-free interbank capital
market case. Recall that a risky interbank capital market introduces fragilities to the credit
market in the sense that when θ ∈ (θ∗0, 1), an economic recession caused by a shortage of
credit becomes possible. By comparing the two panels in Figure 5, one can clearly see that
imposing strict financial regulations stabilizes the real credit market, and when θ ∈ (θ∗0, 1),
the credit supply always abundantly supports an economic expansion, regardless of the
interest rate. The main mechanism for why financial regulation can stabilize the credit
0 1 θ
Recession ExpansionRisky ICM
0 θ̄θ
∗
0 θ
Recession ExpansionRisk-Free ICM
Figure 5: Coordination Outcome (Risk-Free Interbank Capital Market)
market works through the feedback loop between the interbank capital market and the
real credit market. By removing the counterparty risks of interbank lending, financial
regulations prevent the interbank capital market from freezing, which directly improves
the credit supply through the allocative role of the interbank capital market. Meanwhile,
the functioning allocative role of the interbank capital market boosts banks’ confidence
in the economy and limits its negative informative role. Moreover, banks’ confidence in
the economy, in turn, encourages banks to borrow from others and supply more credit to
the real economy, thereby further enhancing the allocative role of the interbank capital
market. These two effects reinforce each other and jointly improve the real credit supply
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and promote economic growth. Finally, the prosperous economy generates a high return
for the real credit supply, which reinforces banks’ incentive to participate in the interbank
capital market.
Financial regulations that eliminate counterparty risks enhance the stability of the credit
market in terms of aggregate coordination outcomes, that is, whether the economy is in
an expansion or in a recession. In addition to that, they also ensure that the interbank
capital market improves the efficiency of the credit market for any fundamentals θ and any
market-clearing interest rate r as summarized in the proposition below.
Proposition 5 In the limit of vanishing interpretation noise, that is, σp → 0, the risk-free
interbank capital market increases the efficient credit supply in economic expansions and
decreases the inefficient credit supply in economic recessions.
Figure 6 visualizes the results by plotting the aggregate credit supply of the financial system.
The black line represents the benchmark case without interbank capital market. The red
(blue) line represents the risk-free interbank capital market case in which the interest rate is
high (low). When the interest rate is high, that is, r̂ = Rh, all capital is channeled through
θ
A
0
1
θ̄θ∗0
1− θ∗0
Figure 6: Aggregate Credit Supply
interbank capital market to the real economy, resulting in an aggregate credit supply A = 1.
Supply of credit is efficient in economic expansions. The interbank capital market improves
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the efficiency of the credit market by increasing aggregate credit supply.
When the interest rate is low, that is, r̂ = 1, although the interest rate conveys vague infor-
mation, it still serves as a coordination device that synchronizes banks’ lending decisions.
Therefore, in aggregate, the total credit supplied by the financial system A is more respon-
sive to changes in fundamentals. At the fundamental threshold θ∗0, the aggregate credit
supply A = 1 − θ∗0 in both cases. Hence, if the fundamentals are above the threshold, the
interbank capital market helps create a more efficient credit supply. Similarly, in economic
recessions when the fundamentals fall below the threshold, the interbank capital market
helps reduce an inefficient credit supply.
1.5.4. Empirical and Policy Implications
Empirical Implications That this paper highlights the feedback between capital flows
in the financial system and the credit supply to the real economy offers important empirical
implications.
First, the equilibrium interest rate positively correlates with the aggregate credit supply and
real economic growth. Before discussing this implication, I will first clarify the interpretation
of the interest rate in the model. Banks’ returns from credit supply reflect the productivity
of the real economy, which is constructive (Rh > 1) in expansions and destructive (Rl < 1) in
recessions. In the financial system, each bank has unbiased—but noisy—private information
and a heterogeneous estimation of real productivity. Through trading with one another,
banks learn about the information possessed by other banks. In other words, the interest
rate for interbank capital flows aggregates all the private information in the financial system
and serves as a precise indicator of real productivity. Hence, mapping into the real world,
one can think of the interest rate for interbank capital flows as the equilibrium real rate
that reflects the marginal productivity of capital in the real economy.21
Regardless of the counterparty risks for the interbank capital market, a low interest rate in
21For simplicity, the paper assumes linear production technology, and the marginal productivity equals
the average productivity in the real economy.
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the model signals bad economic prospects, which discourages banks from supplying credit
to the real economy. With limited access to credit, operating firms and consumers cut
production and consumption, respectively, thereby depressing real economic growth. The
low real economic growth, in turn, generates low returns on bank loans, which justifies the
low borrowing demand for interbank capital and the low equilibrium interest rate.
Consistent with the models implications, during the 2007–2008 financial crisis, the real
interest rate significantly dropped and remained low in the post-crisis recovery. Holston
et al. (2017) estimates equilibrium interest rates at a quarterly frequency from the first
quarter of 1961 to the third quarter of 2016. According to their estimations, in the United
States, the equilibrium interest rate dropped from a pre-crisis level of over 2% to less than
1% and stayed below 1% afterward.22 Moreover, estimates of equilibrium interest rates for
the Euro Area, the United Kingdom, and Canada all demonstrate the same pattern. In the
meantime, the real economy experienced a credit crunch and sluggish growth worldwide.
Regulators around the world also have expressed concerns that the post-crisis slow credit
growth can encumber real investment and consumption, which have contributed to the
shallow recovery after the crisis.23
Second, trading volumes across financial institutions positively correlate with aggregate
credit supply and real economic growth. As demonstrated by the model, when banks stop
trading with one another, capital also gets stuck within the financial system and stops
flowing to the real economy. This halted capital impedes economic growth. Meanwhile, the
sluggish economic growth justifies banks’ reluctance to supply credit to the real economy
and the low trading volumes across financial institutions.
Consistent with the models implications, many wholesale funding markets experienced tur-
bulence and contraction in volume during the 2007–2008 financial crisis, and some have
22Other estimates have reached similar conclusions. See Barsky et al. (2014), Laubach and Williams
(2016), and Holston et al. (2017) for examples.
23See the 2015 speech by James McAndrews (McAndrews, 2015), the former Executive Vice President
and Director of research of the New York Fed, and the evidence of concerns in the ECB mentioned in the
introduction.
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yet to recover.24 For example, the interbank market dependence ratio, which is the total
amount owed to credit institutions over total assets for domestic banks in the EU, has been
declining from 15.5% in 2007 to 6.2% in 2017.25 In the United States, the total interbank
loans held by all commercial banks plummeted from its pre-crisis peak of close to $500
billion to around $100 billion after the crisis and remain dim afterward. 26 In addition to
interbank loans, turmoils in the securitized asset markets also dampen the real credit sup-
plied by the financial system (Loutskina and Strahan, 2009; Stein, 2010; Loutskina, 2011;
di Patti and Sette, 2016). In fact, the lack of a revival of securitization is perceived by the
policy makers in Europe as a major constraint for credit growth in the post-crisis recovery
(Bank of England and European Central Bank, 2014a,b).
Policy Implications This paper emphasizes the benefits of strengthening financial regu-
lations to address counterparty risks among financial institutions. In particular, this paper
conveys two messages that regulators should bear in mind when formulating regulations to
enhance financial stability.
First, even when economic fundamentals appear to be strong, it is important for the policy
makers to ensure that banks can survive under severe economic conditions. The reason is
that concerns about counterparty risks among financial institutions can lead to freezing in-
terbank transactions and create real crisis in a self-fulfilling manner. Appendix A.1.1 shows
that banks cannot solve the problem on their own, because they don’t fully endogenize
the benefit of their own safe transactions on boosting others’ confidence in the economy. In
consonance with the models implications, following the systemic fallouts of financial institu-
tions during the financial crisis, regulators around the world have implemented stress tests
to mandate sufficient capital buffers to absorb losses during adverse economic conditions.
Generally speaking, the regulatory constraint in my model speaks to all prudential regula-
24Examples include the mortgage-backed securities market (Gorton, 2009), the repo market (Gorton and
Metrick, 2012), the short-term interbank lending market (Iyer and Peydro, 2011; Iyer et al., 2014; Cingano
et al., 2016), and the interbank term loan market(Craig and Ma, 2017; Kuo et al., 2014).
25Source: ECB Statistical Data Warehouse (series key CBD2.A.B0.W0.11. Z. Z.A.F.I3004. Z. Z. Z. Z. Z. Z.PC).
26Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED) database (series IBLACBW027NBOG).
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tions that require banks to maintain a healthy balance sheet and mitigate the counterparty
risks for interbank transactions, such as capital requirements and minimum leverage ratio
requirements.
Second, focusing on overall regulatory stringency is not enough. Recognizing the hetero-
geneities across different asset classes is equally important. To be more specific, I revisit
the regulatory constraint,
Rlai + 1 + xi − ai ≥ crxi.
On the left-hand side of the inequality, the risky real lending ai is evaluated at a discount
of 1 − Rl relative to the safe storage investment 1 + xi − ai. For simplicity, so far, I
have focused on the overall regulatory stringency c. In fact, an insufficient discount for
the risky real lending ai can also result in excessive leverage for the borrowing banks and
counterparty risks. Therefore, in the design of stress tests, regulators should evaluate risky
real lending at its default payoff Rl when there is a systemic shortage of credit to the
real economy. In other words, in the spirit of a “macro-prudential” approach, regulators
should endogenize coordination externalities among banks in stress tests. Following the
same reasoning, in the design of risk weights in the capital requirements to limit excessive
leverage taking, regulators should account for possibilities of systemic default on bank loans
due to credit contraction and economic recession. In line with the models implications, in
the 2017 reforms of the Basel III framework, the Basel Committee focused on enhancing
the granularity and risk sensitivity in the calculation of risk-weighted assets(BIS, 2017).
Moreover, the discount for the risky lending ai also speaks to the haircuts for risky collat-
erals posted for interbank transactions. To limit the build-up of excessive leverage outside
the traditional banking system, the Financial Stability Board (FSB) initiated a regulatory
framework for haircut floors on securities-financing transactions (FSB, 2015). This model
provides theoretical justification for mandating haircuts and guidelines for the level of hair-
cuts. The bottom line is that even when the economic fundamentals appear to be strong,
regulators should mandate haircuts such that the collateral value provided by risky assets
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are evaluated by their payoffs during recessions.
Note that a direct capital injection to interbank capital market is not efficient in boosting
credit supply when the economy is stuck in an equilibrium with low interest rates. In this
equilibrium, banks are pessimistic about economic prospects; therefore, they are not willing
to extend credit to the real economy or to demand borrowing from other banks. Frozen
interbank capital flows and frozen real credit supply are a result of the overall pessimism
instead of financing difficulties given the low cost of borrowing from other banks. Aimed at
enhancing credit supply, the ECB conducted two long-term refinancing operations (LTROs)
in December 2011 and February 2012. The LTROs provide funding to banks at a 3-year
maturity and with low interest rates. Despite the large scale of 1 trillion euro lending to
banks, evidence shows that the transmission to real credit supply was limited. Many banks
took advantage of the cheap financing opportunities to invest in high-yield government
bonds instead of supplying credit to support economic recovery. Carpinelli and Crosignani
(2017) estimated that of the e181.5 billion borrowed, Italian banks in their sample invested
e22.6 billion in credit to firms and e82.7 billion in government bonds. Consistent with my
model, when interest rates are low, the efficiency of this kind of capital injection is hindered
by the overall pessimism of economic prospects.
One final remark about the policy implications is that this paper focuses on the aggregate
credit supply by the whole financial system and hence doesn’t account for frictions, such
as relationship lending. In particular, if bank-specific lending relationships exist, that is, if
banks have heterogeneous lending opportunities, stringent regulations can limit individual
banks’ lending capacity and harm the efficiency of capital allocation.
1.6. Other Applications
Beyond the context of regulations that address counterparty risks in the financial system,
my model also provides a general framework to study how financial market regulations
can mitigate coordination problems among market participants. In this section, I analyze
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two applications and provide a theoretical justification for short-selling restrictions and
the ban of naked CDS on sovereign debt. The common message conveyed by these two
exercises is that regulations against aggressive speculation stabilize the financial markets.
These regulations not only directly ease downward pressures imposed by speculation but
also boost market confidence.
1.6.1. Short Selling Restrictions
Although regulators around the world have introduced various restrictions on short sell-
ing to prevent the damage of unfair speculation,27 most existing literature argues against
short-selling constraints, because they are detrimental for liquidity, slow the price discovery
process, and may create pricing bubbles.28 My model can be applied to financial markets
vulnerable to fire-sale activities and provides a theoretical justification for short-selling con-
straints in these financial markets. Appendix A.1.5 provides a formal and detailed analysis.
Below, I will briefly discuss the key results and the intuition.
The coordination problem in the real credit supply process can be reinterpreted as follows.
The action ai represents bank i’s investment in a financial asset. A =
∫ 1
0 aidi is the total
holding the financial asset, and 1 − A measures the fire-sale pressure. If A decreases, it
imposes a higher fire-sale pressure. As a consequence, holding onto the investment in the
financial asset becomes more costly. When A < 1 − θ, the market for the financial asset
melts because of low fundamentals θ or high fire-sale pressures 1 − A, and investments in
the asset generate a return of Rl < 1. Otherwise, the investment is profitable with a return
of Rh > 1.
The interbank capital market setup follows the main model naturally. To isolate the effect
of short-selling restrictions, I restrict attention to the case in which financial regulations are
tight (c = 1), and banks are not concerned about counterparty risks. Therefore, if banks
27During the 2007–2008 financial crisis, the SEC temporarily blocked short selling of financial stocks to
protect investors and markets. Europe and Australia also enacted similar bans on short-selling activities.
28See Diamond and Verrecchia (1987), Saffi and Sigurdsson (2010), and Boehmer and Wu (2012) for
examples. Goldstein and Guembel (2008) exceptionally argues that if firms’ market prices feed back to their
real decisions, short sellers can manipulate the market prices by short selling and make speculative profits.
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are restricted from short selling, like in the main model, the equilibrium implications follow
the risk-free interbank capital market case (see the upper panel of Figure 7).
0 θ̄θ
∗
0 θ
Fire Sale No Fire Sale
Short Selling
Restricted
0 θ̄1θ
∗
1 θ
Fire Sale No Fire Sale
Short Selling
Allowed
Figure 7: Coordination Outcome (Short Selling)
However, as shown in the lower panel of Figure 7, if short selling is allowed (see the shaded
area), when the fundamentals θ ∈ (θ∗0, θ∗1), there is a possibility of a financial market melt-
down because of fire-sale activities. Intuitively, in terms of resource reallocation, pessimistic
banks with low private signals optimally choose to speculate by short selling financial assets.
Short-selling activities directly aggravate the fire-sale pressure by reducing the aggregate in-
vestment A. On top of this, aware of the aggravated fire-sale pressure, banks become more
pessimistic about the health of the financial market. Therefore, the mass of pessimistic
banks that short sell the financial asset increases, which further intensifies the fire-sale pres-
sure. These two effects reinforce each other and jointly lead to a meltdown of the financial
market for higher fundamentals θ. Hence, short-selling restrictions not only directly reduce
fire-sale pressure but also maintain the confidence of banks investing in the financial asset,
which, in aggregate, stabilizes the financial market.
1.6.2. Credit Default Swaps
Since December 1, 2011, the European Parliament has banned naked CDS on sovereign
debts to fight the eurozone crises (European Commission, 2011). The International Mone-
tary Fund (IMF), however, has warned that the ban might raise hedging costs and reduce
investors’ interest in the underlying debt market (IMF, 2013). In this section, I apply the
model of the interbank capital market and credit market to the CDS market and the un-
derlying sovereign debt market. By comparing the two cases—one with naked CDS banned
and the other with naked CDS allowed—I show that the ban of naked CDS enhances the
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underlying sovereign stability. Appendix A.1.6 provides a formal and detailed analysis.
Below, I will briefly discuss the key results and the intuition.
The baseline coordination problem can be reinterpreted as follows. Instead of banks, the
problem comprises a unit mass of investors, each endowed with one unit of capital. a′i
denotes investor i’s investment in the sovereign debt. Thus, A′ =
∫ 1
0 a
′
idi represents the
aggregate investment in sovereign debt. Sovereign debt is exposed to self-fulfilling debt
rollover problems. In particular, the government is solvent if A′ ≥ 1 − θ, where 1 − θ
stands for the government budget deficit. In words, the government is solvent if enough
investors keep lending to the government, such that the government can maintain its normal
operations. In this case, the government repays its sovereign debt obligations in full, and
investors earn a return of Rh > 1. Otherwise, the government defaults on the sovereign
debt, and investors recover a return of Rl < 1.
In addition to the sovereign debt market, investors can trade on the CDS market based
on their heterogeneous private information. Let p denote the price for the CDS contracts,
which is determined by market-clearing condition in equilibrium. If investor i issues x′i > 0
units of CDS contracts, she receives px′i and pays the buyers x
′
i if the sovereign debt defaults.
If investor i is a net buyer of CDS contracts, x′i < 0. To isolate the effect of the ban on the
naked CDS, I impose short-selling constraints and strict regulatory constraints (c = 1) to
eliminate counterparty risks.
Naked CDS Banned
When naked CDS is banned, investors can only buy CDS contracts for hedging purpose. It
turns out that the covered CDS market is equivalent to a risk-free interbank capital market
in terms of coordination outcomes. Specifically, pessimistic investors invest in sovereign
debt and purchase CDS contracts in proportion to hedge the sovereign default risk. Doing
so effectively creates a risk-free portfolio. The optimistic investors, on the other hand, sell
CDS contracts, and then invest their endowed capital and the proceeds from selling CDS
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contracts in the sovereign debt. Therefore, optimistic investors are effectively borrowing
from pessimistic investors, so that they can invest more in the sovereign debt. A high CDS
price p implies a higher hedging cost and, therefore, corresponds to a low interest rate r in
the risk-free interbank capital market. In this case in which naked CDS are banned, the
price is bounded above at p̄, which corresponds to an interest rate of r = 1.
The upper panel in Figure 8 summarizes the equilibrium coordination outcome. Like in the
risk-free interbank market case, when θ ∈ (0, θ∗0), two different market-clearing CDS prices
predict different coordination outcomes. The intuition is that if the investors observe a
high CDS price indicating high default risks of the sovereign debt, they become pessimistic
and refuse to invest in the sovereign debt. The aggregate reduction in the sovereign debt
investment accelerates the shortage of funding for the government, causing a default on the
sovereign debt. Similarly, when the CDS price is high, investors are optimistic and actively
invest in sovereign debt. Doing so prevents sovereign default. However, as long as θ ≥ θ∗0,
the government has an abundant budget, so that it always stays solvent, regardless of the
price of the CDS contracts.
0 θ̄θ
∗
0 θ
Default SolventNaked CDS
Banned
0 1θ∗0 θ
Default SolventNaked CDS
Allowed
Figure 8: Coordination Outcome (CDS Market)
Naked CDS Allowed
If naked CDS is allowed, pessimistic investors optimally choose to speculate against the
solvency of the government by purchasing CDS contracts without investing in sovereign
debt. In stark contrast to the previous case, in this case the price of CDS contracts can rise
above p̄. At this high CDS price, optimistic investors also find it optimal to speculate by
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selling CDS contracts without investing in the risky sovereign debt. As a result, all investors
spend all their endowment on speculation based on their private beliefs, resulting in zero
aggregate investment in sovereign debt. In other words, speculation activities completely
crowd out sovereign debt investment.
As shown in the lower panel of Figure 8, without the ban on naked CDS contracts, when
fundamentals θ ∈ (θ∗0, 1), naked CDS trading harms sovereign stability in the sense that it
creates the possibility that all investors—both pessimistic and optimistic—speculate based
on their beliefs, which crowds out the sovereign debt market. Observing a high CDS price,
all investors know that even optimistic agents speculate instead of investing in sovereign
debt. Knowing this exaggerates their concerns about the solvency of the government and
reduces their incentives to invest in the sovereign debt. Therefore, the ban on abusive
speculations with naked CDS enhances sovereign stability.
1.7. Conclusion
In this paper, I study the effect of capital flows in the financial system on the aggregate
credit supply. I show that capital flows within the financial system play a positive allocative
role in channeling capital to banks prone to supply credit to the real economy. However,
without strict financial regulations to address counterparty risks, interbank lending can
destabilize the credit market. When low interest rates reveal dim economic prospects and
depress banks’ incentive to supply credit, the economy can get stuck in an equilibrium with
freezing capital flows, both within the financial system and out to the real economy. Above
all, this paper emphasizes the benefits of imposing strict financial regulations to ease the
concern of counterparty risks and maintain the optimal functioning of the interbank capital
market and the real credit market.
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CHAPTER 2 : Intervention with Screening in Global Games
Lin Shen Junyuan Zou1 2
2.1. Introduction
In many economic environments, strategic complementarities among agents can give rise to
coordination failure.3 To reduce the welfare loss from coordination failure, policy makers
may intervene by providing incentives for agents to play the socially desirable equilibrium.
For instance, during the recent financial crisis, governments around the world provided ex-
plicit and implicit guarantees on debt obligations of financial institutions to prevent “runs”
on the financial systems. While these policies proved to be effective in restoring financial
stability, some drawbacks also emerged. First, implementing guarantee programs at such
large scale exposes the policy maker to large costs, which jeopardized sovereign debt sus-
tainability and led to the sovereign debt crisis in many European countries (Acharya et al.,
2014; Farhi and Tirole, 2016). Second, the policies were criticized for their vulnerability
to moral hazard problems (Kareken and Wallace, 1978; Keeley, 1990; Cooper and Ross,
2002).4
Given that such large-scale interventions are costly, a natural question is whether it is possi-
ble to reduce the size of intervention programs without compromising the effectiveness. To
answer this question in a general context, we consider a coordination game with incomplete
information as in standard global games (Morris and Shin, 2003). When agents receive pri-
1We are indebted to Itay Goldstein and Doron Levit for their guidance in the process. We are grateful
to Christopher Bertsch (discussant), Philip Bond, Matthieu Bouvard (discussant), Vincent Glode, Chong
Huang, Benjamin Lester, George Mailath, Stephen Morris, Christian Opp, Guillermo Ordonez, Andrew
Postlewaite, Jun Qian, Xavier Vives, as well as seminar and conference participants in the Wharton Finance
Seminar, INSEAD Finance Seminar, the FIRS 2017 Meeting, the WFA 2017 Meeting, the FTG Summer
School 2017, and the 2017 Lisbon Meeting of Game Theory and Applications for useful comments. All errors
are our own.
2Junyuan Zou, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, 3718 Locust Walk, Philadlephia,
PA 19104, zouj@sas.upenn.edu.
3Examples of coordination failures include but not limited to bank run (Diamond and Dybvig, 1983),
currency attack (Obstfeld, 1996), macroeconomic coordination failure (Cooper and John, 1988) and techno-
logical development (Bresnahan and Trajtenberg, 1995).
4Allen et al. (2017) endogenizes the effect of government guarantees on banks’ excessive risk taking and
shows that guarantees are overall welfare improving even with moral hazard problems.
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vate signals, they form interim beliefs regarding the expected payoffs from taking different
actions. We propose a group of programs with voluntary participation that screen agents
based on their interim beliefs. Compared with conventional government-guarantee type of
programs, it has two main advantages. First, in equilibrium, only a small group of marginal
investors self-select into the program, which reduces the implementation costs. Also, our
proposed programs have the advantage that moral hazard problems are limited to the small
group of participating agents.
This paper provides novel insights for the design of intervention policies to reduce coordi-
nation failure in various economic contexts. Some existing literature (Sakovics and Steiner,
2012; Choi, 2014) has studied policies that target ex-ante important agents based on their
payoff functions. We contribute to this literature by highlighting the role of agents’ interim
beliefs of the economic fundamental and other agents’ actions. If an ex-ante important agent
is very optimistic about the coordination result, there’s no need to provide extra incentives
for her to take the socially desirable action. It is more cost-efficient if the resources are
allocated to agents who have medium beliefs and are at the margin of taking the socially
desirable action.
In our benchmark model, we explore a canonical binary-action coordination game under
the global games framework. Global games are useful for linking coordination outcome to
the underlying fundamental and determining the unique equilibrium. More importantly,
they highlight the strategic interactions of agents with heterogeneous private information.
In the model, a continuum of agents are each endowed with an investment opportunity.
Their investments feature strategic complementarities. Specifically, the investments are
successful if and only if the mass of agents investing exceeds a threshold which decreases in
the fundamental of the economy. In addition, each agent receives a noisy private signal of
the fundamental and makes inferences about the other agents’ investment decisions. The
game has a unique equilibrium where all agents follow the same threshold strategy. In
terms of welfare, there exists a region of weak fundamentals in which agents do not invest,
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however, the investments would have been successful if all agents were to invest. Therefore,
social welfare will be improved if the policy maker can lower the investment threshold and
reduce the coordination failure region. The setup of the model is fairly general such that
it can be applied to various economic contexts. In section 6, we discuss three coordination
problems and make policy recommendations based on the proposed intervention policy.
Next, we allow the policy maker to offer a subsidy-tax program with voluntary participa-
tion to all agents who invest. If an investor accepts the offer, she receives a direct subsidy.
In return, she is required to pay tax when the investment is successful. We classified the
intervention programs into three categories based on the subsidy-to-tax ratio. If a program
is too austere, i.e. has low subsidy-to-tax ratio, no agents will participate. We call this
type of programs the zero-participation programs. If a program is too generous such that
all investors participate, we call it a full-participation program. Many existing intervention
policies, including government guarantees and direct subsidies, benefit all agents uniformly
and therefore fall into this category. We show that full-participation programs can effec-
tively reduce coordination failure however are costly to implement. To reduce the costs
of implementation, we propose partial-participation programs with medium subsidy-to-tax
ratios. A partial participation program is equivalent to a costly insurance policy and screens
agents based on their interim belief of success. The most optimistic investors who believe
in a high probability of paying the tax do not take the offer. At the same time, the most
pessimistic agents who believe in a high probability of coordination failure do not find it
worthwhile to invest solely to take advantage of the offer. Only agents with intermedi-
ate beliefs will participate in the program since it provides protection against coordination
failure and investment loss. We show that with a partial-participation program there is a
unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium, in which all agents follow the same threshold strategy
with two thresholds. An agent will invest and reject the offer if she receives a high signal;
she will invest and accept the offer if her signal is medium and between the two thresholds;
she will not invest if she receives a low signal. When the information friction goes to zero,
the two thresholds converge, and the expected mass of agents who accept the offer goes to
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zero, which implies zero expected cost of implementation for the policy maker. Further-
more, with proper choice of subsidy and tax, coordination failures can be eliminated, and
the first-best investment threshold can be achieved.
To understand intuitively how partial-participation programs can improve coordination re-
sults at a minimal cost, let us start with the original threshold equilibrium without in-
tervention programs. For agents receiving signals right below the investment threshold,
without any intervention policy, they will not invest in fear of the coordination failure and
investment loss. The partial-participation programs provide protection against investment
loss and give them extra incentive to make the investment. Therefore, with the partial-
participation programs, all agents rationally expect the mass of agents who invest to in-
crease and the strategic complementarities strengthen all agents’ incentive to invest. Hence,
agents receiving even lower signals would be willing to accept the offer and invest, which is
also expected by all agents in the economy and gives them more incentive to invest. Repeat-
ing the thought process, the extra incentive to invest provided by the partial-participation
programs is amplified by higher-order beliefs, and the investment threshold can be reduced
significantly in equilibrium. Given that all agents are more optimistic and less worried
about coordination failure, the downside protection of the partial-participation programs
becomes less appealing, and the mass of investors who accept the offer in equilibrium is
actually small.
We then compare government guarantee programs with partial-participation programs in
the presence of moral hazard problems. Government guarantee programs are a special case
of full-participation programs and have been widely used to reduce coordination failure.
We extend the benchmark model by assuming that after investment, an investor can earn
private benefit by shirking, which will reduce the success probability of her own investment.
Both types of intervention programs reduce investors’ “skin in the game” hence induce
shirking at the expense of the policy maker and social welfare. For example, in the context
of credit freeze when banks abstain from lending, government guarantees reduce banks’
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incentive to screen and monitor borrowers. Moral hazard problem critically limits the scale
of the government-guarantee type of programs. Specifically, if a government guarantees a
large amount of investment losses, all investors, including the most optimistic ones, would
participate and shirk. In contrast, for partial-participation programs, the moral hazard
problem is limited to the program participants. For the optimistic agents, rejecting the
offer and exerting effort gives higher payoff than participating and shirking. Hence, the
social welfare loss only incurs for medium-belief agents, the mass of whom goes to zero in
the limit of vanishing information frictions. As a result, in the limit, there exist partial-
participation programs that can restore the first best, yet no government-guarantee type of
programs can restore the first best.
Besides the benchmark model, we also show that the results could be generalized to allow
unobservable ex-ante heterogeneity in agents’ payoff and information structure. Regarding
ex-ante agent heterogeneity, a closely related paper is Sakovics and Steiner (2012). The
difference is that they only allow the policy maker to provide direct subsidies conditional
on agents’ observable heterogeneities. Under their setup, the most cost-efficient subsidies
should target the important agents with specific ex-ante characteristics. However, their
policy space falls into the category of full-participation programs in our model, and the
policy maker can save costs and limit moral hazard problems by switching to a partial-
participation program. In other words, we show that subsidization should target the interim
rather than ex-ante “pivotal” types. Moreover, since the “pivotal” agents self-select to
participate in partial-participation programs, the policy maker does not need to observe
agents’ ex-ante characteristics. We also show that the binary payoff structure in the baseline
model can be generalized to a continuous monotonic payoff function.
Our paper is related to two lines of literature. First, our model is built on the literature of
global games which was pioneered by Carlsson and Van Damme (1993). Researchers have
applied the global games techniques to analyze coordination failures in different contexts,
to name a few, bank runs (Rochet and Vives, 2004; Goldstein and Pauzner, 2005), currency
48
attack (Morris and Shin, 1998), credit freeze (Bebchuk and Goldstein, 2011), debt rollovers
(Morris and Shin, 2004; He and Xiong, 2012), and political revolutions (Edmond, 2013).
We take a general approach and propose intervention programs that can be applied to
reduce coordination failure in different contexts. Morris and Shin (2003) reviews the most
commonly applied setup and applications of global games. Our main model in section 2 is
a special case with binary payoffs. In section 5, we discuss a generalized payoff structure
as in Morris and Shin (2003). In both cases, we show that there exists costless intervention
to reduce the coordination threshold and eliminate coordination failures in the limit of zero
information friction.
Second, our mechanism shares similar ideas found in the literature that explores policies
targeting a specific group of agents to reduce coordination failures. For example, within
the contracting literature, Segal (2003) and Bernstein and Winter (2012) show that the
optimal policy is to divide and conquer, i.e. subsidize a subset of players so that they invest
even if no one else invests, then the surplus of players in the no-subsidy set can be fully
extracted. Sakovics and Steiner (2012) and Choi (2014) analyzed a coordination game with
ex-ante heterogeneous agents and showed that different types should be subsidized in a
certain order. These papers all demonstrate that subsidizing a subset of agents to ensure
their participation can efficiently encourage the participation of the rest of the agents and
reduce coordination failure. Our proposed intervention program is different in terms of
implementation. The policy maker offers the same option to all agents, and a subset of
agents self-select to participate in the program. In the generalization of unobservable ex-
ante heterogeneity, we show that our proposed intervention program is more cost-efficient
and does not require information about agents’ heterogeneity. Cong et al. (2017) and Basak
and Zhou (2017) analyze intervention policies under dynamic settings. In both papers, the
policy maker target a subset of agents in each period. The coordination result of the current
period serves as a public signal of the fundamental of the economy. They emphasize the
effect of the public signal on agents’ beliefs and behaviors in the subsequent period(s).
Another closely related paper is Morris and Shadmehr (2017), which analyzes the reward
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schemes for a revolutionary leader to elicit effort from citizens. The optimal reward scheme
also screens citizens for their optimism. However, they consider bounded reward schemes
imposed on a continuous and unbounded effort choice set, while we focus on subsidy-tax
programs that agents can voluntarily choose to participate in. More importantly, while
they assume zero cost for implementing any reward scheme, we target minimizing the cost
of intervention.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present a benchmark model
of a binary-action investment game and introduce intervention policies that can reduce
coordination failures. Section 3 and 4 compare the proposed program with government-
guarantee type of programs in terms of implementation cost and robustness to moral hazard
problems. Two extensions of the benchmark model are discussed in section 5. Section 6
presents several applications of the benchmark model and discusses policy recommendations
in each context. Finally, section 7 concludes.
2.2. The Benchmark Model
In this section, we analyze a binary-action investment game in which each agent’s investment
outcome depends on the aggregate investment in the economy. In such an environment,
inefficient coordination failure can arise in which agents abstain from investment because
of their self-fulfilling expectation that other agents will not invest. Then we introduce
intervention policies and show how they can encourage investment and reduce coordination
failure.
2.2.1. Setups
There is a unit mass of ex-ante identical infinitesimal agents, indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. These
agents are endowed with the same investment opportunity, and they simultaneously make
investment decisions ai ∈ {0, 1}. ai = 1 if agent i invests, and ai = 0 if agent i does not
invest. Not investing results in zero payoffs, while investing incurs a fixed cost c > 0 and
generates a profit of b > c if agent i’s project is successful and 0 if it fails. We assume all
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agents’ investment payoffs are perfectly correlated. The investments would be successful
when the fundamentals of the economy are strong enough or a sufficient number of agents
invest. Specifically, the payoff from an investment project is
π(θ, l) =
 b− c, if l ≥ 1− θ,−c, if l < 1− θ.
where l =
∫ 1
0 aidi represents the fraction of investors or the aggregate investment level,
and θ stands for the fundamentals of the economy. Note that agents’ investment decisions
feature strategic complementarities, because each project is more likely to succeed when
more agents choose to invest. When the fundamentals are higher, it requires less aggregate
investment to make the projects successful. Without information friction, when θ ∈ [0, 1),
all agents investing (l = 1) and all agents not investing (l = 0) are both Nash equilibria.
However, all agents investing is strictly more efficient than the other equilibrium. Therefore,
the first-best outcome is that all agents coordinate to invest when θ ≥ 0 and not to invest
when θ < 0.
We follow the standard global games setup and assume the following information structure.
The fundamental θ is drawn from a uniform distribution with support [θ, θ̄] and it is not
directly observable to the agents when they make investment decisions.5 Instead, each
agent receives a noisy signal about the fundamental xi = θ + σεi, where εi is identically
and independently distributed with a continuous and strictly increasing c.d.f. F (ε), the
support of which is [−12 ,
1
2 ]. Furthermore, we assume that θ < −σ and θ̄ > 1 + σ. Under
this assumption, there exist two dominance regions of signals, [−θ− 12σ, x) and (x̄, θ̄+
1
2σ],
with x and x̄ defined as
Pr (θ ≥ 1|x = x̄) = c
b
,
Pr (θ ≥ 0|x = x) = c
b
.
5We assume a uniform prior to obtain an analytical solution to the coordination game. This is without
loss of generality since it can be viewed as a limiting case as the size of the information friction goes to zero.
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Intuitively, with the lowest aggregate investment level l = 0, an agent is indifferent between
the two actions when she receives signal x̄. Therefore, her dominant strategy when signal
x > x̄ is to invest. Similarly, with the highest aggregate investment level l = 1, an agent
is indifferent between the two actions if she observes signal x. Hence, when x < x, not
investing is the dominant strategy.
2.2.2. Equilibrium without Intervention
In this subsection, we analyze the equilibrium without intervention and identify the ineffi-
ciencies due to coordination failure. Proposition 6 characterizes the equilibrium.
Proposition 6 Without intervention, there is a unique equilibrium in which all agents
follow the same strategy
ai(xi) =
 1, if xi ≥ ξ
∗
0 ,
0, if xi < ξ
∗
0 .
where ξ∗0 =
c
b + σF
−1 ( c
b
)
.
Since there is a continuum of agents, given the realization of fundamentals θ, we can apply
the law of large numbers to calculate the aggregate investment l and predict the coordi-
nation outcomes. In equilibrium, all agents follow the same threshold strategy. Therefore,
the coordination outcome also has a threshold above which the investment projects are
successful. Let θ∗(ξ) denote the fundamental threshold when all agents follow the threshold
strategy ξ, then it is defined by
F
(
θ∗(ξ)− ξ
σ
)
= 1− θ∗(ξ).
In words, at the fundamental threshold, the fraction of investors l equals the cutoff 1 − θ.
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Then the fundamental threshold in equilibrium is given by
θ∗(ξ∗0) =
c
b
.
The fundamental realizations can be divided into three regions as shown below. In the
θ
Efficient No Investment
0
Inefficient Coordination Failure
θ∗(ξ∗0) =
c
b
Efficient Investment
Figure 9: Coordination Results
middle region θ ∈
[
0, cb
)
, if all agents coordinate to invest, the investment projects would
have been successful. However, the agents have self-fulfilling beliefs that other agents do not
invest. As a result, they rationally choose not to invest. Since a unit of successful investment
generates a positive surplus of b−c, in the middle region, coordination failure leads to social
welfare loss of b − c. Hence, the first-best scenario has a fundamental threshold θ∗ equal
to zero. And in the next section, we will show how our proposed intervention program can
lower this cutoff and reduce inefficiencies caused by coordination failure.
2.2.3. Intervention Program
Having characterized the equilibrium in the game without intervention, we now describe
the subsidy-tax intervention program that the policy maker can use to boost investment
and reduce coordination failure. The intervention program consists of two parts, a direct
subsidy s ∈ [0, c] and a contingent tax t ∈ [0, b). Specifically, if an investor decides to accept
the offer, she receives an upfront subsidy s regardless of the investment outcome and pays
a lump-sum tax t only if the investment succeeds.6 The program is only available to the
investors and they voluntarily decide whether to participate in the program. Note that there
is an implicit assumption that the actions taken by the agents are observable to the policy
maker and can be contracted on. We make this assumption because, as shown in Bond
6Since in the benchmark model there’s only two possible payoffs from investing, we only need to specify
a contingent lump-sum tax. In section 2.5.2, we analyze a more general setup where there’s a continuum of
investment outcomes and we allow tax to be proportional to the investment revenue.
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and Pande (2007), if the policy maker cannot observe individual actions, its ability to use
subsidy-tax schemes as a coordination device is greatly limited. This assumption imposes
certain limitations on the application of our proposed intervention mechanism. For example,
in the context of currency attack, it is hard to trace agents’ action and tax conditional on
agents’ investment behavior. Therefore, the intervention program discussed in this paper
cannot be applied to solving currency deflation caused by coordination failure (Morris and
Shin, 1998). Despite this limitation, there is a wide range of real-world applications. In
section 6, we discuss three representative examples.
Mathematically, if an investor accepts the offer, her payoff is modified to
π̃(θ, l) =
 b− t− (c− s), if l ≥ 1− θ,−(c− s), if l < 1− θ.
The upfront subsidy s reduces the cost of investment and encourages agents to invest. The
contingent tax t directly helps the policy maker recover the cost of providing subsidies.
More importantly, it will become clear later that the contingent tax t indirectly saves cost
by deterring participation of optimistic agents. The timeline of the coordination game with
the intervention program is modified as follows. At the beginning of the game, the policy
maker announces the intervention program (s, t). Note that since the subsidy s and tax t are
both state independent, the announcement of the intervention program does not convey any
information possessed by the policy maker. Angeletos et al. (2003) demonstrates that the
informational role of state contingent policy can lead to multiple equilibria in global games.
Therefore, the intervention programs analyzed in this paper are free from the signaling
concern of state contingent policies and do not require the policy maker to have superior
information about the fundamentals of the economy. Then the fundamental θ is realized,
and each agent receives a noisy signal of the fundamental. After observing the signal, agents
simultaneously make their decisions on whether to invest and if so, whether to participate in
the intervention program. As soon as the decisions are made, active investors pay the cost c,
and the policy maker transfers the subsidy s to all investors participating in the intervention
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program. Then the aggregate investment l and the investment returns are realized. Finally,
the policy maker collects tax t from the investors participating in the intervention program
if the investments are successful. The timeline is summarized in Figure 10 below.
Policy maker
announces
intervention program
(s, t)
θ is realized,
agents receive
private signals
Investment
and
participation
decisions
Investors incur
cost c, government
transfers s
to participators
Aggregate investment
l is realized and
investors receive
investment return
Government
collects tax t
from participants
Figure 10: Timeline of the Investment Game
Although the intervention program is specified as a subsidy-tax program, it can be in-
terpreted as other forms of intervention with transfers between the policy maker and the
investors, contingent on the coordination result. For example, a government-guarantee type
program that promises to cover the loss of failed investment up to sg ≤ c is equivalent to a
subsidy-tax program with s = t = sg. To see this, under both programs, the net transfer
from the government to any participating investor is 0 in the case of successful investments
and sg in the case of failed investments. Similarly, an asset purchase program in which
the policy maker buys tb fraction of the project with price s is equivalent to a subsidy-tax
program (s, t).
2.2.4. Equilibrium with Intervention
We now analyze the equilibrium with intervention and demonstrate how the intervention
program works to reduce coordination failure. With the intervention program, an agent
has three choices: {a = 1, Reject}, {a = 1, Accept}, and {a = 0}. Note that although
agents make two decisions, whether to invest and conditional on investing, whether to
accept the offer, only their investment decisions affect the coordination results. Therefore,
an agent only cares about the investment decisions of the others but not their participation
in the intervention program. As a result, to analyze the best response and equilibrium
strategies, it is sufficient to condition on other agents’ investment strategies. Let p̂i =
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Pr[l ≥ 1 − θ|xi] denote the interim belief of success of agent i given her private signal xi
and other agents’ investment strategies a−i(x). The expected payoffs from {a = 1, Reject}
and {a = 1, Accept} are
E[π(θ, l)|xi] = p̂ib− c, (2.1)
E[π̃(θ, l)|xi] = p̂i(b− t)− (c− s) (2.2)
respectively. And the expected payoff from {a = 0} is zero. Figure 11 depicts the expected
payoff as a function of the interim belief p̂. It can be divided into three cases according to
the subsidy-tax ratio st .
p̂
Eπ
0
Eπ(θ, l)
Eπ̃(θ, l)
c−s
b−t
c
b
1
(a) Case 1: st ≥ 1
p̂
Eπ
0
Eπ(θ, l)
Eπ̃(θ, l)
s
t
c−s
b−t
c
b 1
(b) Case 2: cb ≤
s
t < 1
p̂
Eπ
0
Eπ(θ, l)
Eπ̃(θ, l)
c
b
s
t
1
(c) Case 3: st <
c
b
Figure 11: Expected Payoffs and Interim Beliefs
In the first case when st ≥ 1, accepting the offer dominates rejecting the offer. This is
because investors always receive a higher subsidy s than their tax payment required by
the intervention program. We call this type of programs the full-participation programs.
Without intervention, the belief threshold for investment is the cost-benefit ratio cb . With
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a full-participation program, the threshold is lowered to c−sb−t . In the third case with
s
t <
c
b ,
rejecting dominates accepting the offer. We call this type of programs the zero-participation
programs. Thus, the threshold belief under the zero-participation program is the same as
the original cost-benefit ratio cb . The second case is the most interesting. When
c
b ≤
s
t < 1
(figure 11.b), an agent would only accept the offer and invest when she has an intermediate
belief p̂ ∈ [ c−sb−t ,
s
t ]. We call this type of programs the partial-participation programs. Notice
in both case 1 and case 2, the provision of the intervention program lowers the threshold
belief to c−sb−t . The difference is that, in case 2, the most optimistic agents do not participate
in the intervention program, which is cost saving especially when the information friction
is small. We will analyze the cost of the programs in detail in section 3.
Next we sketch the analyses of equilibrium with intervention. It will become clear later that
iterated deletion of dominated strategies allows us to focus on cutoff investment strategies.
We say an agent follows a cutoff investment strategy with threshold k, if her investment
strategy is
ai(x; k) =
 1, if x ≥ k,0, if x < k. (2.3)
Let p(x; k) denote the interim belief of success when an agent receives private signal x and
all other agents follow a cutoff investment strategy k,
p(x; k) = Pr(θ > θ∗(k)|x) = F
(
x− θ∗(k)
σ
)
, (2.4)
where θ∗(k) is the fundamental threshold for successful investment and satisfies F
(
k−θ∗(k)
σ
)
=
θ∗(k). An agent’s interim belief of success p(x; k) increases in x and decreases in k, because
a high private signal x indicates a high realization of fundamentals θ, and a low investment
threshold k implies a high aggregate investment l. Both imply a high probability of success.
In all three cases depicted in figure 11, the optimal investment strategy is that an agent
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invests if and only if her belief p(x, k) exceeds a threshold. Since p(x, k) is monotonic in
both x and k, an agent’s best response to other agents’ cutoff strategy k is also a cutoff
investment strategy based on her own signal. The two dominance regions form two extreme
cutoff investment strategies. Starting there, by iterated deletion of dominated strategies,
we are able to prove the uniqueness of the equilibrium with intervention. The details of
the analyses can be found in the proof of proposition 7 below. The following proposition
characterizes the equilibrium with a subsidy-tax intervention program (s, t).7
Proposition 7 When the policy maker offers a subsidy-tax intervention program (s, t) 0,
the game has a unique equilibrium. There are three different cases,
1. When st ≥ 1, the equilibrium is for any agent i,
ai = 1,Accept, if xi ≥ ξ∗(s, t),
ai = 0, if xi < ξ
∗(s, t).
where
ξ∗(s, t) =
c− s
b− t
+ σF−1
(
c− s
b− t
)
,
2. When cb ≤
s
t < 1, the equilibrium is for any agent i,
ai = 1,Reject, if xi ≥ η∗(s, t),
ai = 1,Accept, if ξ
∗(s, t) ≤ xi < η∗(s, t),
ai = 0, if xi < ξ
∗(s, t),
7 Frankel et al. (2003) prove existence, uniqueness and monotonicity in multi-action global games. How-
ever, our setup does not satisfy the continuity assumption. Therefore, we provide our own proof in the
Appendix.
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where
ξ∗(s, t) =
c− s
b− t
+ σF−1
(
c− s
b− t
)
,
η∗(s, t) =
c− s
b− t
+ σF−1
(s
t
)
.
3. When st <
c
b , the equilibrium is for any agent i,
ai = 1,Reject, if xi ≥ ξ∗(s, t),
ai = 0, if xi < ξ
∗(s, t),
where
ξ∗(s, t) =
c
b
+ σF−1
(c
b
)
.
The ratio of the upfront subsidy s and the ex-post tax t can be interpreted as the generosity
of the program. If the offer is generous (case 1), all investors find it profitable to accept
the offer and the equilibrium investment cutoff depends on the modified cost c′ = c− s and
benefit b′ = b − t. If the offer is austere (case 3), all investors will not be interested in the
offer. Therefore the equilibrium investment cutoff is the same as the original cutoff without
the intervention program. The most interesting case is case 2, in which the generosity of
the offer is medium. Investors with high private signals have strong beliefs in the success
of the project, so they will reject the subsidy offer since they believe in a high probability
of paying a net tax in the future. However, even without subsidies, these optimistic agents
would invest anyway. Agents with low private signals have strong beliefs in the failure of the
project, so even with the subsidy s, they still suffer a loss of c−s from investing. Therefore,
these agents would not invest regardless of the intervention program. In contrast, investors
receiving signals around the threshold do not have strong beliefs about the coordination
results. Without the intervention program, some of these agents would not invest. The
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intervention program provides insurance against losses in case of failed investment and gives
these agents extra incentive to invest. With the extra incentive, these agents’ decisions are
effectively altered and the aggregate action l therefore increases. The increase in l, in turn,
strengthens all agents’ incentive to invest. Agents with even lower signals would participate
in the program and change their decisions to invest. Through iterations of higher-order
beliefs, the action cutoff is significantly lowered. Moreover, agents with signals around the
old cutoff are significantly more optimistic, and therefore the intervention program is no
longer appealing to them. In equilibrium, the mass of investors accepting the offer is rather
small. We call these investors the “pivotal” investors, since the equilibrium investment
cutoff is determined by their modified cost and benefit.
In case 1 and 2, the fundamental cutoff above which the investment projects are successful
is
θ∗(ξ∗(s, t)) =
c− s
b− t
. (2.5)
Note that the new fundamental cutoff is lower than that without government intervention.
Therefore, the provision of the intervention program successfully reduces the inefficient
coordination failure region. If the government picks s = c and t ∈ [s, b), the fundamental
cutoff can be reduced to 0, eliminating the whole region of inefficient coordination failure
as demonstrated in Figure 12.
θ
Efficient No Investment
0 θ∗ = c−sb−t
Inefficient
Coordination
Failure
θ∗0 =
c
b
Efficient Investment
Figure 12: Coordination Results after Intervention
2.3. Cost of Implementation
In this section, we compare the implementation cost of partial-participation and full-participation
intervention programs in two cases, one with negligible information frictions and one with
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non-negligible information frictions. We then discuss the intuitions why partial-participation
is more cost-efficient than full-participation programs.
2.3.1. Cost of the Intervention Programs
We compare the expected cost of the partial-participation and full-participation programs
conditional on the same target fundamental threshold θ∗ of successful investment. To allow
for the possibility that the policy maker values tax and subsidy differently, the value of tax
for the policy maker is normalized to 1 and the cost of providing subsidy is assumed to be
τ . The ex-post cost of providing the intervention program to an individual investor is
ĉ(θ, s, t) =
 τs− t, if l ≥ 1− θ,τs, if l < 1− θ. (2.6)
When ĉ(θ, s, t) is negative, the policy maker profits from providing this intervention pro-
gram.
For the rest of the analyses, we focus on τ ≥ 1 for two reasons. First, we believe it is a
realistic characterization. If subsidy is provided before tax collection, τ > 1 reflects the
funding cost of the policy maker due to the opportunity cost of other welfare-improving
programs. Alternatively, if the program is government guarantee, τ > 1 reflects the cost
of commitment, such as setting aside funds specifically for the program. Moreover, any
administrative cost incurred by providing subsidy or collecting tax can raise τ . Secondly,
if τ < 1, given negligible information frictions, the policy maker can easily restore the first
best and profit at the same time by offering t = s = c.8 The coordination problem then
becomes trivial. Therefore, for the rest of the paper, we assume τ ≥ 1.
Let C(θ, s, t;σ) denote the ex-post total cost of providing a subsidy-tax intervention program
(s, t) given the realized fundamental θ and the information friction σ. For full-participation
programs, i.e., st ≥ 1, all investors participate in the intervention program. The ex-post
8To be precise, the policy maker should set t = s = c − ε with a very small ε to avoid over-investment
when θ < 0 and keep the left dominance region.
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cost of implementation is
C(θ, s, t;σ) =
 (τs− t)
[
1− F
(
ξ∗(s,t)−θ
σ
)]
, if θ ≥ c−sb−t ,
τs
[
1− F
(
ξ∗(s,t)−θ
σ
)]
, if θ < c−sb−t .
(2.7)
For partial-participation programs cb ≤
s
t < 1, only pivotal investors participate in the
intervention program. In this case,
C(θ, s, t;σ) =
 (τs− t)
[
F
(
η∗(s,t)−θ
σ
)
− F
(
ξ∗(s,t)−θ
σ
)]
, θ ≥ c−sb−t ,
τs
[
F
(
η∗(s,t)−θ
σ
)
− F
(
ξ∗(s,t)−θ
σ
)]
, θ < c−sb−t .
(2.8)
If st <
c
b , no agents will find it profitable to opt in to the intervention program, therefore
C(θ, s, t;σ) = 0.
Proposition 8 below compares the ex-post and ex-ante expected cost of partial-participation
programs and full-participation programs, which restore first best in the limit of vanishing
information frictions.
Proposition 8 With strictly costly subsidy τ > 1, when the information friction σ goes to
0, there exists a continuum of full-participation programs (s, t) and a continuum of partial-
participation programs (s′, t′) achieving the first-best outcome, where s = s′ = c and t ≤ c <
t′ ≤ b.
For any such (s, t) and (s′, t′), given θ, the full-participation program (s, t) is ex-post more
costly than the partial-participation program (s′, t′). Specifically,
lim
σ→0
C(θ, s, t;σ) = τs− t > lim
σ→0
C(θ, s′, t′;σ) = 0, if θ > 0;
lim
σ→0
C(θ, s, t;σ) = τs− t > lim
σ→0
C(θ, s′, t′;σ) = s
′
t′ (τs
′ − t′), if θ = 0;
lim
σ→0
C(θ, s, t;σ) = lim
σ→0
C(θ, s′, t′;σ) = 0, if θ < 0.
Moreover, the full-participation program (s, t) is ex-ante strictly more costly than the partial-
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participation program (s′, t′). Specifically, lim
σ→0
EθC(θ, s, t;σ) > lim
σ→0
EθC(θ, s′, t′;σ) = 0.
The proof is in the Appendices. When the information friction is small, although both
full-participation programs and partial-participation programs can effectively reduce coor-
dination failures and restore the first-best outcome, the partial-participation programs are
ex-post weakly less costly than the full-participation programs in all states. Intuitively,
compared with full-participation programs, partial-participation programs have less par-
ticipants since the optimistic investors are deterred from participating. This subsequently
reduces the cost of implementation. If the policy maker evaluates the ex-ante expected cost
of the programs, in the limit of negligible information frictions, the partial-participation
programs incur zero cost and strictly dominate the full-participation programs.
Now we extend the analysis to the case of non-negligible information frictions σ > 0. To
facilitate the comparison of the cost of different programs given the same fundamental θ∗,
we introduce an alternative parameterization of the intervention programs. Specifically, an
intervention program (s, t) can be equivalently parameterized by (θ∗, λ) as follows,
s =
c− θ∗b
1− θ∗
+ θ∗λ,
t =
c− θ∗b
1− θ∗
+ λ.
θ∗ = c−sb−t is the target fundamental threshold, and λ =
t−s
1−θ∗ is proportional to the net tax
charged by the program when the project succeeds. λ can also be interpreted as the scale of
the program because given the same target θ∗, both tax and subsidy are strictly increasing
in λ. Intuitively, when λ increases, the intervention program charges a higher net tax and
becomes less attractive. To achieve the same target, the government needs to increase the
direct subsidy s (and the tax t at the same time) to provide more downside protection to
the investors. When λ ∈ [− c−θ∗b1−θ∗ , 0], the subsidy-to-tax ratio
s
t ≥ 1, and the program is a
full-participation program. When λ ∈ (0, b−c1−θ∗ ),
c
b <
s
t < 1, and the program is a partial-
participation program. Note that to achieve the same target θ∗, the partial-participation
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programs are larger in scale λ than the full-participation programs. The reason is that
partial-participation programs are less generous, i.e. have lower subsidy-to-tax ratio than
full-participation programs, the magnitude of partial-participation programs need to be
larger to provide more downside protection as compensation.
Suppose the policy maker is considering switching from a full-participation program (θ∗, λ)
to a partial-participation program (θ∗, λ′). The change in the expected cost of implemen-
tation comes from both the extensive and the intensive margin. On the extensive margin,
the most optimistic investors will no longer enter the program. Hence, this effect always
reduces the expected cost of intervention. However, on the intensive margin, the cost of
providing the program to an individual investor could increase or decrease. Formally, the
difference in unit cost is
ĉ(θ, s′, t′)− ĉ(θ, s, t) =
 (τθ
∗ − 1)(λ′ − λ), if θ ≥ θ∗,
τθ∗(λ′ − λ), if θ < θ∗.
With vanishing information frictions, the effect on the intensive margin is negligible because
the mass of participants in partial-participation programs goes to zero except for the knife-
edge case of θ = θ∗. Therefore, switching to any partial-participation program will always
reduce the cost of implementation. This is no longer true with non-negligible information
frictions. In proposition 9, we provide two sufficient conditions such that switching to a
partial-participation program reduces the expected cost of implementation.
Proposition 9 For any σ > 0, if 1 ≤ τ < G(θ∗, 1) or θ∗(1 + σ) < 1, there exists a
partial-participation program (θ∗, λ) which achieves θ∗ at lower expected cost than any full-
participation program targeting θ∗, where G(α, β) is defined for any 0 ≤ α ≤ β ≤ 1 as
G(α, β) =
∫ F−1(β)
F−1(α)
F (x)dx
α(F−1(β)− F−1(α))
.
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The proof involves technical details and is included in the Appendix. Here we provide
some intuitions. Since partial-participation programs provide more subsidy and charges
more tax to each participants, the effect on the intensive margin depends on the ratio of
expected mass of taxpayers to the expected mass of subsidy receivers. This ratio is equal
to G(θ∗, 1) in a partial-participation program (θ∗, λ) when λ approaches 0. If τ < G(θ∗, 1),
the ratio is large enough such that the increase in expected tax revenue is greater than
the increase in expected subsidy provision. Hence, the effect on the intensive margin also
works in favor of the partial-participation programs, and switching to a partial-participation
program with small λ reduces the expected cost. Notice for any given θ∗ < 1, G(θ∗, 1) > 1.
Therefore, the special case of τ = 1 always satisfies the first condition. The second condition
governs the relative importance of the two margins. If θ∗ and σ are jointly small, the
participation threshold η∗ for partial-participation programs is also small, therefore the
mass of participants is significantly reduced. In particular, if the second condition holds, the
effect on the extensive margin dominates that on the intensive margin, making the proposed
partial-participation program less costly than any full-participation programs. In summary,
Proposition 9 gives three circumstances in which the most cost-efficient subsidy-tax program
is a partial-participation program: ambitious target (small θ∗), small information frictions
(small σ), or small cost of subsidy τ . Note that as a special case, if the policy maker targets
at the first-best θ∗ = 0, there always exists a partial-participation program that dominates
all full-participation programs.
We use a numerical example to demonstrates how switching to a partial-participation pro-
gram from a full-participation program can reduce the expected cost of the intervention.
Suppose the prior on θ is uniformly distributed on [θ, θ̄] = [−0.2, 1.2]. The private noise ε
follows a uniform distribution over [−12 ,
1
2 ] and σ = 0.2. c and b are set to 1 and 1.25, so the
benchmark success threshold is cb = 0.8. The policy maker has a cost parameter τ = 1.05
and targets a success threshold θ∗ = 0.2. The least costly full-participation program to
achieve the equilibrium threshold is s = t = 0.9375. The ex-post cost as a function of the
realized fundamental is represented by the solid blue line in Figure 13. The cost is positive
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Figure 13: Cost Functions
for all θ > θ∗ because all investing agents sign up for the program and there’s a positive cost
τs−t of providing this program to each agent. When θ falls below θ∗, the cost surges because
the investment projects fail and the policy maker can’t recover t. Now the policy maker
switches to a partial-participation program. There’s a continuum of partial-participation
programs that targets the same threshold θ∗. We take (s′, t′) = (0.97, 1.1) for an example.
The red dashed line in the top panel of Figure 13 represents the ex-post cost function of
program (s′, t′). It has a similar shape as the cost function of the full-participation program.
However, it converges to 0 when θ is large enough so that all agents receive signals higher
than η∗ and no agents participate in the intervention program. The difference between the
two cost functions is plotted in the bottom panel. Compared to the full-participation pro-
gram, the partial-participation program incurs lower cost when θ > θ∗ because of the higher
tax charge and the lower participation rate. When θ < θ∗, since the partial-participation
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program provides higher subsidy, it incurs higher cost than the full-participation program.
On average, the partial-participation program incurs lower expected cost.
2.3.2. Discussions
From previous analyses, we show that partial-participation intervention programs can im-
prove the coordination results to the first-best outcome in the investment game, yet has
zero cost when the information friction vanishes. This result seems striking at first glance.
The most important reason why the partial-participation intervention program works ef-
fectively at a minimal cost is that it targets precisely the marginal agents who are on the
investment threshold and can be incentivized to invest relatively easily. These agents are
also the “pivotal” investors whose investment decisions are crucial in the determination of
the investment threshold. The figure below demonstrates how through higher-order beliefs,
our proposal effectively reduces coordination failure.
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Figure 14: Role of Higher-Order Beliefs
In each iteration, the lower axis denotes the signal received by an agent, and the upper axis
denotes the corresponding belief. Start from the cutoff strategy ξ∗0 , which is the original
cutoff without intervention. The partial intervention program incentivizes agents to lower
the investment threshold to ξ∗1 . Since all agents understand that more agents are willing to
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invest, given the same private signals, they all believe in a higher aggregate action l and a
higher probability of successful investment p(x; ξ∗1). Therefore, they are willing to lower their
investment threshold further to ξ∗2 . Similarly, with the additional mass of agents receiving
signals between ξ∗1 and ξ
∗
2 investing, all agents are more optimistic about the success of the
investment and therefore further lower their investment threshold to ξ3. At the same time,
as the agents become more optimistic about their investments, the intervention program
becomes less attractive, which implies a decreasing sequence of participation thresholds η∗n.
With an infinite number of iterations, both the investment threshold and the participation
threshold are significantly lowered. As the information friction decreases, investors become
more certain about the coordination results, so the mass of “pivotal” investors shrinks to
zero. However, as long as there exist a few pivotal investors, the intervention program will
have a significant effect on the investment threshold due to higher-order beliefs.
Our partial-participation programs share similar spirit to the targeted intervention pro-
grams. Sakovics and Steiner (2012) analyze coordination games with heterogeneous agents
and argue that the optimal subsidy schedule is to target a certain type of agent. In section
5, we examine an extension with heterogeneous agents and show that there exist partial-
participation programs that incur zero cost to restore first-best outcome in the limit of
negligible information frictions. Similar to the main model, in equilibrium, only a small
mass of “pivotal” agents self-select to accept the policy maker’s offer. The only difference
is that different agent types have different thresholds, and the “pivotal” agents are the ones
receiving signals around their own thresholds. The result conveys one message contrasting
Sakovics and Steiner (2012) that policy makers should target interim rather than ex-ante
important types. Also, one common problem with targeted intervention programs is that
information acquisition to identify the targeted type(s) can be costly. The policy maker
needs to correctly identify each agent’s type to implement the targeted intervention pro-
grams. In contrast, our proposed intervention programs incentivize the “pivotal” agents to
self-reveal their types, therefore the implementation only requires information on the payoff
structure of different types. As a result, our proposed program is superior to the targeted
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intervention programs in terms of reducing the costs of collecting information.
2.4. Interventions in the Presence of Moral Hazard
In this section, we address the concern of moral hazard problem of government guarantees
and demonstrate our proposal’s robustness to moral hazard problems. For example, in the
context of self-fulfilling credit freeze (Bebchuk and Goldstein, 2011), banks may abstain from
lending in fear that the other banks will withdraw lending, which results in a coordination
failure of credit crunch. If the government provides guarantees on bank losses, the banks
may have the incentive to shirk in screening and monitoring the borrowers, since the losses
caused by shirking is guaranteed by the government. In order to do incorporate moral
hazard problems in the model, we modify the game into two stages. The first stage is the
same as the benchmark model with an intervention program, except that the payoffs are not
realized until the second stage. If the realized fundamental θ < 1− l, we say the aggregate
state is Bad. In this case, the investment project fails and the game ends immediately. If
the realized fundamental θ ≥ 1 − l, we say the aggregate state is Good. In this case, the
game enters the second stage, in which investors make their effort choices. If an investor
exerts effort, the investor pays a cost of effort ce, and her project succeeds with probability
1.9 On the other hand, if an investor shirks, her own project succeeds with probability
1−γ. As in the benchmark model, the project generates b in case of success and 0 in case of
failure. And for the participants in the intervention program, they are required to pay tax
t if their investments are successful. We make the following assumption on the parameters.
Assumption 1 The investment opportunity has the following properties,
a) shirking is inefficient, ce < γb;
b) the investment projects are ex-ante efficient, b > c+ ce.
9The results hold as long as the success probability when exerting effort is between 1 − γ and 1, which
prevents the policy maker from inferring effort choice based on ex-post investment outcome. Otherwise, the
moral hazard problem can potentially be solved by imposing ex-post punishment when the policy maker
observes failed investment.
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Given the assumptions above, the first-best scenario is that all agents invest and exert effort
if the fundamental θ ≥ 0, and all agents do not invest otherwise.
The equilibrium with moral hazard problem can be solved backward. In the second stage,
an investor would exert effort if and only if
b− t− ce ≥ (1− γ)(b− t). (2.9)
This condition can be interpreted as a constraint on the size of the tax t,
t ≤ b− c
e
γ
. (2.10)
When the tax is above the threshold, participating investors has too little “skin in the
game” to exert effort, resulting in inefficient outcomes. Intuitively, with a higher cost of
effort ce or lower losses caused by shirking γ, the incentive problem is more severe, imposing
a tighter constraint on the size of tax t.
Next, we will analyze the equilibrium under different programs and examine whether a full-
participation program like government guarantee or a partial-participation program can
achieve first best when there is moral hazard problem in the private investment project. In
the context of our model, we interpret the government guarantee program as a subsidy-tax
program (s, t) with s = t, which is the full-participation programs with least cost. Since
participating in the government guarantee program weakly dominates investing alone, every
investor will take advantage of this program.
Government Guarantee. The moral hazard problem in the second stage imposes an
upper limit on the scale of the government guarantee program if the policy maker wants to
enforce effort.
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The expected payoff from investing with the government guarantee program is
E[π̃(θ, l)|xi] =
 p̂i(b− t− c
e)− (c− s), if t ≤ b− ceγ ,
p̂i(1− γ)(b− t)− (c− s), if t > b− c
e
γ .
(2.11)
From the analysis of the benchmark model, we know that in the unique Bayesian Nash
equilibrium, the fundamental threshold above which the aggregate state is good is equal
to the belief of the marginal investor. Given a program with t ≤ b − ce/γ that prevents
shirking, the fundamental threshold in equilibrium is
θ∗ =
c− s
b− t− ce
. (2.12)
Given a program with t > b − ce/γ that tolerates shirking, the fundamental threshold in
equilibrium is
θ∗ =
c− s
(1− γ)(b− t)
. (2.13)
In both cases, reducing the fundamental threshold to the first best θ∗ = 0 requires the
subsidy s to be as close to c as possible. However, by the nature of the intervention
program, this also requires the contingent tax t = s to be as close to c as possible. The
scale of the intervention program is constrained by the incentive constraint as shown in
(2.10), and whether the constraint is binding depends on the severity of the moral hazard
problem.
Assumption 2 The moral hazard problem is severe, c
e
γ > b− c.
Given Assumption 2 above, the maximum program size t that prevents shirking in the
second period is strictly less than c, the cost of the investment project. Therefore, the
government guarantee program cannot achieve efficient fundamental threshold in the first
stage and prevent shirking in the second period at the same time. The result is summarized
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in Proposition 10 below. When Assumption 2 does not hold, the government guarantee
program with t = c achieves the first-best outcome.
Proposition 10 Given Assumption 1 and 2, no government guarantee program can restore
the first-best outcome when σ → 0.
Partial-participation Programs. Now let us consider a subsidy-tax program with
s
t ∈ [
c
b , 1). Given that the tax is higher than the subsidy, whether to participate in the
program depends on investors’ idiosyncratic beliefs of the probability that the aggregate
state is good. As in the benchmark model, the program is the most attractive to agents
with intermediate beliefs. What complicates the analyses is that agents will take into ac-
count their effort decisions in the second period when they compare the cost and benefit of
participating in the program. When the moral hazard problem in the second period is not
severe, i.e., Assumption 2 does not hold, the policy maker can choose s = c and t ∈ [c, b) to
implement the first-best outcome, which is the same as government guarantee programs. In
the following analyses, we focus on the case when the moral hazard problem is severe, i.e.,
Assumption 2 holds, and full-participation government guarantee programs cannot achieve
the first best.
Given that Assumption 2 holds and t > c, the optimistic agents will reject the intervention
offer and exert effort, the agents with medium beliefs will accept the intervention offer
and shirk. Intuitively, the intervention offer reduces participant’s investment risk as well
as “skin in the game”. The most optimistic agents who strongly believe in the success of
investment do not want to share the profits with the policy maker. Therefore, they will
reject the offer and fully endogenize the payoff from investment which incentivizes them to
make the first-best effort choice. In contrast, the agents with medium beliefs are willing to
invest only if the policy maker bears part of the investment risk. However, the intervention
program also reduces their “skin in the game” because they need to share the investment
profits with the policy maker but bare the full cost of effort. As a result, these agents will
participate in the intervention program and shirk.
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Formally, given the optimal effort choices in the second stage, the expected payoffs from
{a = 1, Reject} and {a = 1, Accept} for an agent who receives signal xi and forms belief p̃i
are
E[π(θ, l)|xi] = p̃i(b− ce)− c, (2.14)
E[π̃(θ, l)|xi] = p̃i(1− γ)(b− t)− (c− s). (2.15)
The expected payoffs are linear and increasing in the belief p̃i, and the slopes are different.
The difference in the slopes of Eπ(θ, l) and Eπ̃(θ, l),
(b− ce)− (1− γ)(b− t) = γb+ t(1− γ)− ce > 0 (2.16)
is strictly positive given Assumption 1a. Investing alone is the optimal choice if and only if
the belief p̃i exceeds the critical participation belief
p∗2(s, t) ≡
s
γb+ t(1− γ)− ce
. (2.17)
Not investing is the optimal action choice if and only if the belief of the agent is worse than
the critical investment belief
p∗1(s, t) ≡
c− s
(1− γ)(b− t)
. (2.18)
The optimal action choice if the belief of success probability is between p∗1(s, t) and p
∗
2(s, t)
is to invest and accept the offer.
Similar to those in the benchmark model, the critical beliefs determine the equilibrium
thresholds of investment and participation regarding the private signal x. Investment effi-
ciency in the first stage requires the critical investment belief p∗1(s, t) to be as close to 0 as
possible, which implies that the policy maker should choose subsidy s = c. On the other
hand, if t can be selected properly such that the critical participation belief p∗2(s, t) < 1,
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the investors who are very optimistic about the aggregate state would choose to invest and
reject the offer. The exclusion of optimistic investors from the program improves efficiency
in the second stage game and reduces the policy maker’s cost from inefficient failures due
to shirking. As the information friction goes to zero, the mass of “pivotal” investors who
participate in the program goes to zero. The following proposition summarizes the result.
Proposition 11 Given Assumption 1 and 2, the equilibrium outcome given a subsidy-tax
program (s, t) with s = c and c+c
e−γb
1−γ < t < b converges to the first best when σ → 0. The
ex-ante cost of providing such program also converges to 0 when σ → 0.
The above proposition demonstrates the advantage of the partial-participation programs
compared with full-participation programs like government guarantee when the moral haz-
ard problem is relatively severe. In the benchmark model, both types of programs can
achieve the first-best outcome at zero cost with diminishing information friction if τ = 1.
They are different in terms of the program size: full-participation programs invite all in-
vestors, while partial-participation programs only target the “pivotal” investors. Absent
other frictions, the size of a program does not alter the efficiency or the cost of implement-
ing the program. However, the moral hazard problem causes welfare losses in proportion
to the size of a program. When using a government guarantee program, the policy maker
faces a trade-off between the first-stage investment efficiency and the second-stage effort
efficiency. A program with high subsidy over tax ratio ( st ) encourages investment in the
first stage but deters effort input in the second stage. This trade-off limits the role of the
government guarantee program in improving social efficiency. On the contrary, despite the
moral hazard problem, a partial-participation program still achieves the first-best outcome
at zero cost. The advantage of partial-participation programs in dealing with moral hazard
is that they only involve a small mass of investors. Although these participating investors
shirk in the second stage, it will have a limited impact on the social welfare since the mass
of these participating investors goes to zero as the information friction vanishes. In general,
the partial-participation program proposed in this paper is superior to the full-participation
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programs such as government guarantee in the presence of any size-related inefficiency.
2.5. Extensions
2.5.1. Unobservable Ex-ante Heterogeneity
In this part, we study whether the existence of ex-ante heterogeneity in agents’ payoff struc-
ture and information structure changes our results. The assumptions on the heterogeneity
resemble those in Sakovics and Steiner (2012). Our analyses differ from their paper in two
dimensions. First, they studied the optimal intervention when the policy maker can only
provide a lump-sum subsidy, while we consider subsidy-tax programs. Second, they assume
the types of agents are observable, while we allow for hidden types.
There are N groups of infinitesimal agents indexed by g, each group with mass mg. There
are three folds of heterogeneity. First, the agents differ in their profitability. They pay the
same investment cost c yet earn different revenue bg from successful investment. Assume
there is no inefficient project, so bg > c for all g. Second, the agents impose different
levels of externalities for the coordination results. Specifically, the aggregate action l =∑N
g=1
∫mg
0 w
gagi di. Same as in the benchmark model, the condition that investment is
successful is l ≥ 1− θ. The weights are normalized such that
∑N
g=1w
gmg = 1. Lastly, each
agent receives a private signal xgi = θ + σε
g
i , where ε
g
i is independent across agents and
follows a group-specific distribution with c.d.f. F g(ε), the support of which is
[
−12 ,
1
2
]
. We
assume an agent’s group is not observable to the policy maker. However, the policy maker
knows the composition of agents.
The equilibrium without intervention is summarized by the following proposition.
Proposition 12 Without intervention, there is a unique equilibrium in which an agent in
group g invests if and only if her private signal is greater or equal to ξg0 , which is given by
ξg0 =
N∑
g=1
mgwg
c
bg
+ σF−1g
( c
bg
)
. (2.19)
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From the above proposition, we can calculate the fundamental threshold θ∗ above which
the investments are successful. The expression for the fundamental threshold is given by
θ∗ =
N∑
g=1
mgwg
c
bg
, (2.20)
which is a weighted average of the cost-benefit ratio of different types of agents. Let bmin =
min {bg}Ng=1. The following proposition shows our previous results still hold when there is
unobservable heterogeneity among agents.
Proposition 13 Given a subsidy-tax program with s < c and s < t < bmin, there exists a
unique equilibrium in which a type j agent follows the strategy below,
a = 1,Reject, if x ≥ η∗g(s, t),
a = 1,Accept, if ξ∗g(s, t) ≤ x < η∗g(s, t),
a = 0, if x < ξ∗g(s, t),
where
ξ∗g(s, t) =
N∑
g=1
mgwg
c− s
bg − t
+ σF−1g
(
c− s
bg − t
)
,
η∗g(s, t) =
N∑
g=1
mgwg
c− s
bg − t
+ σF−1g
(s
t
)
.
When s = c and c < t < bmin, the equilibrium outcome converges to the first-best outcome
and the expected cost of the program converges to 0 when σ → 0.
If agents also differ in the cost of investment, i.e., cg can be different across groups, we need
to relax the assumption that type are unobservable to the government. Instead, we assume
the government can observe ci for each individual agent. If ci = c
g1 = cg2, the government
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does not need to know whether agent i is from g1 or g2. Under this setup, it is equivalent
to solve the problem with c̃g = 1 and b̃g = b
g
cg , then scale up agent i’s offer by c
g
i .
The intuition for how our proposed intervention program works in the case with ex-ante
heterogeneous agents is essentially the same as in the benchmark model. The intervention
program incentivizes “pivotal” agents who originally choose not to invest to change their
decisions. All agents knowing that there is an increase in the aggregate action l all believe in
a higher probability of success. Amplified by higher-order beliefs, the intervention program
can efficiently restore the first-best coordination results. Note that the notion of “pivotal”
agents refers to the interim type of agents. Since different groups earn different profitabilities
from successful investments, they require a different success probability to agree to invest.
Our intervention program identifies and targets agents with beliefs right below the cutoffs of
their own group. In Sakovics and Steiner (2012), they only look at direct subsidy programs
and argue that an efficient program should target the ex-ante “pivotal” group, the group
with low bg and high wg in our setup. Our results above demonstrate that by allowing an
additional intervention tool, the contingent tax t, we are able to reduce coordination failure
at a much lower cost. Moreover, the implementation of our proposed program does not
require information on an agent’s group, therefore our proposed program could save the
potential cost of information acquisition.
2.5.2. General Payoff Structure
In this section, we follow the setups of the symmetric binary-action global games in Morris
and Shin (2003) and allow for general monotonic payoff functions.
As in the benchmark model in section 2, an agent’s payoff from not investing (ai = 0) is
normalized to zero. An agent’s payoff from investing (ai = 1) is modified to be a continuous
function π(x, l), which weakly increases in both the private signal x and the aggregate action
l =
∫ 1
0 aidi.
10 The fundamental θ follows a uniform distribution on [θ, θ̄]. The private signal
10We assume the payoff is a function of the private signal instead of the fundamental for simplicity of
demonstration. Our results still hold under the alternative setup. See Morris and Shin (2003) for the
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received by agent i is xi = θ + σεi, where εi are i.i.d. and has a density function f(ε) and
a distribution function F (ε) with support [−12 ,
1
2 ].
For simplicity, we only consider the family of linear intervention programs. In general, we
could allow transfer as a non-linear function of the agents’ payoff. The intervention program
(s, t) consists of two parts, a direct subsidy s ≥ 0 and a proportional tax t ∈ [0, 1]. If an
agent accepts the offer, she receives the direct upfront subsidy s and pays the proportional
tax after the realization of the investment outcome. Her payoff from accepting the offer is11
π̃(x, l) = (1− t)π(x, l) + s. (2.21)
Agents who receive low private signals believe in low realization of the fundamental θ and low
aggregate action l, so they are pessimistic about their payoffs from investments. Therefore,
they expect to pay low tax and are more willing to accept the offer than optimistic agents.
Recall the partial-participation programs in the benchmark model. These programs do not
appeal to the optimistic agents who do not need extra incentive to invest, which efficiently
saves resources and reduces the cost of the program. The proportional tax t captures this
feature and helps to target agents receiving medium signals.
We adopt the standard assumptions on the payoff function in the literature.
Assumption 3 The payoff function π(x, l) satisfy the following properties:
1. (Monotonicity) The payoff function π(x, l) is weakly increasing in both arguments.
2. (Strict Laplacian State Monotonicity)
∫ 1
0 π(x, l)dl is strictly increasing in x.
discussion of the two setups.
11 One might notice that when π(x, l) < 0, investors end up paying a negative “tax”. In fact, let π =
π(θ − 1
2
σ, 0) be the lower bound of the payoff. The intervention program can be implemented by providing
a positive subsidy s− tπ and imposing a proportional tax t on the positive tax base π(x, l)− π.
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3. (Limit Dominance) There exists θ0, θ1 ∈ (θ + 12σ, θ̄ −
1
2σ) such that
π(x, 1) < 0, for all x < θ0, (2.22)
π(x, 0) > 0, for all x > θ1, (2.23)
4. (Continuity)
∫ 1
0 g(l)π(x, l)dl is continuous in x for any density function g.
The first assumption states the strategic complementarities among the investment choices
of different agents. The individual payoff of investing increases when more agents invest.
Also, a higher fundamental increases everyone’s incentive to invest, given the same aggregate
investment. Note that the payoff function need not be strictly increasing or continuous. For
example, the payoff function in our benchmark model in Section 2 is a step function. The
role of the second assumption is to make sure the equilibrium is unique when it exists,
with or without the intervention program. The third assumption ensures the existence of
two dominance regions so that we can adopt the iterated deletion of dominated strategies
from both sides. The last assumption regulates integration of the payoff function so the
equilibrium always exists.
The equilibrium without intervention is characterized in the proposition below. The “nat-
ural outcome” serves as a benchmark to analyze the effect of intervention programs.
Proposition 14 Without intervention (s = t = 0), when the information friction σ is
small enough, there is a unique equilibrium in which each agent invests if and only if her
private signal x ≥ ξ∗0 given by ∫ 1
0
π(ξ∗0 , l)dl = 0.
Compare the coordination results characterized in the above proposition with the first-best
outcome. In the first-best scenario, if all agents investing can generate positive surplus, the
social optimal outcome is for all agents to invest. In other words, the first-best scenario is
that all agents follow the same cutoff strategy θ0, the upper bound for the left dominance
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region. By Assumption 3, unless π(θ0, l) = 0 for any l ∈ [0, 1], the natural coordination
outcome ξ∗ > θ0. Therefore if the realized fundamental θ ∈ (ξ∗, θ0), there would be a
coordination failure. And the goal of intervention is to reduce the coordination threshold
from ξ∗ to as close to θ0 as possible.
Next we analyze the equilibrium with an intervention program (s, t). We focus on the
partial-participation programs and demonstrate its zero cost of implementation in the lim-
iting case. Proposition 15 summarizes the conditions for such partial-participation pro-
grams. For the convenience of discussion, we first define partial-participation programs
with targeted threshold for coordination failure as follows.
Definition 2 A intervention program (s, t) is a partial-participation program with target
ξ∗ if and only if it satisfy the following three conditions,
1. (Intervention Target)
∫ 1
0 π(ξ
∗, l)dl = − s1−t .
2. (Optimism Exclusion) π(ξ∗, 1) > st ,
3. (Left Dominance Region) π(θ, 1) < − s1−t ,
Denote a coordination game with information friction σ and intervention program (s, t) by
G(σ; s, t), we can prove the following proposition.
Proposition 15 Given a partial-participation program (s, t) with target ξ∗, the following
two properties must be satisfied in any Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the coordination game
G(σ; s, t),
1. Agents invests if and only if their private signal x > ξ∗;
2. There exists a threshold η∗(σ) such that investing agents strictly prefer not to partic-
ipate in the intervention program if and only if their private signal x > η∗(σ).
When σ → 0, η∗(σ) converge to ξ∗.
80
The above proposition provides conditions under which there exist partial-participation
programs to reduce the investment threshold to ξ∗. Same as in the benchmark regime-
change model, in the limit, ex ante expected mass of participants goes to zero, which
implies zero cost of implementation. The question remaining is whether there exist such
programs to costlessly restore the first-best scenario, i.e. ξ∗ = θ0. The proposition below
answers this question.
Proposition 16 If
∫ 1
0 π(θ0, l)dl ≥ π(θ, 1), for any ξ
∗ ∈ (θ0, ξ∗0), there exists a partial-
participation program with target ξ∗.
With the intervention program, all agents become more optimistic about their investment
payoff. Therefore, the left dominance region, where agents prefer not to invest even if l = 1,
shrinks. The condition specified in Proposition 16 guarantees that the left dominance re-
gion still exists with the intervention program. If the condition is violated, there might
be multiple equilibria when targeting ξ∗ close to θ0. However, if we follow the equilibrium
refinements proposed in Goldstein and Pauzner (2005), we can select the equilibrium de-
scribed in Proposition 15 even without the left dominance region. Therefore, following the
refinements, there always exists a partial-participation program that restores the first-best
scenario. Moreover, the left dominance region may disappear because we limit our attention
to programs with linear transfers. Linear transfer schedules generally gives a lot of subsi-
dies in case of low fundamental. If the policy maker lowers subsidies in the case of very low
fundamental realizations (when θ < θ0) or adds convexity to the tax schedule properly, the
left dominance region as well as the uniqueness of the equilibrium can be recovered. Either
way, there always exists an intervention program that can restore the first-best scenario.
2.6. Selected Applications
The partial-participation programs can be applied to various contexts with coordination
problems. In this section, we discuss three representative applications.
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2.6.1. Debt Rollover
It has been widely recognized in the literature that panic-based debt run can leads to
inefficient firm default. Specifically, consider a firm with many small debt-holders. The
firm is more likely to survive if more debt-holders roll over their debts. Therefore, debt-
holders’ rollover decisions features strategic complementarities. When the fundamental of
the firm is weak, debt-holders might stop rolling over their debts because they worry the
others would also stop, which can leads to self-fulfilling debt run. Our analyses suggest
tranching can be a cost-efficient way to reduce such coordination failure. Instead of one
standard debt contract, the firm can issue two types of debts with different seniorities.
The senior debt promises lower return yet provides higher payment than the junior debt
when the firm defaults. Without tranching, debt-holders who have medium beliefs and
coordination concerns would not roll over their standard debts. With the safer option of
senior debt, they are willing to lend to the firm which eases the liquidity concern of the firm
and boosts all debt-holders’ beliefs in the firm’s survival. This effect can be amplified by
higher order beliefs. In equilibrium, only the pivotal debt-holders choose the senior option.
However, the availability of the safer senior debt improves all debt-holders’ belief in that
the firm can raise enough funds to survive.
Bank run is another similar application. To implement the partial-participation programs,
the government can offer optional but costly deposit insurance. In fact, Alipay, the largest
online payment platform in China, offers all users an option to purchase insurance against
losses on their associated financial accounts. The insurance is costly if their accounts are
safe yet provides protection when the platform fails. Therefore, it would work in a similar
way as the senior debt option to reduce coordination failure. It is less costly than the
mandatory deposit insurance because it screens for the “pivotal depositors” and leaves out
the optimistic depositors who would not run even without insurance protection.
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2.6.2. Market Freeze
During the 2008 financial crisis, many financial institutions and investors significantly re-
duced their leverage. This process pushed down the market prices of Commercial Mortgage-
Backed Securities (CMBS) and Residual Mortgage-Backed Securities (RMBS). The markets
for RMBS and CMBS froze, and prices were well below their fundamentals. Among others,
coordination failure can prevent the market from thawing. If only a few investors partici-
pate in the market for Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS), the liquidity in the market is not
enough to drive the prices back to the fundamental and the participating investors suffer
losses on their investments. However, if a significant amount of liquidity is injected in the
market, the prices are more likely to be driven back to reflect the fundamental and investors
who bought at a discount can profit from the investment.
In March of 2009, the US Treasury announced the Legacy Securities Public-Private Invest-
ment Program (PPIP). Under the program, private equity was matched by government
equity and debt to form Public-Private Investment Funds (PPIFs) and purchase highly
rated legacy MBS from financial institutions. Private investors in the PPIFs effectively
receive investment subsidies from the government and are levered up for their investment.
They earn higher investment return in good times and are protected by limited liabilities
in bad times. Hence, PPIP is uniformly beneficial to all qualifying private investors and
can be interpreted as full-participation programs in our model. PPIP is not efficient in
resource allocation in the sense that part of the government funding is provided to the
optimistic investors who would have invested in MBS market without PPIP. According to
our analyses, the government can reduce the cost of rejuvenating the market by offering a
partial-participation program instead. Mapping into the context of PPIP, the government
could offer to inject equity into PPIFs in proportion to debt holdings by private investors.
This option of debt investment reduces the losses from freezing the MBS market. As a
return, the government shares the profit of investment if the market for MBS is successfully
rejuvenated. This offer incentivizes the pivotal investors to invest in the MBS market. Since
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all investors are aware of the offer, they know that the aggregate investment will increase
and hence also have more incentive to invest.
2.6.3. Shopping Mall Investment
We analyze a real investment problem in this section. Pashigian and Gould (1998) docu-
ments the strategic complementarities among department stores in the same shopping mall.
Specifically, department stores with reputations can bring in mall traffic and increase the
sales of less-known stores. As discussed in Sakovics and Steiner (2012), the difference in
reputation maps into wg, the importance in coordination outcome of different groups in
section 5.1.
Consider a newly opened shopping mall inviting different brands to open new stores. Since
all stores benefit from customers’ visit to the shopping mall, all stores’ investment return
increases in the occupancy ratio of the shopping mall. Therefore, coordination failure
could lead to low occupancy ratio and failure of the shopping mall. In order to boost
investment, according to our analyses, the shopping mall manager could offer an equity
injection option. Specifically, if a brand accepts the equity injection offer and opens a new
store in the shopping mall, the shopping mall manager pays part of the investment cost
and receives proportional profit made by the store as a return. This offer is not appealing
to the optimistic brands because they do not want to share the profits with the shopping
mall. For brands that are around investment threshold, the equity injection offer reduces
their investment risk and increases their expected payoff from the investment. Amplified by
higher-order beliefs, all brands significantly lower their investment threshold. Moreover, in
equilibrium, only the “pivotal” brands accept the offer. Therefore the resources to finance
the intervention program are efficiently allocated.
It is reasonable to assume different brands have different profit functions. We have shown in
section 5.2 that the interim critical agents who are around their own investment thresholds
self-select to accept our offer. The result that the equity injection offer effectively reduces
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coordination failure and incurs low financing cost for the shopping mall owner still holds.
2.7. Conclusions
In this paper, we analyze a canonical coordination game under global games framework and
propose a novel intervention program for a policy maker to reduce coordination failures.
The intervention program screens for the marginal agents who receive medium signals,
which reduces the cost of implementation for the program. At the same time, correctly
incentivizing the marginal agents have a significant impact on all agents due to strategic
complementarities and the amplification through higher order beliefs. In the limit of zero
noise in agents’ private signals, our proposed program eliminates all coordination failures
at zero cost since the expected mass of marginal investors goes to zero. Compared with
conventional government guarantee type of programs, our proposed program not only incurs
lower cost of implementation but also is shown to be more robust to moral hazard problems.
We demonstrate with three examples that our proposed program has a wide range of ap-
plications in improving coordination failures. As a concluding remark, we would like to
point out some limitations of the proposed program. First, the program requires the policy
maker to observe and condition the provision of the program on agents’ action choices,
which might not be feasible. For example, in the context of panic-based currency attack,
it is hard to trace the identities of the currency holders and give them an optional offer.
Second, the effectiveness of the proposed program relies on agents’ rationality. If agents
possess bounded rationality, the amplification effect through higher order beliefs will be
limited.
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APPENDIX
A.1. Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1.1. Endogenizing Interbank Lending Contracts
Recall that the borrowing banks in the interbank capital market are subject to the regulatory
constraint below.
Rlai + 1 + xi − ai ≥ crxi (A.1)
When there is insufficient regulatory requirement (c < 1), banks might agree bilaterally to
post additional collateral (i.e. increase c) to mitigate the counter-party risks,. To address
this concern, in this section, I check the pairwise stability and see whether both the lending
bank and the borrowing bank can be better-off with safer interbank contracts. I first show
that without any friction, banks would voluntarily choose to use risk-free contracts for
interbank lendings. However, with minimum cost of inspection associated with posting
additional collateral, in the “bad equilibrium” with low interest rate, banks would stick to
the risky contracts.
Below I consider the case without any friction and show that all banks choose to trade
with risk-free contracts. Let cmin denote the exogenous minimum regulatory requirement.
Banks can contract on additional collateral and achieve any c ∈ [cmin, 1]. Given interest rate
function r(c), for a bank with belief π, let {a∗(π, c), x∗(π, c)} denote the bank’s portfolio
choice if it trades with collateral level c and c∗(π) denote the bank’s choice of collateral level.
In equilibrium, given interest rate function r(c), banks’ portfolio strategy {a∗(π, c), x∗(π, c)}
and contract strategy c∗(π) must satisfy
1. (Individual Rationality) a∗(π, c) and x∗(π, c) solves the portfolio choice problem
for a bank with belief π on interbank capital market c.
2. (Pairwise Stability) For any two banks i 6= j ∈ [0, 1], there is no c such that
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(a) x∗(πi, c)x
∗(πj , c) < 0;
(b) U(a∗(πi, c), x
∗(πi, c)|πi, c) ≥ U(a∗(πi, c∗(πi)), x∗(πi, c∗(πi))|πi, c∗(πi)));
(c) U(a∗(πj , c), x
∗(πj , c)|πj , c) ≥ U(a∗(πj , c∗(πj)), x∗(πj , c∗(πj))|πj , c∗(πi)));
(d) at least one of (b) and (c) holds with strict inequality.
where U(a, x|π, c) = π(Rha−rx)+(1−π)(Rla−rx)+1+x−a is the expected payoff
function for a bank with belief π and portfolio choice {a, x} on interbank capital
market c.
It turns out that the only market with positive trading volume is the risk-free interbank
capital market with collateral requirement c = 1, which is summarized in Proposition 17
below.
Proposition 17 In equilibrium, all risky interbank capital markets (c < 1) have zero trad-
ing volume.
The figure below plots a bank’s expected payoff as a function of its belief, and the red line
highlights its optimal choice. For the optimistic banks with high π, they borrow in the
interbank capital markets and are indifferent between risky and safe contracts. However,
for the lending banks with low π, they strictly prefer to lend with the safe contract which
optimizes risk allocation in the financial system. Intuitively, trading on interbank capital
markets improves risk allocation. Since the lending banks believe in a high probability
of economic recession, it is more costly for them to bear risks than the borrowing banks
with optimistic beliefs. Through interbank transactions, the borrowing banks effectively
lever up their risk-taking by promising the safer cash flows backed by collaterals to the
lending banks. When the collateral requirement c decreases, each borrowing bank is able
to take a higher leverage and earn higher expected payoff, the interest rate representing
the cost of borrowing surges at the same time because the lending banks demand higher
promised return to compensate for the risk. The risk-free interbank capital market with
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Lender (c < 1)
c = 1 allows the borrowing banks to bear all the risks and the lending banks to be free from
risks, which optimizes the risk allocation and maximizes the total surplus. Therefore, the
risk-free interbank capital market is the only active market in equilibrium.
In a frictionless world, all banks choose to use risk-free contracts backed by sufficient collat-
eral, and hence no bank defaults in equilibrium. However, in reality, unsecured interbank
lending does exist. Moreover, even for collateralized wholesale funding market like asset-
backed securities (ABS) and mortgage-backed securities (MBS), defaults do occur indicating
that these securities are undercollateralized and not risk-free. Below I introduce the cost
of inspection to the lenders in the interbank capital market and demonstrate that in the
bad equilibrium with interbank capital market freeze, banks optimally choose to trade with
risky contracts. Note that as long as writing safe contracts is more costly than writing risky
contracts, the result goes through. Since for each unit of interbank lending, safe contract
requires more collateral, it incurs a higher cost associated with inspecting the quality of
the collateral. Especially for opaque and nonstandard assets, in order to make sure the
value of the collateral is sufficient in recessions, the cost of inspection and monitoring is not
negligible.
Specifically, lenders in the interbank capital market need to pay a cost of inspection I(c)
for each unit lent when they require additional collateral, where I(c) > 0 ∀c > cmin and
I(cmin) = 0. In the bad equilibrium with interbank capital market freeze, all banks are
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relatively pessimistic about the coordination outcome, and very few banks borrow in the
interbank capital market resulting in a low interest rate. Therefore, in the bad equilibrium,
borrowing banks extract almost all surplus from the interbank trading. As long as the safe
interbank contract incurs higher cost of inspection than risky interbank contract, the total
surplus from trading is lower for safe interbank lending. Hence, in the bad equilibrium with
low cost of borrowing in the interbank capital markets, borrowing banks can extract more
surplus from risky interbank lending than safe interbank lending. Recall from section 5 that
without inspection cost, for interbank capital market with collateral level c, the lower bound
for interest rate is r(c) = Rh−Rlc(R−1)+1−Rl . Proposition 18 below states that when the interest
rate for interbank cmin is low enough, all other interbank capital markets with additional
collateral requirement are crowed out.
Proposition 18 When r(cmin) → r(cmin), banks lend with risky contracts with collateral
level cmin.
The figure below plots the banks’ expected payoffs as a function of their beliefs. The dashed
π
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Lender (c = cmin)
line represents the expected payoff of a lender on interbank capital market c > cmin when
there is no inspection cost. Without inspection cost, additional collateral improves risk
allocation between the lending banks and the borrowing banks, and banks always prefer
to lend with additional collateral. However, in the bad equilibrium with low interest rates,
the surplus extracted by the lending banks goes to zero. As long as the inspection cost is
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positive, lending on interbank capital markets with additional collateral requirements are
dominated by safe storage or lending without additional collateral.
A.1.2. Demand Noise on the Interbank Capital Market
In this appendix, I show how the noise on the public signal can be micro-founded by demand
noise in the interbank capital market.
With the demand noise in the interbank capital market εD(r, εp), the aggregate demand
depends on the realization of the demand shock σp, and the market-clearing condition is
re-written as follow,
DN (θ, r, εp) = D(θ, r) + εD(r, εp) = 0, (A.2)
where D(θ, r) =
∫∞
−∞ x(π(θ + σsεs, r))φ(εs)dεs is the aggregate rational demand by the
banks. I follow Angeletos and Werning (2006) and Hellwig et al. (2006), and assume the
following functional form of the demand noise εD(r, εp),
Assumption 4 The demand noise in the interbank capital market takes the following func-
tional form,
εD(r, εp) =Φ
(
h (d, r) +
σp
σs
εp + d
)
− rc
rc−Rl
Φ
(
h (d, r) +
σp
σs
εp
)
where d =
Φ−1(π∗2)−Φ−1(π∗1)√
δ
, εp ∼ N (0, 1) and h(d, r) is an implicit function such that
Φ(h(d, r))
Φ(h(d, r) + d)
= 1− Rl
rc
.
Below I demonstrate how the noisy demand εD(r, εp) introduces noise on the public in-
formation revealed by the market-clearing interest rate r. Recall that without frictions,
the market-clearing interest rate conveys perfect information about the realization of the
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fundamentals θ = z(r), which is the unique solution to
D(z(r), r) =
Rl
rc−Rl
(
1− Φ
(
s∗2(r)− θ
σs
))
−
(
Φ
(
s∗2(r)− θ
σs
)
− Φ
(
s∗1(r)− θ
σs
))
= 0.
With the implicit function h(d, r) defined in Assumption 4, we can express the perfect
information z(r) as follows,
z(r) = s∗2(r) + σsh
(
s∗2(r)− s∗1(r)
σs
, r
)
.
Then it can be easily verified by substituting θ = z(r) + σpεp in equation A.2 that
DN (z(r) + σpεp, r, εp) = 0.
In other words, observing interest rate r, banks infer that the fundamentals θ = z(r)+σpεp.
As mentioned in section 1.4.2, when the interest rate is high such that interbank lending is
guaranteed, it corresponds to a special case that the lower belief cutoff to become a lending
bank π∗1(r) = 0, and the lower signal cutoff s
∗
1(r) = −∞. Substituting in π∗1(r) = 0, the
expression for the demand noise εD(r, εp) in Assumption 4 can be simplified as
εD(r, εp) = 1−
rc
rc−Rl
Φ
(
Φ−1
(
1− Rl
rc
)
+
σp
σs
εp
)
.
Similarly, when strict regulations (c = 1) make sure that interbank capital market is risk-
free, the demand noise follows the above simplified form.
One final remark for introducing demand noise in the interbank capital market is that the
coordination outcome depends on the realization of the demand shock. Therefore, given
realized fundamentals θ, we can only predict the probability of an economic expansion.
Even so, it can be easily verified that the probability of an economic expansion increases
in θ. Nonetheless, in this paper, I focus on the limiting case when σp → 0, which gives
lim
σp→0
εD(εp, r) = 0 ∀r ∈ [1, R). Therefore, in the limit, the coordination result becomes
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deterministic.
A.1.3. Non-Negligible Public Noise
In this appendix, I briefly discuss the equilibrium in the non-limiting case when the noise
on the public signal σp > 0, and demonstrate that the model is smooth in σp such that
results hold in general in the non-limiting case.
I first consider the risky interbank capital market case in section 1.4. Figure 15 plots the
fundamental threshold θ∗(r) (red line) and the market-clearing interest rate r∗(θ) (blue).
The general expressions for the two functions can be found in the proof of Proposition 2.
Panel (a) is the non-limiting case when the noise on the public signal σp > 0, while panel
(b) is the limiting case discussed in the main text. Given any interest rate r, we can find the
corresponding fundamentals that clears at this rate from the blue line representing r∗(θ),
and the fundamental threshold from the red line representing θ∗(r). Therefore, if the blue
line lies above the red line at fundamentals θ, the economy is in an expansion with profitable
credit supply to the real sector.
r
θ
1
r Rh
r∗(θ)
θ∗(r)
(a) σp > 0
r
θ
1
r Rh
r̂(θ)
lim
σp→0
θ∗(r)
(b) σp → 0
Figure 15: Equilibrium (Risky Interbank Capital Market)
Note that when the public noise is non negligible (panel a), if θ is in the middle region, there
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can be three different market-clearing interest rates. Figure 16 plots the demand and supply
curve for a given realization of θ in the multiple equilibria region. Although there are three
possible market-clearing interest rate, point B is unstable in the sense that if interest rate
increases, there are more demand and less supply pushing the rate even higher. Moreover, it
converges to C in the limit. In panel (a) of Figure 15, the “hump” on the left gets narrower
as the the noise σp vanishes and disappears in the limit. Therefore, I focus on the two stable
equilibria, i.e. point A and C. Point A corresponds to the efficient equilibrium in which
interbank capital flows are active and the interest rate is high, resulting in high aggregate
credit supply and economic expansion. In contract, point C corresponds to the inefficient
equilibrium in which interbank capital market freezes and the interest rate is low, resulting
in low aggregate credit supply and economic recession.
Figure 16: Demand/Supply Curve (Risky Interbank Capital Market)
Figure 17 plots the case when interbank lending is risk-free. Panel (a) displays the general
results when the demand noise is non-negligible, while panel (b) corresponds to the limiting
case.
0Parameter values: θ = 0.2, c = 0.8, Rl = 1.3, δ = 0.01, σs = 0.5
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In the general case, as long as θ > 0, there exists an equilibrium in which the interest
rate r ∈ (1, Rh), and abundant credit supply supports an economic expansion. While for
θ ≤ θ∗(1), there exists another equilibrium with interest rate r = 1, and the shortage of
credit supply leads to an economic recession.
r
θ
θ̄
θ∗(1)
1 Rh
r∗(θ)
θ∗(r)
(a) σp > 0
r
θ
θ̄
θ∗0
1 Rh
r̂(θ)
lim
σp→0
θ∗(r)
(b) σp → 0
Figure 17: Equilibrium (Risk-Free Interbank Capital Market)
A.1.4. Extra Financial Regulations: c > 1
This section analyzes the case in which banks face extra financial regulations. Figure 18
below presents the optimal portfolio choice of a bank given its belief π(si, r). Compared with
the risk-free interbank capital market case(c = 1), a bank faces tighter leverage constraint
and therefore is able to borrow less. In other words, the extra regulations effectively increase
the cost of borrowing in the interbank capital markets. In particular, when the interest
rate r = 1, the optimistic banks will not borrow to invest in the safe storage, and their
portfolio choice is deterministic. However, the pessimistic banks are still indifferent between
interbank lending and the safe storage. As a result, similar to the case with c = 1, an interest
rate r = 1 conveys a vague public signal about the fundamental.
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a = rc
rc−Rl
, x = Rl
rc−Rl
a = 0, x = −1
π∗ = r−Rl
Rh−Rl
π
(a) r ∈ (1, Rh)
a = c
c−Rl
, x = Rl
c−Rl
a = 0, x ∈ [−1, 1
c−1 ]
π∗ = 1−Rl
Rh−Rl
π
(b) r = 1
Figure 18: Portfolio Choice (Extra Regulatory Requirements)
Market clearing condition in the interbank capital market, the interbank capital market
rate r serves as a public signal with normally distributed noise, i.e.
z(r) = θ − σpεp if r ∈ (1, Rh),
z(1) ≥ θ − σpεp if r = 1,
where z(r) = s∗(r)− σsΦ−1
(
Rl
cr
)
.
When the interest rate r ∈ (1, Rh), all banks’ budget constraints are binding. In other
words, although each optimistic bank borrows less with stringent regulatory requirement,
in aggregate, all capital available in the financial system are lent out to the real sectors
through interbank trading. Hence, in the limit of vanishing demand noise in the interbank
capital market, the aggregate lending A = 1 and therefore the fundamental threshold θ∗ = 0
which is the first-best outcome.
When the interest rate r = 1, pessimistic banks who receive negative signals about the
fundamentals θ are indifferent between lending in the interbank capital market and the
safe storage technology. Similar to the case with just sufficient regulatory requirement,
fundamentals θ ∈ (−∞, θ̄) can clear at r = 1 in equilibrium, while θ̄ is higher under extra
regulatory requirement. The reason is that when fundamentalsθ are high, a large mass of
banks receive positive signals and are willing to borrow in the interbank capital market gen-
erating an upward pressure on the interest rate r. Under extra regulatory requirement, each
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optimistic bank is allowed to borrow less which limits the upward pressure on the interest
rate, and hence the interbank capital markets can clear at r = 1 for higher realizations of
fundamentals θ. As a result, an interest rate r = 1 conveys more positive information about
the fundamentals θ. In summary, although the extra regulatory requirement limit the bor-
rowing capacity of each optimistic bank, and hence the allocative role of interbank capital
markets, the information conveyed by the interest rate r = 1 becomes more positive which
enhances all banks beliefs through the informative role. These two effects cancel out giving
the same fundamental threshold θ∗. The proposition below summarizes the equilibrium in
the limit of vanishing noise on the public signal.
Proposition 19 In the limit of vanishing noise on the public signal, i.e. σp → 0,
1. for any θ > θ̄(c), r̂(θ) = Rh, and the economy is in an expansion;
2. for any θ ∈ [θ∗0, θ̄(c)], r̂(θ) ∈ {Rh, 1}, and the economy is in an expansion regardless
of the interest rate;
3. for any θ ∈ (0, θ∗0), r̂(θ) ∈ {Rh, 1}, the economy is in an expansion if r̂(θ) = Rh, and
the economy is in a recession if r̂(θ) = 1;
4. for any θ ≤ 0, r̂(θ) = 1, and the economy is in a recession;
where θ∗0 =
1−Rl
Rh−Rl and θ̄(c) =
1−Rl
Rh−Rl + σs
[
Φ−1
(
Rl
c +
(
1− Rlc
)
1−Rl
Rh−Rl
)
− Φ−1
(
Rl
c
)]
which
increases monotonically in c ≥ 1. The fundamental threshold function lim
σp→0
θ∗(r) is the
same for any c ≥ 1.
Under extra regulatory requirement (c > 1), the fundamental threshold function lim
σp→0
θ∗(r)
is the same as in the case when c = 1. Therefore, in terms of aggregate coordination outcome
or the return of bank lending to the real sectors, extra regulations seems costless. However,
they reduce efficient lending and raise inefficient lending for all realizations of fundamentals
θ. When the interest rate r̂(θ) = Rh, all capital held by the pessimistic banks are channeled
through interbank capital market to the optimistic banks, and hence the aggregate lending
96
by the banking system A = 1. The proposition below summarizes the welfare implication
when r̂ = 1 under extra regulatory requirement (c > 1).
Proposition 20 In the limit of vanishing noise trading, i.e. σp → 0, in the equilibrium
with interest rate r̂(θ) = 1,
• when θ ∈ (−∞, θ∗0), the economy is in a recession, and the inefficient lending A strictly
increases in c for all c ≥ 1;
• when θ ∈ (θ∗0, θ̄(1)), the economy is in an expansion, and the efficient lending A strictly
decreases in c for all c ≥ 1.
To summarize, although the aggregate state of the economy is the same, extra financial
regulations imposes welfare loss in the equilibrium with r = 1 for all realizations of funda-
mentals θ.
A.1.5. Analysis of Short Selling Restrictions
As mentioned in Section 1.6.1, if banks are restricted from short selling as in the main
model, the equilibrium implications follow Proposition 4 in the risk-free interbank capital
market case.
Below I relax the short selling constraint by allowing ai to be negative and compare the
coordination outcomes with the case when short selling is restricted. In particular, given
its belief π, bank i solves the portfolio choice problem below,
max
{ai,xi}
π(Rhai − rxi) + (1− π)(Rlai − rxi) + 1 + xi − ai
s.t. ai ≤ 1 + xi (Budget Constraint)
Rlai + 1 + xi − ai ≥ rxi (Regulatory Constraint - Borrower)
Rhai + 1 + xi − ai ≥ rxi (Margin Constraint - Short Seller)
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Note that when short selling is allowed, the short sellers may default if the asset lives
through the fire sales and generates a high return Rh. To eliminate the counter-party risks
and isolate the effect of short selling, I impose a margin constraint on the short sellers to
make sure they don’t default when they make a wrong bet.
Figure 19 below characterizes the optimal portfolio choice of a bank given its belief π.
In comparison to the case when short selling is restricted, as plotted in Figure 4, the
optimistic banks don’t short sell, and their portfolio choices remain the same. Specifically,
they borrow in the interbank capital market and invest all available capital in the financial
asset. However, the pessimistic banks with low private signals choose to speculate by short
selling. They lend in the interbank capital market and use their interbank lending as margin
to short sell the financial assets.
a = r
r−Rl
, x = Rl
r−Rl
a = − r
Rh−r
, x = − Rh
Rh−r
π∗(r) = r−Rl
Rh−Rl
π
(a) r ∈ (1, Rh)
a = 1
1−Rl
, x ≥ Rl
1−Rl
a = − 1
Rh−1
, x ≥ − Rh
Rh−1
π∗(1) = 1−Rl
Rh−Rl
π
(b) r = 1
Figure 19: Portfolio Choice (Short Selling Allowed)
When the interest rate r ∈ (1, Rh), short selling activities have no aggregate effect on
the financial market. The reason is that the short sellers also lend in the interbank capital
market, and their capital is eventually invested in the financial asset by the optimistic banks,
which cancels out their short selling practices. To see it more clearly, since all banks budget
constraint binds, i.e., ai = 1 + xi, the market-clearing condition in the interbank capital
market implies that the aggregate investment in the financial asset A = 1 in equilibrium.
However, if the interest rate r = 1, the pessimistic banks, which short sell the financial
asset, may invest in the safe storage technology. In this case, short selling can have real
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impacts on the financial market. Proposition 21 below summarizes the destabilizing effect
of short selling activities.
Proposition 21 When short selling is allowed, in the limit of vanishing interpretation
noise, there exists an equilibrium in which for any θ ∈ (θ∗0, θ∗1), the interest rate r̂(θ) = 1
and the financial market melts down, where θ∗1 =
Rh(1−Rl)
(Rh−1)(Rh−Rl) > θ
∗
0.
Recall that if short selling is restricted, as shown in the lower panel of Figure 5, as long
as fundamentals θ > θ∗0, the economy is in an expansion, which corresponds to a healthy
financial market in this section. However, if short selling is allowed, when the fundamentals
θ ∈ (θ∗0, θ∗1), there is a possibility of financial market meltdown due to fire sale activities.
Intuitively, short selling activities directly aggravate the fire sale pressure by reducing the
aggregate investment A. On top of that, aware of this direct effect, banks observing a
low interest rate r = 1 become more pessimistic about the health of the financial market.
Therefore, the mass of pessimistic banks that short sell the financial asset increases, which
further intensifies the fire sale pressure. These two effects reinforce each other and jointly
lead to a meltdown of the financial market for higher fundamentals θ. Hence, short selling
restrictions not only directly reduce fire sales but also maintain the confidence of banks
investing in the financial asset, which in aggregate stabilizes the financial market.
A.1.6. Analysis of Credit Default Swaps
Naked CDS Banned
When naked CDS on sovereign debt is banned, I call the market a covered CDS market.
In this subsection, I establish the equivalence between the covered CDS market and the
risk-free interbank capital market analyzed in section 1.5. Below is the portfolio choice
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problem for investor i given its belief π.
max
{a,x}
πRha
′
i + (1− π)(Rla′i − x′i) + 1 + px′i − a′i
s.t. a′i ≤ 1 + px′i (Budget Constraint)
1 + (Rl − 1)a′i + px′i ≥ x′i (Regulatory Constraint)
a′i(Rh −Rl) + x′ ≥ 0 (Covered Constraint)
a′i ≥ 0 (Short-Sell Constraint)
It turns out that there is a one-to-one mapping between investors’ portfolio choice and
banks’ portfolio choice in the risk-free interbank capital market case. Specifically, a risk-
free covered portfolio can be constructed by investing in sovereign debt and purchasing CDS
contracts in proportion to hedge the risk. The upper bound for the price of CDS contract,
p̄ = Rh−1Rh−Rl , is such that the covered portfolio generates a return of one, such that investors
are indifferent between the covered portfolio and the safe storage. As shown in Figure
20, if the price of CDS contract is low p ∈ (0, p̄), the covered portfolio generates higher
returns than the safe storage, and the pessimistic investors invest their endowed capital in
the covered portfolio. The optimistic investors, on the other hand, sell CDS contracts, then
invest their endowed capital and the proceeds from selling CDS contracts in the sovereign
debt. Effectively, the optimistic investors are borrowing from the pessimistic investors to
relax their budget constraint and invest more in the sovereign debt. In this sense, the CDS
market is playing a similar allocative role as the interbank capital market in channeling
funds from the pessimistic investors to the optimistic investors. When the price of CDS
contract is high p = p̄, the pessimistic investors are indifferent between the safe storage and
the risk-free covered portfolio. From the optimistic investors’ perspective, the profit from
selling CDS contract is so high that they are indifferent between investing directly in the
sovereign debt and selling CDS contract. In fact, if an investor makes the portfolio choice
{a′, x′} = {a− rRhx,
(Rh−Rl)r
Rh
x} given the price of a CDS contract p = Rh−r(Rh−Rl)r , she receives
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a′ = 1
1−Rlp
, x′ = 1−(1−Rl)a
′
1−p
a′ = 1
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, x′ = −(Rh −Rl)a′
π∗(p) = 1−Rlp
1+(Rh−Rl)p
π
(a) p ∈ (0, p̄)
a′ ∈
[
0, 1
1−Rlp̄
]
, x′ = 1−(1−Rl)a
′
1−p̄a
′ ∈
[
0, 1
1+p̄(Rh−Rl)
]
, x′ = −(Rh −Rl)a′
π∗(p̄) = 1−Rl
Rh−Rl
π
(b) p = p̄
Figure 20: Portfolio Choice (Naked CDS Banned)
the same payoff as investing a and borrows x at interest rate r in the bank’s problem. Hence,
the covered CDS market is equivalent to a risk-free interbank capital market in terms of
portfolio choice and the allocative role.
The information structure also follows the interbank capital market model. Besides its
private signal si, investor i also observes the market clearing CDS price p, which clears the
CDS market and reveals public information. Since the optimal portfolio choice is equivalent
to that in the interbank capital market model, there is also a one-to-one mapping for
the market-clearing condition. Following that, with the same interpretation noise when
investors extract information from the market-clearing CDS price, we can figure out the
one-to-one mapping for the belief-updating process of the investors. Therefore, the covered
CDS market is also equivalent to a risk-free interbank capital market in the informative role.
With the equivalence in both resource allocation and information revelation, the equilibrium
implications described in Proposition 3-5 hold for the covered CDS market. The upper panel
in Figure 8 summarizes the equilibrium coordination outcome.
Naked CDS Allowed
If naked CDS is allowed, that is, if the covered constraint is removed from investors’ portfolio
choice problem, the CDS market is no longer equivalent to an interbank capital market. In
particular, the pessimistic investors can speculate against the solvency of the government
by investing in naked CDS contracts.
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Investors’ optimal portfolio choice is summarized in Figure 21. In contrast to the previous
case, the pessimistic investors now choose to speculate by purchasing CDS contracts without
investing in the sovereign debt. For the optimistic investors, when the price of CDS contracts
is low, such that p ∈ (0, p̄), they make the same portfolio choice as in the covered CDS
market case displayed in Figure 20. Specifically, they sell CDS contracts to relax their
budget constraints, then invest their endowed capital and the proceeds from selling CDS
contracts in sovereign debt. Therefore, the CDS market plays an active allocative role in
channeling all capital from the pessimistic investors to the optimistic investors and boosting
the investment in the sovereign debt. Hence, speculations by the pessimistic investors do
not threaten the solvency of the government when the price of CDS contracts is low.
a′ = 1
1−Rlp
, x′ = 1−(1−Rl)a
′
1−p̄a
′ = 0, x′ = − 1
p
π∗(p) = 1−Rlp
1+(Rh−Rl)p
π
(a) p ∈ (0, p̄)
a′ ∈
[
0, 1
1−Rlp̄
]
, x′ = 1−(1−Rl)a
′
1−p̄a
′ = 0, x′ = − 1
p
π∗(p̄) = 1−Rl
Rh−Rl
π
(b) p = p̄
a′ = 0, x′ = 1
1−pa
′ = 0, x′ = − 1
p
π∗(p) = 1− p π
(c) p ∈ (p̄, 1)
Figure 21: Portfolio Choice (Naked CDS Allowed)
The starkest contrast to the previous case is that the price of CDS contracts can rise above
p̄. At such high CDS price, the optimistic investors find it more profitable to speculate
by selling CDS contracts without investing in the risky sovereign debt. As a result, all
investors spend all their endowment on speculation based on their private beliefs, resulting
in zero aggregate investment in the sovereign debt. In other words, the speculation activities
completely crowd out the sovereign debt investment. Proposition 22 below summarizes the
destabilizing effect of naked CDS trading on the solvency of the government.
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Proposition 22 If naked positions are allowed, in the limit of vanishing interpretation
noise, there exists an equilibrium in which for any θ ∈ (θ∗0, 1), the CDS price p = 1 and the
sovereign debt defaults.
As shown in the lower panel of Figure 8, without the ban on naked CDS contracts, when
fundamentals θ ∈ (θ∗0, 1), naked CDS trading harms the sovereign stability in the sense
that it creates the possibility that all investors, pessimistic and optimistic, speculate based
on their beliefs, which crowds out the sovereign debt market. Therefore, the ban of such
abusive speculations with naked CDS enhances the sovereign stability.
A.1.7. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1.
Given a bank’s belief of the probability that bank lending to the real sector is profitable π,
the bank solves the portfolio choice problem below.
max
a∈[0,1]
π(Rha+ 1− a) + (1− π)(Rla+ 1− a)
Therefore, a bank will optimally chooses a = 1 if its belief π ≥ 1−RlRh−Rl and a = 0 otherwise.
Next, I will prove the uniqueness of equilibrium by iterated deletion of dominated strategies.
Strategies survive n rounds of iterated deletion of dominated strategies if and only if
a(s) = 0, if s < sn, (A.3)
and a(s) = 1, if s ≥ s̄n. (A.4)
where {(sn, s̄n)}
∞
n=0 satisfies
−∞ = s0 < s1 ≤ · · · ≤ sn ≤ · · · ≤ s̄n ≤ · · · ≤ s̄1 < s̄0 = +∞. (A.5)
This result can be proven by induction. Let s0 = −∞ and s̄0 = +∞. Therefore, the first
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round of deletion starts with the full set of strategies. Let π(s; k) denote the belief of a
bank with private signal s when all other banks follow a cutoff strategy k,
π(s; k) = Pr(θ > θ∗k|s) = Φ
(
s− θ∗k
σs
)
where θ∗k is the fundamental threshold when all banks follow the cutoff strategy k and
satisfies Φ
(
k−θ∗k
σs
)
= θ∗k. Suppose round n ∈ N of deletion has been completed. In round
n + 1, the best scenario for a bank to lend is that all other banks follow a cutoff strategy
with threshold sn. Therefore, for any s such that π(s; sn) <
1−Rl
Rh−Rl , a(s) = 0 is the dominate
strategy. Similarly, the worst scenario for a bank to choose a(s) = 1 is that all other banks
follow a cutoff strategy with threshold s̄n. As a result, for s such that π(s; s̄n) >
1−Rl
Rh−Rl ,
a(s) = 1 is the dominant strategy.
Given that π(s; k) is non-decreasing in s, the strategy profiles that survives deletion of
dominated strategies can be summarized in the form of (A.19)(A.20), with (sn+1, s̄n+1)
defined inductively as
sn+1 = inf
{
s : π(s; sn) ≥
1−Rl
Rh −Rl
}
(A.6)
and
s̄n+1 = sup
{
x : π(x; s̄n) ≤
1−Rl
Rh −Rl
}
(A.7)
The monotonicity of π(s; k) guarantees that sn+1 ≤ s̄n+1 given sn ≤ s̄n. Note that the
dominance region assumption implies that s1 > −∞ and s̄1 < +∞. Therefore, {(sn, s̄n)}
∞
n=0
is a well-defined sequence of real couple which satisfies (A.21).
Now we’ve proved that {sn}∞n=1 and {s̄n}∞n=1 are both monotonic and bounded sequences.
Thus, they converges to two finite numbers s and s̄ respectively when n→∞. And the two
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limits satisfy
s ≤ s̄. (A.8)
The definition (A.22)(A.23) implies that π(s; s) ≥ 1−RlRh−Rl and π(s̄; s̄) ≤
1−Rl
Rh−Rl . Note that
π(s; s) = Φ
(
s− θ∗s
σs
)
= θ∗s , (A.9)
is strictly increasing in s. Therefore s = s̄ = s∗0 must be the unique solution to θ
∗(s) =
1−Rl
Rh−Rl , which is
s∗0 =
1−Rl
Rh −Rl
+ σsΦ
−1
(
1−Rl
Rh −Rl
)
. (A.10)
Since there’s only one strategy that survives the iterated deletion of dominated strategies,
the equilibrium of the game is unique and the associated equilibrium strategy is the cutoff
strategy with threshold s∗0.
Proof of Lemma 1. If bank i chooses to become a borrower (xi ≥ 0), its portfolio choice
problem given its belief πi is
max
{a,x}
E(u) = πi max{0, Rhai + 1 + xi − ai − rxi}+ (1− πi) max{0, Rlai + 1 + xi − ai − rxi}
s.t. ai ≤ 1 + xi (Budget Constraint)
Rlai + 1 + xi − ai ≥ crx (Regulatory Constraint)
ai ≥ 0 (Short-Sell Constraint)
xi ≥ 0 (Borrowing Constraint)
Borrower’s portfolio choices can be broken down into three cases depending on the default
outcome. The first case is when Rhai+1+xi−ai−rxi < 0, i.e. borrower i defaults in both
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expansions and recessions. In this case, the expected payoff of a borrower is zero, which is
strictly dominated by {a, x} = {0, 0} with an expected payoff of one. Hence, a borrower
will never choose a portfolio that always defaults.
The second case is when Rlai + 1 + xi − ai − rxi ≥ 0, i.e. borrower i pays back in full in
both expansions and recessions. Under this extra constraint, the expected payoff function
can be written as E(u) = (πiRh+ (1−πi)Rl)ai+ 1 +xi−ai− rxi, and the optimal portfolio
choice is
ai = 0 and xi = 0, if πi <
1−Rl
Rh −Rl
,
ai = 1 and xi = 0, if πi ∈
(
1−Rl
Rh −Rl
,
r −Rl
Rh −Rl
)
,
ai =
r
r −Rl
and xi =
Rl
r −Rl
, if πi >
r −Rl
Rh −Rl
.
Hence, if bank i never defaults, it will borrow only when πi ≥ r−RlRh−Rl , and its expected
payoff is E(u) = πi r(Rh−Rl)r−Rl .
The last case is when Rlai + 1 +xi− ai− rxi < 0 ≤ Rhai + 1 +xi− ai− rxi, i.e. borrower i
defaults in recessions and pays back in full in expansions. In this case, the expected payoff
function can be written as E(u) = πi(Rhai + 1 + xi − ai − rxi). Note that in this case,
the optimal portfolio choice is independent of bank i’s belief. Bank i optimally chooses
{ai, xi} = { crcr−Rl ,
Rl
cr−Rl } and achieves expected payoff E(u) = πi
r(Rhc−Rl)
cr−Rl > πi
r(Rh−Rl)
r−Rl ,
i.e. higher than that achieved when bank i never defaults.
Hence, in equilibrium, all borrowing banks choose {ai, xi} = { crcr−Rl ,
Rl
cr−Rl } and default only
in recessions. When borrowing bank i defaults, it pays back the lender in the interbank
capital market Rlai+1+xi−aixi = cr for each dollar borrowed. Therefore, all lending banks
expect to receive full promised return r when firm loans are profitable and cr otherwise.
Proof of Lemma 2. Banks’ strategy functions are uniquely characterized by equation 1.1-
1.8. Below I characterize the other elements of the equilibrium. The information contained
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from market-clearing interest rate r is z(r), which is characterized by
D(z(r), r) =
Rl
rc−Rl
(
1− Φ
(
s∗2(r)− θ
σs
))
−
(
Φ
(
s∗2(r)− θ
σs
)
− Φ
(
s∗1(r)− θ
σs
))
= 0.
We can express the information revelation function z(r) as follows,
z(r) = s∗2(r) + σsh
(
s∗2(r)− s∗1(r)
σs
, r
)
, (A.11)
where h(d, r) is an implicit function such that
Φ(h(d, r))
Φ(h(d, r) + d)
= 1− Rl
rc
.
Given bank i’s private signal si and the public signal z(r)+σpεp, θ follows a normal posterior
distribution with mean µ(si, r) = δsi + (1 − δ)z(r) and standard deviation σ =
√
δσs.
Therefore, the beliefs of the marginal banks who receives signal s∗2(r) and s
∗
1(r) are
π(s∗2(r), r) = Φ
(
µ(s∗2(r), r)− θ∗(r)
σ
)
= π∗2(r)
π(s∗1(r), r) = Φ
(
µ(s∗1(r), r)− θ∗(r)
σ
)
= π∗1(r)
which implies
s∗2(r)− θ∗(r)
σs
=
√
δΦ−1 (π∗2(r))− (1− δ)h
(
s∗2(r)− s∗1(r)
σs
, r
)
, (A.12)
and
s∗2(r)− s∗1(r)
σs
=
Φ−1(π∗2)− Φ−1(π∗1)√
δ
. (A.13)
At the fundamental threshold θ∗(r), the aggregate investment
A(θ∗(r), r) =
cr
cr −Rl
(
1− Φ
(
s∗2(r)− θ∗(r)
σs
))
= 1− θ∗(r).
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Plugging in equation A.12, we have
θ∗(r) =
cr
cr −Rl
Φ
[√
δΦ−1 (π∗2(r))− (1− δ)h
(
Φ−1(π∗2)− Φ−1(π∗1)√
δ
, r
)]
− Rl
cr −Rl
.
Hence, we can get the expression of signal threshold from equation A.12
s∗2(r) = θ
∗(r) + σs
[√
δΦ−1 (π∗2(r))− (1− δ)h
(
Φ−1(π∗2)− Φ−1(π∗1)√
δ
, r
)]
.
From equation A.13, we can then get the expression for s∗1(r)
s∗1(r) = s
∗
2(r)− σs
Φ−1(π∗2)− Φ−1(π∗1)√
δ
.
Substituting in the expressions for s∗1(r) and s
∗
2(r), we can characterize z(r) that is uniquely
defined in equation A.11. Therefore, substituting in the expression for z(r) and θ∗(r), we
can characterize the belief function as follows,
π(si, r) = Φ
(
δsi + (1− δ)z(r)− θ∗(r)
σ
)
.
Proof of Proposition 2.
Large interest rate When r ∈ [c−1, Rh), π∗1(r) = 0 and s∗1(r) = −∞. Hence, substituting
in the expression of s∗2(r), we can rewrite the market-clearing condition as follows,
θ = z(r∗(θ)) = θ∗(r∗(θ)) + σs
(√
δΦ−1 (π∗2(r
∗(θ)))− δΦ−1
(
Rl
cr
))
where
θ∗(r) =
cr
cr −Rl
Φ
[√
δΦ−1 (π∗2(r)) + (1− δ)Φ−1
(
Rl
cr
)]
− Rl
cr −Rl
.
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Note that lim
σp→0
z(r) = 0 ∀r ∈ (r,Rh) and lim
r→Rh
z(r) = ∞. In other words, for θ > 0, there
exists at least one market clearing rate r∗(θ) ∈ [c−1, Rh). Next, I prove that the limit of
the interest rate r̂(θ) = lim
σp→0
r∗(θ) = Rh. That is for any ε > 0, there exists a σ̄p > 0 such
that ∀σp < σ̄p, |Rh − r∗(θ)| < ε, i.e. r∗(θ) > Rh − ε.
• ∀r ∈ [1, Rh − ε], lim
σp→0
θ∗(r) = 0. Therefore, there exists a σ̄1 such that ∀σp < σ̄1,
|θ∗(r)| < θ2 .
• Similarly, ∀r ∈ [1, Rh − ε], lim
σp→0
σs
(√
δΦ−1 (π∗2(r))− δΦ−1
(
Rl
cr
))
= 0. Therefore,
there exists a σ̄2 such that ∀σp < σ̄2,
∣∣∣σs (√δΦ−1 (π∗2(r))− δΦ−1 (Rlcr ))∣∣∣ < θ2 .
Therefore, for any σp < σ̄p = min{σ̄1, σ̄2} and any r ∈ [1, Rh − ε], we have z(r) < θ.
Moreover, since z(r) is continuous and lim
r→Rh
z(r) = ∞, the solution to market-clearing
condition r∗(θ) > Rh − ε. Therefore, r̂(θ) = lim
σp→0
r∗(θ, εp) = Rh. Moreover, since θ
∗(r) T 0
if and only if
√
δΦ−1 (π∗2(r
∗(θ))) T δΦ−1
(
Rl
cr∗(θ)
)
. Therefore, θ∗(r∗(θ)) and θ − θ∗(r∗(θ))
have the same sign. As a result, if θ > 0, it must be θ∗(r∗(θ)) > 0 and θ − θ∗(r∗(θ)) > 0.
Therefore, for any θ > 0, there exists a market clearing interest rate r̂ = Rh, and the
economy is in an expansion.
Small interest rate When the interest rate r∗(θ) ∈ (r, c−1), substituting in the expres-
sion of s∗2(r) and s
∗
1(r), we can rewrite the market-clearing condition as follows,
θ = z(r∗(θ)) = θ∗(r∗(θ)) + Θ(r∗(θ)).
where
θ∗(r) =
cr
cr −Rl
Φ
[√
δΦ−1 (π∗2(r))− (1− δ)h
(
Φ−1(π∗2(r))− Φ−1(π∗1(r))√
δ
, r
)]
− Rl
cr −Rl
,
and
Θ(r) = σs
(√
δΦ−1 (π∗2(r)) + δh
(
Φ−1(π∗2(r))− Φ−1(π∗1(r))√
δ
, r
))
.
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Note that as r decreases to r, h
(
Φ−1(π∗2)−Φ−1(π∗1)√
δ
, r
)
→ −∞. Therefore, θ∗(r) increases to
1 at the speed of h and Θ(r) decreases to −∞ at a slower speed of δh as r decreases to
r. Moreover, both functions lim
σp→0
θ∗(r) = 0 and lim
σp→0
Θ(r) = 0 ∀r ∈ (r, c−1). Hence, when
σp → 0, as r decreases to r, θ∗(r) first dominates Θ(r) resulting in the sum close to 1 then
decreases to −∞ as Θ(r) later dominates. In other words, for θ ∈ (−∞, 1), there exists at
least one market clearing rate r ∈ (r, c−1). Next I will show that r̂(θ) = lim
σp→0
r∗(θ) = r
for all θ that has a market clearing rate r ∈ (r, c−1). That is for any ε > 0, there exists a
σ̄p > 0 such that ∀σp < σ̄p, |r − r∗(θ)| < ε, i.e. r∗(θ) < r + ε.
• ∀r ∈ [r + ε, c−1], lim
σp→0
θ∗(r) = 0. Therefore, there exists a σ̄1 such that ∀σp < σ̄1,
|θ∗(r)| < | θ2 |.
• Similarly, ∀r ∈ [r + ε, c−1], lim
σp→0
Θ(r) = 0. Therefore, there exists a σ̄2 such that
∀σp < σ̄2, |Θ(r)| < | θ2 |.
Therefore, for any σ < σ̄ = min{σ̄1, σ̄2} and any ∀r ∈ [r + ε, c−1], we have −|θ| < θ∗(r) +
Θ∗(r) < |θ|. Moreover, since θ∗(r) + Θ∗(r) is continuous and lim
r→r
θ∗(r) + Θ∗(r) = −∞, the
solution to market-clearing condition r∗(θ) < r + ε. Therefore, r̂(θ) = lim
σp→0
r∗(θ, εp) = r.
Moreover, Θ(r) increases in r, and as r decreases to r lim
r→r+
Θ(r) = −∞. Therefore, for any
θ < 1, there exists an interest rate r̂(θ) = r, and θ − θ∗(r) = Θ(r) < 0, i.e. the economy is
in a recession.
Proof of Proposition 3. When r ∈ (1, Rh), the posterior belief of marginal bank with
private signal s∗(r) is normally distributed with mean µ(s∗(r), r) = s∗(r)−(1−δ)σsΦ−1
(
Rl
r
)
and standard deviationσ =
√
δσs. Hence the belief of the marginal bank who receives signal
s∗(r) is
π(s∗(r), r) = Φ
(
µ(s∗(r), r)− θ∗(r)
σ
)
=
r −Rl
Rh −Rl
which implies
s∗(r)− θ∗(r)
σs
= (1− δ)Φ−1
(
Rl
r
)
+
√
δΦ−1
(
r −Rl
Rh −Rl
)
(A.14)
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At the fundamental threshold θ∗(r), the aggregate investment
A(θ∗(r), r) =
r
r −Rl
(
1− Φ
(
s∗(r)− θ∗(r)
σs
))
= 1− θ∗(r).
Plugging in equation A.14, we have
θ∗(r) =
r
r −Rl
Φ
[√
δΦ−1
(
r −Rl
Rh −Rl
)
+ (1− δ)Φ−1
(
Rl
r
)]
− Rl
r −Rl
. (A.15)
Hence, we can get the expression of signal threshold from equation A.14
s∗(r) = θ∗(r) + σs
[√
δΦ−1
(
r −Rl
Rh −Rl
)
+ (1− δ)Φ−1
(
Rl
r
)]
(A.16)
In the limit,
lim
σp→0
θ∗(r) =
r
r −Rl
Φ
[
Φ−1
(
Rl
r
)]
− Rl
r −Rl
= 0.
Below I analyze the equilibrium thresholds when r = 1. For the marginal bank who receive
private signal s∗(1), the posterior p.d.f. of θ is
f(θ|s∗(1), r = 1) ∝ φ
(
si − θ
σs
)
Φ
(
z(1)− θ
σp
)
.
In the limit of vanishing noise on the public signal, it converges to a truncated normal
distribution N (s∗(1), σs) truncated from above at z(1) = s∗(1)− σsΦ−1(Rl). Therefore, in
the limit, the belief of the marginal bank is
lim
σr→0
π(s∗(1), 1) =
1
1−Rl
Φ
 limσp→0 s∗(1)− limσp→0 θ∗(1)
σs
−Rl
 = 1−Rl
Rh −Rl
.
The aggregate lending at the fundamental threshold θ∗(1) can be expressed as
lim
σp→0
A(θ∗(1), 1) =
1
1−Rl
1− Φ
 limσp→0 s∗(1)− limσp→0 θ∗(1)
σs

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Substituting in the expression lim
σr→0
π(s∗(1), 1), we have
lim
σp→0
A(θ∗(1), 1) = 1− lim
σr→0
π(s∗(1), 1) =
Rh − 1
Rh −Rl
.
Therefore, the fundamental threshold lim
σp→0
θ∗(1) = 1 − lim
σp→0
A(θ∗(1), 1) = 1−RlRh−Rl . Hence,
the signal threshold in the limit is
lim
σp→0
s∗(1) =
1−Rl
Rh −Rl
+ σsΦ
−1
(
Rl + (1−Rl)
1−Rl
Rh −Rl
)
. (A.17)
Proof of Proposition 4. If the market-clearing interest rate r∗(θ) ∈ (1, Rh), the market-
clearing condition implies that
θ = z(r∗(θ)) = s∗(r∗(θ))− σsΦ−1
(
Rl
r∗(θ)
)
Substituting in the expression of s∗(r) in equation A.16,
θ = z(r∗(θ)) = θ∗(r∗(θ)) + σs
(√
δΦ−1
(
r∗(θ)−Rl
Rh −Rl
)
− δΦ−1
(
Rl
r∗(θ)
))
Given lemma 2 below, it can be easily verified that z(r) monotonically increases in r in the
limit. The proof of lemma 2 can be found at the end.
Lemma 3 In the limit when σp → 0, θ∗(r) monotonically increases in r.
Note that lim
σp→0
z(r) = 0 ∀r ∈ (1, Rh) and lim
r→Rh
z(r) = ∞. Since z(r) increases in r
monotonically, for any θ > 0, there exists a market clearing interest rate r∗(θ) ∈ (1, Rh).
Next, I prove that the limit of the interest rate r̂(θ) = lim
σp→0
r∗(θ) = Rh. That is for any
ε > 0, there exists a σ̄p > 0 such that ∀σp < σ̄p, |Rh − r∗(θ)| < ε, i.e. r∗(θ) > Rh − ε.
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• ∀r ∈ [1, Rh − ε], lim
σp→0
θ∗(r) = 0. Therefore, there exists a σ̄1 such that ∀σp < σ̄1,
|θ∗(r)| < θ2 .
• Similarly, ∀r ∈ [1, Rh − ε], lim
σp→0
σs
(√
δΦ−1
(
r−Rl
Rh−Rl
)
− δΦ−1
(
Rl
r
))
= 0. Therefore,
there exists a σ̄2 such that ∀σp < σ̄2,
∣∣∣σs (√δΦ−1 ( r−RlRh−Rl)− δΦ−1 (Rlr ))∣∣∣ < θ2 .
Therefore, for any σp < σ̄p = min{σ̄1, σ̄2} and any r ∈ [1, Rh − ε], we have z(r) < θ.
Moreover, since z(r) is continuous and lim
r→Rh
z(r) = ∞, the solution to market-clearing
condition r∗(θ) > Rh − ε. Therefore, r̂(θ) = lim
σp→0
r∗(θ, εp) = Rh.
Next, I show that the economy is in an expansion. It suffices to show that θ > θ∗(r∗(θ)).
The interbank capital market clearing implies that
θ − θ∗(r∗(θ)) =
√
δΦ−1
(
r∗(θ)−Rl
Rh −Rl
)
− δΦ−1
(
Rl
r∗(θ)
)
.
Recall the expression of fundamental threshold θ∗(r) in equation A.15. It can be easily
verified that θ∗(r) T 0 if and only if
√
δΦ−1
(
r∗(θ)−Rl
Rh−Rl
)
T δΦ−1
(
Rl
r∗(θ)
)
. Therefore, θ∗(r∗(θ))
and θ − θ∗(r∗(θ)) have the same sign. As a result, if θ > 0, it must be θ∗(r∗(θ)) > 0 and
θ − θ∗(r∗(θ)) > 0. Therefore, for any θ > 0, there exists a market clearing interest rate
r̂ = Rh, and the economy.
When the equilibrium interest rate r∗(θ) = 1, the interbank capital market-clearing condi-
tion implies
θ ≤ z(1) = s∗(1)− σsΦ−1(Rl).
Let θ̄ = lim
σp→0
z(1). Substituting in the expression for s∗(1) in equation A.17, we have
θ ≤ θ̄ = 1−Rl
Rh −Rl
+ σs
[
Φ−1
(
Rl + (1−Rl)
1−Rl
Rh −Rl
)
− Φ−1(Rl)
]
.
Therefore, for θ ≤ θ̄, there exists a market clearing interest rate r̂(θ) = 1. As proved in
Proposition 3, lim
σp→0
θ∗(1) = θ∗(0). Therefore, for any θ ∈ [θ∗(0), θ̄], the economy is in an
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expansion; for any θ < θ̄, the economy is in a recession.
Proof of Lemma 3. By definition, lim
σp→0
√
δ = lim
σp→0
√
σ2p
σ2s+σ
2
p
= 0. Therefore, it is
equivalent to look at the limit of
√
δ → 0. The Taylor expansion of θ∗(r) with respect to
√
δ is
θ∗(r) =
r
r −Rl
φ
[
Φ−1
(
Rl
r
)]
Φ−1
(
r −Rl
Rh −Rl
)√
δ +O(δ).
Let α1(r) = φ
[
Φ−1
(
Rl
r
)]
and α2(r) = Φ
−1
(
r−Rl
Rh−Rl
)
. Then the term with order of
√
δ, i.e.
α(r) = rr−Rlα1(r)α2(r)
√
δ.
α′(r) =
√
δ
(
− Rl
(r −Rl)2
α1α2 +
Rl
r(r −Rl)
Φ−1
(
Rl
r
)
α2 +
r
(r −Rl)(Rh −Rl)
α1
φ(α2)
)
>
√
δ
(
− Rl
(r −Rl)2
α1α2 −
1
(r −Rl)
α1α2 +
r
(r −Rl)(Rh −Rl)
α1
φ(α2)
)
=
√
δrα1
(r −Rl)2φ(α2)
(
−α2φ(α2) +
r −Rl
Rh −Rl
)
>
√
δrα1
(r −Rl)2φ(α2)
(
−Φ(α2) +
r −Rl
Rh −Rl
)
= 0
Therefore, in the limit when σp → 0, θ∗(r) monotonically increases in r.
Proof of Proposition 5.
As specified in Proposition 1, in the benchmark without an market, banks follow the thresh-
old strategy s∗0 = θ
∗
0 − σsΦ−1 (1− θ∗0), where θ∗0 =
1−Rl
Rh−Rl is the fundamental threshold.
Hence, we can write the equilibrium aggregate lending as a function of the realized funda-
mentals as follow,
A0(θ) = Φ
(
θ − s∗0
σs
)
= Φ
(
θ − θ∗0
σs
+ Φ−1(1− θ∗0)
)
.
When the interest rate r̂(θ) = Rh, all banks’ budget constraint binds, i.e. ai = 1 +
xi ∀i. Therefore, in aggregate, A(θ, r̂(θ)) = D(θ, r̂(θ)) + 1. The market-clearing condi-
tion, D(θ, r̂(θ)) = 0 implies that the aggregate lending in equilibrium is A(θ, r̂(θ)) = 1 >
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A0(θ) ∀θ > 0. That is the interbank capital market increases the efficient credit supply in
economic expansions when the interest rate r̂(θ) = Rh.
When the interest rate r̂(θ) = 1, the equilibrium aggregate lending is
lim
σp→0
A(θ∗(1), 1) =
1
1−Rl
Φ
(
θ − s∗(1)
σs
)
Substituting in the expression for s∗(1) in equation A.17,
lim
σp→0
A(θ, 1) =
1
1−Rl
Φ
(
θ − θ∗0
σs
+ Φ−1((1−Rl)(1− θ∗0))
)
Next, I will compare the aggregate lending with that in the benchmark. Define the difference
between the aggregate lending as follow
∆(θ) = lim
σp→0
A(θ, 1)−A0(θ).
Note that ∆(θ∗0) = 0, i.e. at the fundamental threshold, the welfare achieved by introducing
the interbank capital market is the same as in the benchmark. Moreover, lim
θ→−∞
∆(θ) = 0,
because the aggregate lending goes to zero as the fundamentals decrease in both cases. Take
the first order derivative with respect to θ,
d∆(θ)
dθ
= β
(
eγ(θ−θ
∗
0) − (1−Rl)
)
where β and γ are two positive constant. There exists a unique θ = θ∗0 +γ
−1ln(1−Rl) < θ∗0
such that d∆(θ)dθ R 0 if and only if θ R θ. Therefore, when the realized fundamentals θ > θ
∗
0,
∆(θ) > ∆(θ∗0) = 0, i.e. the interbank capital market increases the efficient credit supply.
When the realized fundamentals θ < θ∗0, ∆(θ) < max {∆(θ∗0), lim
θ→−∞
∆(θ)} = 0, i.e. the
interbank capital market decreases the inefficient credit supply.
Proof of Proposition 17. Lemma 1 specifies the optimal portfolio choice for borrowers
in the interbank capital market with collateral requirement c. Therefore, for a borrower
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who has belief πi and borrows on interbank capital market c, its expected payoff can be
written as
πi
r(c)(Rhc−Rl)
cr(c)−Rl
Since borrowers always default when they suffer losses from their bank loans to the operating
firms, to maximize their expected payoffs, they can simply maximize their payoffs when their
bank loans are profitable. Therefore, every borrower regardless of its belief solves the same
maximization problem, i.e.
max
c
πi
r(c)(Rhc−Rl)
cr(c)−Rl
= πi max
c
r(c)(Rhc−Rl)
cr(c)−Rl
.
Let ū = maxc
r(c)(Rhc−r)
cr(c)−r denote a borrower’s maximum payoff when bank loans are prof-
itable. In equilibrium, if an interbank capital market c has positive trading volume, its
interest rate r(c) must satisfy
r(c) =
ūRl
(ū−Rh)c+Rl
.
Hence, we can restrict attention to interbank capital markets with above interest rate.
Below I analyze formally the portfolio choice problem from a lender’s perspective. For
lender j with belief πj , it achieves expected payoff specified below by lending on interbank
capital market c.
πjr(c) + (1− πj)cr(c) =
ūRl(πj + (1− πj)c)
c(ū−Rh) +Rl
.
It must be higher than πj ū which is the expected payoff for being a borrower. Therefore,
lenders in the interbank capital markets must have beliefs π ≤ Rlū−Rh+Rl . In equilibrium, if
lender j lends on a risky interbank capital market with c < 1, it must earn a higher return
than lending on the risk-free interbank capital market with c = 1, i.e.
ūRl(πj + (1− πj)c)
c(ū−Rh) +Rl
≥ ūRl
ū−Rh +Rl
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which gives πj ≥ Rlū−Rh+Rl . Therefore, a lender who lends on interbank capital market with
c < 1 must have belief π = Rlū−Rh+Rl . Because of the continuous signal structure, the mass
of banks with belief π = Rlū−Rh+Rl is zero. Hence, in equilibrium, risky interbank capital
markets with c < 1 have zero trading volume.
Proof of Proposition 18. Since the cost of contracting is imposed on lenders in the
interbank capital market, borrowers’ decision on the which interbank capital market to enter
is the same as in the main model. As shown in the proof of Proposition 17, in equilibrium, all
borrowers receive the same payoff in expansions and solve the same maximization problem
below.
max
c
πi
r(c)(Rhc−Rl)
cr(c)−Rl
= πi max
c
r(c)(Rhc−Rl)
cr(c)−Rl
.
Note that on any interbank capital market c, the borrowers’ expected payoff decreases in
r(c). Therefore, the maximum expected payoff a borrower can achieve on interbank c is
when r(c) = r(c) = Rh−Rlc(Rh−1)+1−Rl . Substitute in the express for r(c), we can calculate the
maximum payoff for a borrower is πi
R−r
1−r regardless of the collateral level c. Therefore, when
r(cmin)→ r(cmin), the maximum payoff that borrowing banks receive in expansion is
ū = max
c
r(c)(Rhc−Rl)
cr(c)−Rl
=
Rh −Rl
1−Rl
.
And all interbank capital markets with positive trading volume should have r(c) = r(c).
However, from lending bank j’s perspective, its expected payoff from lending on interbank
c is
πjr(c) + (1− πj)cr(c)− I(c) =
(Rh −Rl)(πj + (1− πj)c)
c(Rh − 1) + 1−Rl
− I(c).
It must be greater than the expected payoff from being a borrower or investing in the safe
storage, i.e.
(Rh −Rl)(πj + (1− πj)c)
c(Rh − 1) + 1−Rl
− I(c) ≥ max{πū, 1}.
There is solution to the above inequality when c = cmin and no solution for any c > cmin.
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Proof of Proposition 19. Below I prove the monotonicity of θ̄(c). It is equivalent to
show that f(t) = Φ−1
(
t+ (1− t) 1−RlRh−Rl
)
−Φ−1 (t) decreases monotonically in t. Take the
first order derivative with respect to t,
d
dt
f(t) =
(
1− 1−Rl
Rh −Rl
)(
φ
(
Φ−1
(
t+ (1− t) 1−Rl
Rh −Rl
)))−1
−
(
φ
(
Φ−1 (t)
))−1
.
Therefore it suffices to prove that
g(t) =
(
1− 1−Rl
Rh −Rl
)
φ
(
Φ−1 (t)
)
− φ
(
Φ−1
(
t+ (1− t) 1−Rl
Rh −Rl
))
is non-positive for any t ∈ [0, Rl]. Note that
d
dt
g(t) =
(
1− 1−Rl
Rh −Rl
)[
Φ−1
(
t+ (1− t) 1−Rl
Rh −Rl
)
− Φ−1 (t)
]
is non-negative for any t ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore, g(t) ≤ g(1) = 0 for any t ∈ [0, Rl].
The proof of the rest of the proposition follows the proof of proposition 3 and 4.
Proof of Proposition 20. The aggregate lending under regulatory requirement c is
A(θ, c) =
1
1−Rl/c
Φ
(
θ − θ∗0
σs
+ Φ−1
((
1− Rl
c
)
(1− θ∗0)
))
.
Let t(c) = 1− Rlc , which increases in c monotonically. Hence, the aggregate lending function
can be expressed as
A(θ, t) =
1
t
Φ
(
a(θ) + Φ−1 (t(1− θ∗0))
)
,
where a(θ) =
θ−θ∗0
σs
. Take the first order derivative with respect to t,
d
dt
A(θ, t) =
1
t2
[
t(1− θ∗0)
φ(Φ−1(t(1− θ∗0)))
− Φ(a(θ) + Φ
−1(t(1− θ∗0))
φ(a(θ) + Φ−1(t(1− θ∗0))
]
.
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Note that Φ(x)φ(x) strictly increases in x.
1 Hence, the above first order derivative ddtA(θ, t) T 0
when a(θ) S 0. As a result, ddtA(θ, t) T 0 when θ S θ
∗
0, and
d
dcA(θ, c) T 0 when θ S θ
∗
0.
Proof of Proposition 21.
If the market-clearing interest rate r∗(θ) = 1, the fundamentals
θ ≤ z(1) = s∗(1)− σsΦ−1
(
Rl(Rh − 1)
Rh −Rl
)
.
For the marginal banks that receive private signal s∗(1), the posterior p.d.f. of θ is
f(θ|s∗(1), r = 1) ∝ φ
(
si − θ
σs
)
Φ
(
z(1)− θ
σp
)
.
In the limit of vanishing noise on the public signal, it converges to a truncated normal distri-
bution N (s∗(1), σs) truncated from above at z(1) = s∗(1) − σsΦ−1
(
Rl(Rh−1)
Rh−Rl
)
. Therefore,
in the limit, the belief of the marginal bank is
lim
σp→0
π(s∗(1), 1) =
lim
σp→0
Φ
(
s∗(1)−θ∗(1)
σs
)
− Rl(Rh−1)Rh−Rl
1− Rl(Rh−1)Rh−Rl
=
1−Rl
Rh −Rl
.
The aggregate lending at the fundamental threshold θ∗(1) can be expressed as
lim
σp→0
A(θ∗(1), 1) =
1
1−Rl
(
1− lim
σp→0
Φ
(
s∗(1)− θ∗(1)
σs
))
− 1
Rh − 1
lim
σp→0
Φ
(
s∗(1)− θ∗(1)
σs
)
.
Substituting in the expression lim
σp→0
π(s∗(1), 1), we have
lim
σp→0
A(θ∗(1), 1) = 1− Rh
Rh − 1
lim
σr→0
π(s∗(1), 1) = 1− Rh(1−Rl)
(Rh − 1)(Rh − 1)
.
1See Gordon (1941) for details.
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Therefore, the fundamental threshold is
lim
σp→0
θ∗(1) = 1− lim
σp→0
A(θ∗(1), 1) =
Rh(1−Rl)
(Rh − 1)(Rh − 1)
.
Hence, the signal threshold in the limit is
lim
σp→0
s∗(1) = lim
σp→0
θ∗(1) + σsΦ
−1
(
lim
σp→0
Φ
(
s∗(1)− θ∗(1)
σs
))
. (A.18)
The interbank capital market-clearing condition when r = 1 implies that
θ ≤ z(1) = s∗(1)− σsΦ−1
(
Rl(Rh − 1)
Rh −Rl
)
.
Substituting in the expression for s∗(1) in equation A.18, we have
z(1) = lim
σp→0
θ∗(1) + σs
[
Φ−1
(
lim
σp→0
Φ
(
s∗(1)− θ∗(1)
σs
))
− Φ−1
(
Rl(Rh − 1)
(Rh −Rl
)]
.
Since
lim
σp→0
π(s∗(1), 1) =
lim
σp→0
Φ
(
s∗(1)−θ∗(1)
σs
)
− Rl(Rh−1)Rh−Rl
1− Rl(Rh−1)Rh−Rl
=
1−Rl
Rh −Rl
,
the positive numerator implies that lim
σp→0
Φ
(
s∗(1)−θ∗(1)
σs
)
> Rl(Rh−1)Rh−Rl . Therefore, z(1) >
lim
σp→0
θ∗(1). Let θ∗1 = lim
σp→0
θ∗(1), then for any θ ∈ (θ∗0, θ∗1), there exists a market clearing
interest rate r̂ = θ∗(1). Moreover, since θ is less than the fundamental threshold θ∗1, the
economy is in a recession.
Proof of Proposition 22. When CDS price p ∈ (p̄, 1), the aggregate investment in
sovereign debt A = 0. Therefore, the fundamental threshold θ∗(p) = 1 ∀p ∈ (p̄, 1). The
market-clearing condition on the CDS market
∫ ∞
−∞
x(θ + σsε, p)φ(ε)dε = 0
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implies that the CDS price contains perfect information about the fundamentals θ, i.e.
θ = s∗(p)− σsΦ−1(p).
To preserve the belief heterogeneity, I assume that banks make noisy inference based on the
information and update their beliefs based on the noisy public signal
θ = s∗(p)− σsΦ−1(p) + σpεp.
Hence, for a marginal investor with private signal s∗(p), the posterior distribution of fun-
damentals θ given her private signal s∗(p) and the public signal p is N (s∗(p) − σs(1 −
δ)Φ−1(p), δσ2s), and her belief
π(s∗(p), p) = 1− Φ
(
θ∗(p)− s∗(p) + σs(1− δ)Φ−1(p)√
δσ
)
= 1− p.
Substituting in θ∗(p) = 1, we can solve for the signal cutoff
s∗(p) = 1 + σs(1− δ −
√
δ)φ−1(p).
From the market-clearing condition, we know that for fundamentals
θ = 1− σs(δ +
√
δ)φ−1(p),
there exists an equilibrium with CDS price p ∈ (p̄, 1). Note that the right-hand side of the
above equation decreases monotonically in p, lim
σp→0
1 − σs(δ +
√
δ)φ−1(p) = 1 ∀p ∈ (p̄, 1)
and lim
p→1
1− σs(δ+
√
δ)φ−1(p) = −∞ ∀σp > 0. Therefore, for any θ ∈ (−∞, 1), there exists
an equilibrium with CDS price p∗(θ) ∈ (p̄, 1) and the sovereign debt defaults. Below I show
that in the limit p̂(θ) = lim
σp→0
p∗(θ) = 1 ∀θ ∈ (−∞, 1). That is to show ∀ε > 0, there exists
a σ̄p > 0 such that ∀σp < σ̄p, |1− p∗(θ)| < ε, i.e. p∗(θ) > 1− ε.
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• ∀p ∈ (p̄, 1− ε), lim
σp→0
σs(δ+
√
δ)φ−1(p) = 0. Therefore, there exists a σ̄1 > 0 such that
∀σp < σ̄1, σs(δ +
√
δ)φ−1(p) < 1−θ2 .
• ∀σp < σ̄2 = 1−θ2εp , σpεp > −
1−θ
2 .
Hence, for any σp < σ̄p = min{σ̄1, σ̄2} and any p ∈ (p̄, 1− ε), we have 1−σs(δ+
√
δ)φ−1(p)+
σpεp > θ. Moreover, since 1−σs(δ+
√
δ)φ−1(p) is continuous and lim
p→1
1−σs(δ+
√
δ)φ−1(p) =
−∞, the market clearing CDS price p∗(θ) > 1− ε.
Therefore, for any θ ∈ (θ∗0, 1), there exists a market clearing CDS price p̂(θ) = 1. Since the
fundamental threshold θ∗(p) = 1 ∀p ∈ (p̄, 1), in this region, the economy is in a recession.
A.1.8. Laplacian Property
For a bank with private signal at the threshold, when she decides whether to extend credit
to the real sector, she makes inferences on the aggregate lending and hence the rank of her
signal among all banks. Her private signal is entirely uninformative about her rank and
consequently about the aggregate lending. Therefore, she is uncertain about the realized
proportions of types above and below the threshold and is indifferent between extending
credit and not.
Lemma 4 (Laplacian Property) In the limit of vanishing demand noise, the aggregate
lending is, conditional on interest rate r = 1 and the threshold signal s∗(1), uniformly
distributed on [0,1].
Proof of Lemma 4.
In the limit of vanishing demand noise, for a bank observing private signal s∗(1) and in-
terest rate r = 1, fundamentals θ follow a truncated normal distribution with cumulative
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distribution function as follows,
F (θ|si = s∗(1), r = 1) =
Φ
(
θ−s∗(1)
σs
)
Φ
(
θ̄−s∗(1)
σs
)
where by the market-clearing condition θ̄ = z(1) = s∗(1) − σsΦ−1 (r). Therefore, the
expression can be simplified as
F (θ|si = s∗(1), r = 1) =
1
1−Rl
Φ
(
θ − s∗(1)
σs
)
The aggregate lending at fundamentals θ when the interest rate r = 1 is
A(θ, 1) =
1
1−Rl
Φ
(
θ − s∗(1)
σs
)
.
Hence, the c.d.f. of aggregate lending conditional on interest rate r = 1 and the threshold
signal s∗(1) is
Pr(A(θ, 1) < a|si = s∗(1), r = 1) = F (|s∗(1) + σsΦ−1((1−Rl)a)) = a.
Therefore, the aggregate lending A(θ, 1) is uniformly distributed on [0, 1].
A.2. Appendix to Chapter 2
A.2.1. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 6. It can be proved by iterated deletion of dominated strategies.
Let p(x; k) denote the interim belief of success when an agent receives private signal x and
all other agents follow a cutoff investment strategy k as defined by Equation (2.4). First, we
want to show that strategies survive n rounds of iterated deletion of dominated strategies
123
if and only if
a(x) = 0, if x < ξ
n
, (A.19)
and a(x) = 1, if x ≥ ξ̄n. (A.20)
where
{
(ξ
n
, ξ̄n)
}∞
n=0
satisfies
−∞ = ξ
0
< ξ
1
≤ · · · ≤ ξ
n
≤ · · · ≤ ξ̄n ≤ · · · ≤ ξ̄1 < ξ̄0 = +∞. (A.21)
This result can be proved by induction. Let ξ
0
= −∞ and ξ̄0 = +∞, so the first round of
deletion starts with the full set of strategies. Suppose round n ∈ N of deletion has been
completed. In round n+ 1, the best scenario for an agent to invest is that all other agents
follow a cutoff strategy with threshold ξ
n
. Therefore, for any x such that p(x; ξ
n
) < cb ,
a(x) = 1 is strictly worse than a(x) = 0. Similarly, the best scenario for an agent to choose
ai = 1 is that all other agents follow a cutoff strategy with threshold ξn. As a result, for x
such that p(x; ξ̄n) >
c
b , any strategy profile with a(x) = 1 is strictly better than a(x) = 0.
Given p(x; k) is non-decreasing in x, the strategy profiles that survives deletion of domi-
nated strategies can be summarized in the form of (A.19)(A.20), with (ξ
n+1
, ξ̄n+1) defined
inductively as
ξ
n+1
= inf
{
x : p(x; ξ
n
) ≥ c
b
}
(A.22)
and
ξ̄n+1 = sup
{
x : p(x; ξ̄n) ≤
c
b
}
(A.23)
The monotonicity of p(x; k) guarantees that ξ
n+1
≤ ξ̄n+1 given ξn ≤ ξ̄n. Note the dominance
region assumption implies that ξ
1
> −∞ and ξ̄1 < +∞ when σ is small enough. Therefore,
124
{
(ξ
n
, ξ̄n)
}∞
n=0
is a well-defined sequence of real couple which satisfies (A.21).
Now we’ve proved that {ξ
n
}∞n=1 and {ξ̄n}∞n=1 are both monotonic and bounded sequences.
Thus, they converges to two finite numbers ξ and ξ̄ respectively when n → ∞. And the
two limits satisfy
ξ ≤ ξ̄. (A.24)
The definition (A.22)(A.23) implies that p(ξ; ξ) ≥ cb and p(ξ̄; ξ̄) ≤
c
b . Note that
p(ξ; ξ) = F
(
ξ − θ∗(ξ)
σ
)
= θ∗(ξ), (A.25)
is strictly increasing in ξ. Therefore ξ = ξ̄ must be the unique solution to θ∗(ξ) = cb , which
is
ξ∗0 =
c
b
+ σF−1
(c
b
)
. (A.26)
Since there’s only one strategy that survives the iterated deletion of dominated strategies,
the equilibrium of the game is unique and the associated equilibrium strategy is the cutoff
investment strategy with threshold ξ∗0 .
Lemma 5 Suppose the optimal strategy of an agent as a function of her interim belief of
success p̂i can be characterized as
ai = 1,Reject, if p̂i > p
∗
2,
ai = 1,Accept, if p
∗
1 < p̂i ≤ p∗2,
ai = 0, if p̂i ≤ p∗1,
where p∗1 and p
∗
2 are two threshold beliefs that satisfy 0 ≤ p∗1 < p∗2 ≤ 1. There is a unique
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Bayesian Nash equilibrium and the equilibrium strategy of any agent is
ai = 1,Reject, if xi ≥ η∗,
ai = 1,Accept, if ξ
∗ ≤ xi < η∗,
ai = 0, if xi < ξ
∗,
where ξ∗ = p∗1 + σF
−1 (p∗1) and η
∗ = p∗1 + σF
−1 (p∗2)
Proof of Lemma 5. We want to find a sequence
{
(ξ
n
, ξ̄n)
}∞
n=0
such that strategies
survives n rounds of iterated deletion of dominated strategies only if
a(x) = 0, if x < ξ
n
, (A.27)
and a(x) = 1, if x ≥ ξ̄n. (A.28)
The reason that we can only iterate on the investment cutoff without keeping track of the
participation decisions is that an agent’s investment decision is independent of other agents’
participation decisions. The recursive expression for
{
(ξ
n
, ξ̄n)
}∞
n=0
is
ξ
n+1
= inf{x : p(x; ξ
n
) ≥ p∗1}, (A.29)
ξ̄n+1 = sup{x : p(x; ξ̄n) ≤ p∗1}. (A.30)
Applying the same techniques in the proof of Proposition 6, it becomes clear that the limit
of the two cutoff sequences converges to
ξ∗(s, t) = p∗1 + σF
−1 (p∗1) , (A.31)
which is the investment cutoff in the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the global game.
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The associated participation cutoff η is the solution to
p(η; ξ∗(s, t)) = p∗2. (A.32)
Solving the above equation yields
η∗(s, t) = p∗1 + σF
−1 (p∗2) . (A.33)
Proof of Proposition 7. In case 1, invest-and-reject is dominated by invest-and-accept.
Therefore, we can rewrite the investment payoff by letting b′ = b − t and c′ = c − s and
directly apply Proposition 6. Similarly, invest-and-accept is jointly dominated by invest-
and-accept and not-invest in case 3. Since the intervention program is never going to be
accepted, the equilibrium is the same as that described in Proposition 6. Case 2 is a direct
implication of Lemma 5.
Proof of Proposition 8.
As specified in Equation 2.5, with program (s, t), the fundamental cutoff is c−sb−t . Therefore,
the programs targeting at the first-best fundamental cutoff 0 should satisfy s = c. Hence,
the subsidy to tax ratio of a program targeting at the first best is st =
c
t . If the ratio is greater
than 1, the program is a full-participation program. Otherwise, it is a partial-participation
program.
As a result, if (s, t) satisfies the following two conditions, it is a full-participation program
targeting the first best.
1. 0 ≤ t ≤ c,
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2. s = c.
If (s′, t′) satisfies the following two conditions, it is a partial-participation program targeting
the first best.
1. c < t′ ≤ b,
2. s′ = c.
Lastly, we calculate the limit of the cost functions as specified in Equation 2.7 and 2.8. For
any θ > 0,
lim
σ→0
C(θ, s, t) = lim
σ→0
(τs− t)
[
1− F
(
0− θ
σ
+ F−1(0)
)]
= (τs− t) [1− F (−∞)] = τs− t
lim
σ→0
C(θ, s′, t′) = lim
σ→0
(τs′ − t′)
[
F
(
0− θ
σ
+ F−1
(
s′
t′
))
− F
(
0− θ
σ
+ F−1(0)
)]
= (τs′ − t′) [F (−∞)− F (−∞)] = 0
If θ = 0,
lim
σ→0
C(θ, s, t) = lim
σ→0
(τs− t)
[
1− F
(
F−1(0)
)]
= τs− t
lim
σ→0
C(θ, s′, t′) = lim
σ→0
(τs′ − t′)
[
F
(
F−1
(
s′
t′
))
− F
(
F−1(0)
)]
=
s′
t′
(τs′ − t′)
The cost of a partial-participation program is strictly less than that of a full-participation
program.
s′
t′
(τs′ − t′) = τc c
t′
− c < τc− c ≤ τs− t
For any θ < 0,
lim
σ→0
C(θ, s, t) = lim
σ→0
τs
[
1− F
(
0− θ
σ
+ F−1(0)
)]
= τs [1− F (∞)] = 0
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lim
σ→0
C(θ, s′, t′) = lim
σ→0
τs′
[
F
(
0− θ
σ
+ F−1
(
s′
t′
))
− F
(
0− θ
σ
+ F−1(0)
)]
= τs′ [F (∞)− F (∞)] = 0
Proof of Proposition 9. We compare the expected cost of a full-participation program
with (s, t) a partial-participation program (s′, t′) with small enough λ > 0.
The expected cost of the full-participation program is
Eθ[C(θ, s, t)] =
τs
θ̄ − θ
∫ θ̄
θ
[
1− F
(
ξ∗ − θ
σ
)]
dθ − t
θ̄ − θ
∫ θ̄
θ∗
[
1− F
(
ξ∗ − θ
σ
)]
dθ,
and that of the partial-participation program (s′, t′),
Eθ[C(θ, s′, t′)] =
τs′
θ̄ − θ
∫ θ̄
θ
[
F
(
η∗ − θ
σ
)
− F
(
ξ∗ − θ
σ
)]
dθ − t
′
θ̄ − θ
∫ θ̄
θ∗
[
F
(
η∗ − θ
σ
)
− F
(
ξ∗ − θ
σ
)]
dθ,
where ξ∗ and η∗ are the investment threshold and participation threshold defined as in
Proposition 7, ξ∗ = θ∗ + σF−1(θ∗), η∗(s′, t′) = θ∗ + σF−1
(
s′
t′
)
. To suppress notations, we
omit the dependence of η∗ on (s′, t′). The difference between the cost of full-participation
program (s, t) and that of partial-participation program (s′, t′) can be decomposed into two
parts, Eθ[C(θ, s, t)]− Eθ[C(θ, s′, t′)] = ∆1 + ∆2, where
∆1 =
τs− t
θ̄ − θ
∫ θ̄
θ∗
[
1− F
(
η∗ − θ
σ
)]
dθ +
τs
θ̄ − θ
∫ θ∗
θ
[
1− F
(
η∗ − θ
σ
)]
dθ,
∆2 = −
τθ∗(t′ − t)
θ̄ − θ
∫ θ̄
θ
[
F
(
η∗ − θ
σ
)
− F
(
ξ∗ − θ
σ
)]
dθ +
t′ − t
θ̄ − θ
∫ θ̄
θ∗
[
F
(
η∗ − θ
σ
)
− F
(
ξ∗ − θ
σ
)]
dθ.
∆1 and ∆2 are the cost difference on the extensive margin and intensive margin respectively.
Notice E[C(θ, s, t)] is linear in s and t. Therefore, the expected cost of any full-participation
program lies between the cost of the guarantee program λ1 = 0 with (s, t) = (
c−θ∗b
1−θ∗ ,
c−θ∗b
1−θ∗ ),
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and the pure subsidy program λ2 = − c−θ
∗b
1−θ∗ , with (s, t) = (c − θ
∗b, 0). In the remaining
part of the proof, we show that if either of the two conditions is satisfied, the proposed
partial-participation program (s′, t′) = ( c−θ
∗b
1−θ∗ + θ
∗λ, c−θ
∗b
1−θ∗ + λ) with small positive λ has
lower cost than both the guarantee program and the pure subsidy program.
Consider the pure subsidy program (s, t) = (c− θ∗b, 0). Plugging (s, t) into the expression
of ∆1, we have
∆1 =
τ(c− θ∗b)
θ̄ − θ
∫ θ̄
θ
[
1− F
(
η∗ − θ
σ
)]
dθ,
=
τ(c− θ∗b)
θ̄ − θ
∫ θ̄
θ
∫ θ̄+ 1
2
σ
η∗
1
σ
f
(
x− θ
σ
)
dxdθ,
=
τ(c− θ∗b)
θ̄ − θ
∫ θ̄+ 1
2
σ
η∗
∫ θ̄
θ
1
σ
f
(
x− θ
σ
)
dθdx,
=
τ(c− θ∗b)
θ̄ − θ
∫ θ̄+ 1
2
σ
η∗
[
1− F
(
x− θ̄
σ
)]
dx,
=
τ(c− θ∗b)
θ̄ − θ
[
θ̄ +
1
2
σ − η∗ − σ
∫ 1
2
− 1
2
F (y)dy
]
>
τ(c− θ∗b)
θ̄ − θ
(1− θ∗),
which is strictly positive.
For ∆2, notice
∫ β
α
[
F
(
η∗ − θ
σ
)
− F
(
ξ∗ − θ
σ
)]
dθ =
∫ β
α
∫ η∗
ξ∗
1
σ
f
(
x− θ
σ
)
dxdθ,
=
∫ η∗
ξ∗
∫ β
α
1
σ
f
(
x− θ
σ
)
dθdx,
=
∫ η∗
ξ∗
[
F
(
x− α
σ
)
− F
(
x− β
σ
)]
dx,
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therefore
∆2 =
(
c− θ∗b
1− θ∗
+ ε
)
1
θ̄ − θ
[∫ η∗
ξ∗
F
(
x− θ∗
σ
)
dx− τθ∗(η∗ − ξ∗)
]
,
=
(
c− θ∗b
1− θ∗
+ ε
)
θ∗(η∗ − ξ∗)
θ̄ − θ
[∫ F−1( s′
t′
)
F−1(θ∗)
F (y)
θ∗(F−1
(
s′
t′
)
− F−1(θ∗))
dy − τ
]
,
=
(
c− θ∗b
1− θ∗
+ ε
)
θ∗(η∗ − ξ∗)
θ̄ − θ
[
G
(
θ∗,
s′
t′
)
− τ
]
.
Taking λ to 0, we have
lim
λ→0+
∆2 =
(
c− θ∗b
1− θ∗
)
θ∗σ(12 − F
−1(θ∗))
θ̄ − θ
[G(θ∗, 1)− τ ] = c− θ
∗b
θ̄ − θ
θ∗σ[G(θ∗, 1)− τ ].
If the first condition holds, τ < G(θ∗, 1), limε→0+ ∆2 > 0, ∆1 + ∆2 is strictly positive for
small enough λ. Also, if the second condition holds, θ∗ + σ < 1,
lim
λ→0+
∆1 + ∆2 >
τ(c− θ∗b)
θ̄ − θ
(1− θ∗ − θ∗σ) > 0.
Now let’s turn to the guarantee program with s = t = c−θ
∗b
1−θ∗ . For ∆1, since η
∗ = θ∗ +
σF−1( s
′
t′ ) < θ
∗ + 12σ, we have
∆1 >
(τ − 1)s
θ̄ − θ
∫ θ̄
θ∗
[
1− F
(
θ∗ + 12σ − θ
σ
)]
dθ +
τs
θ̄ − θ
∫ θ∗
θ
[
1− F
(
θ∗ + 12σ − θ
σ
)]
dθ ≥ 0.
The last inequality is strict when τ > 1. For ∆2, we have
∆2 = λ
σθ∗(F−1
(
s′
t′
)
− F−1(θ∗))
θ̄ − θ
[
G
(
θ∗,
s′
t′
)
− τ
]
.
If τ > 1, limλ→0+ ∆1 > 0, limλ→0+ ∆2 = 0. Thus, Eθ[C(θ, s, t)]−Eθ[C(θ, s′, t′)] = ∆1+∆2 >
0 for small enough λ.
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If τ = 1, since s
′
t′ >
c
b > θ
∗, G
(
θ∗, s
′
t′
)
> 1 = τ , ∆2 > 0 for any positive λ. Combining with
∆1 ≥ 0, we have Eθ[C(θ, s, t)]− Eθ[C(θ, s′, t′)] = ∆1 + ∆2 > 0 for any positve λ.
To sum up, in either case, when λ being positve and small enough, the partial particiaption
program (s′, t′) = ( c−θ
∗b
1−θ∗ +θ
∗λ, c−θ
∗b
1−θ∗ +λ) has lower expected cost than any full-participation
program targeting θ∗.
Proof of Proposition 11. If we can choose (s, t) properly such that 0 < p∗1(s, t) <
p∗2(s, t) < 1, Lemma 5 implies in the unique Bayesian Nash equilibrium, agents follow a
threshold strategy
ai = 1,Reject, if xi ≥ η∗(s, t),
ai = 1,Accept, if ξ
∗(s, t) ≤ xi < η∗(s, t),
ai = 0, if xi < ξ
∗(s, t),
where
ξ∗(s, t) = p∗1(s, t) + σF
−1(p∗1(s, t)),
η∗(s, t) = p∗1(s, t) + σF
−1(p∗2(s, t)).
Moreover, ξ∗(s, t) and η∗(s, t) both converges to p∗1(s, t) when σ → 0. Thus, for any con-
tinuous belief of the fundamental held by the government, the ex-ante cost of the program
converges to 0 when σ → 0.
Now we want to show that it is possible to choose (s, t) such that 0 < p∗1(s, t) < p
∗
2(s, t) < 1
and p∗1(s, t) can be arbitrarily close to 0. Let s = c− ε and
c+ce−γb
1−γ < t < b. The choice of
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t is feasible since Assumption 1b implies c+c
e−γb
1−γ < b. Note
c+ce−γb
1−γ < t implies
p∗2(s, t) =
s
γb+ t(1− γ)− ce
<
c− ε
c
,
p∗1(s, t) =
c− s
(1− γ)(b− t)
=
ε
(1− γ)(b− t)
.
Therefore, for any fixed t, when ε → 0, p∗1(s, t) converges to 0 and p∗2(s, t) converges to a
positive number which is strictly less than 1.
Proof of Proposition 12. The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 5. We want to find
a sequence
{
(ξg
n
, ξ̄gn)Ng=1
}∞
n=0
such that the strategies of group g agents survive n rounds of
iterated deletion of dominated strategies only if
ag(x) = 0, if x < ξg
n
, (A.34)
and ag(x) = 1, if x ≥ ξ̄gn. (A.35)
To simplify notations, let ξ
n
= (ξg
n
)Ng=1 and ξ̄n = (ξ̄
g
n)Ng=1 be the vectors of threshold signals.
The recursive expression for
{
(ξg
n
, ξ̄gn)Ng=1
}∞
n=0
is
ξg
n+1
= inf
x
{x : pg(x; ξ
n
) ≥ c
bg
}, (A.36)
ξ̄gn+1 = sup
x
{x : pg(x; ξ̄n) ≤
c
bg
}. (A.37)
We can prove by induction that
−∞ = ξ
0
< ξ
1
≤ · · · ≤ ξ
n
≤ · · · ≤ ξ̄n ≤ · · · ≤ ξ̄1 < ξ̄0 = +∞. (A.38)
Since any bounded monotonic sequence has a finite limit, take n to ∞, we have
ξ̄ ≥ ξ. (A.39)
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Now we want to show ξ̄ = ξ. It can be proved by contradiction. Suppose ξ̄ > ξ. Let h be
the group such that ξ̄h − ξh = maxg
{
ξ̄g − ξg
}
> 0. Note that θ∗(ξ̄) is the solution to
N∑
g=1
wgmgF g
(
ξ̄g − θ
σ
)
= θ. (A.40)
Therefore, θ∗(ξ̄)− (ξ̄h − ξh) is the solution to
N∑
g=1
wgmgF g
(
ξ̄g − (ξ̄h − ξh)− θ
σ
)
− θ − (ξ̄h − ξh) = 0. (A.41)
Also notice θ∗(ξ) is the solution to
N∑
g=1
wgmgF g
(
ξg − θ
σ
)
− θ = 0. (A.42)
Let’s compare (A.41) and (A.42). Since ξg > ξ̄g − (ξ̄h − ξh) and ξ̄h − ξh > 0, the left hand
side of (A.42) is strictly larger than the left hand side of (A.41) for any given θ. Given the
left hand side of (A.42) is strictly decreasing in θ, we must have θ∗(ξ̄)− (ξ̄h − ξh) < θ∗(ξ).
Therefore,
ph(ξ̄h; ξ̄) =Prh[θ > θ∗(ξ̄)|ξ̄h],
=F h
(
ξ̄h − θ∗(ξ̄)
σ
)
,
=F h
(
ξh − [θ∗(ξ̄)− (ξ̄h − ξh)]
σ
)
,
>F h
(
ξh − θ∗(θ∗(ξ))
σ
)
,
=ph(ξh; ξ).
However. (A.36) and (A.37) implies ph(ξ̄h; ξ̄) = ph(ξh; ξ) = c
bh
. Contradiction. This implies
ξ̄ = ξ = ξ0.
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To solve for ξ0, note ξ0 and θ0 are the solutions to
N∑
g=1
wgmgF g
(
ξg − θ
σ
)
= θ, (A.43)
F g
(
ξg − θ
σ
)
=
c
bg
, for any g = 1, . . . , N. (A.44)
Plugging (A.44) into (A.43) we have
θ0 =
N∑
g=1
mgwg
c
bg
, (A.45)
ξg0 =
N∑
g=1
mgwg
c
bg
+ σF−1g
( c
bg
)
, for any g = 1, . . . , N. (A.46)
Proof of Proposition 13. The optimal response of an agent in group g is
ai = 1,Reject, if p̂i ≥
s
t
,
ai = 1,Accept, if
c− s
bg − t
≤ p̂i <
s
t
,
ai = 0, if p̂i <
c− s
bg − t
;
We can apply the same method in the proof of Proposition 12 and show that in any equi-
librium, agents of group g invest if and only if their private signal is greater or equal to
ξ∗g(s, t) =
N∑
g=1
mgwg
c− s
bg − t
+ σF−1g
(
c− s
bg − t
)
. (A.47)
Given the investment thresholds, we know the fundamental threshold above which there
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will be successful investment is
θ∗(s, t) =
N∑
g=1
mgwg
c− s
bg − t
. (A.48)
Therefore, the signal η∗(s, t) that makes an agent from group g indifferent between accepting
and rejecting the intervention program is
η∗(s, t) =
N∑
g=1
mgwg
c− s
bg − t
+ σF−1g
(s
t
)
. (A.49)
Proof of Proposition 14. Consider an agent who receives private signal x and knows
that all other agents invest if and only if observing private signal k. The expected payoff
from investing is
U(k, x) =
∫ θ̄
θ
1
σ
f
(
x− θ
σ
)
π
(
θ, 1− F
(
k − θ
σ
))
dθ
Note that U(k, x) weakly decreases in k and weakly increases in x. Intuitively, an agent
has higher expected payoff if everyone else is more willing to invest or the agent receives a
high signal indicating a high fundamental θ. Also note that U(−∞, x) < 0 for x < θ0 and
U(+∞, x) > 0 for x > θ1.
Next we prove the uniqueness of equilibrium by iterated deletion of dominated strategies.
The strategy profile of an agent is the action as a function of the private signal received. We
denote it by a(x) : R → {0, 1}. We will prove that strategy survives n rounds of iterated
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deletion of dominated strategies if and only if
a(x) = 0, if x < ξ
n
, (A.50)
and a(x) = 1, if x ≥ ξ̄n. (A.51)
where
{
(ξ
n
, ξ̄n)
}∞
n=0
satisfies
−∞ = ξ
0
< ξ
1
≤ · · · ≤ ξ
n
≤ · · · ≤ ξ̄n ≤ · · · ≤ ξ̄1 < ξ̄0 = +∞. (A.52)
This result can be proved by induction. Let the starting node be ξ
0
= −∞ and ξ̄0 = +∞,
meaning that there is no restrictions on agents’ strategy. Suppose round n ∈ N of deletion
has been completed. In round n + 1, the most optimistic belief for an agent is that all
other agents follow a cutoff strategy with threshold ξ
n
. Therefore, for any x such that
U(ξ
n
, x) < 0, a(x) = 1 is strictly dominated by a(x) = 0. Similarly, the most pessimistic
belief for an agent is that all other agents follow a cutoff strategy with threshold ξ̄n. As a
result, for x such that U(ξ̄n, x) > 0, any strategy profile with a(x) = 0 is strictly dominated
by a(x) = 1.
Given U(k, x) is non-decreasing in x, the strategy profiles that survives deletion of domi-
nated strategies must satisfy the restrictions in (A.50) and (A.51), with (ξ
n+1
, ξ̄n+1) defined
inductively as
ξ
n+1
= inf{x : U(ξ
n
, x) ≥ 0} (A.53)
and
ξ̄n+1 = sup{x : U(ξ̄n, x) ≤ 0} (A.54)
The monotonicity of U(k, x) guarantees that ξ
n+1
≤ ξ̄n+1. Note that the dominance region
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assumption implies that ξ
1
> −∞ and ξ̄1 < +∞. Therefore,
{
(ξ
n
, ξ̄n)
}∞
n=0
is a well-defined
sequence of real couples which satisfies (A.52).
Now we’ve proved that {ξ
n
}∞n=1 and {ξ̄n}∞n=1 are both monotonic and bounded sequences.
Thus, they converges to two finite numbers ξ and ξ̄ respectively when n→∞. The definition
(A.53) and (A.54) imply that U(ξ, ξ) ≥ 0 and U(ξ̄, ξ̄) ≤ 0. Notice for y ∈ [θ0, θ1],
U(y, y) =
∫ θ̄
θ
1
σ
f
(
y − θ
σ
)
π
(
y, 1− F
(
y − θ
σ
))
dθ =
∫ 1
0
π (y, l) dl,
strictly increases in y and ξ ≤ ξ̄, it must be the case that U(ξ, ξ) = U(ξ̄, ξ̄) = 0.
Since U(y, y) is continuous in y, U(θ, θ) ≤ 0, U(θ̄, θ̄) ≥ 0, there is a unique solution to
U(y, y) =
∫ 1
0 π (y, l) dl = 0. Denote the solution by ξ
∗
0 , and we have ξ = ξ̄ = ξ
∗
0 . Therefore,
the only strategy that survives the iterated deletion of dominated strategies is the cutoff
investment strategy with cutoff ξ∗0 .
Proof of Proposition 15. Consider an agent who receives private signal x and knows
that all other agents invest if and only if their signal is above k. The expected payoff from
investing and rejecting the intervention offer is
UR(k, x) =
∫ θ̄
θ
1
σ
f
(
x− θ
σ
)
π
(
θ, 1− F
(
k − θ
σ
))
dθ.
The expected payoff from investing and accepting the offer is
UA(k, x) = (1− t)UR(k, x) + s
Therefore, the maximum expected payoff from investing is
U(k, x) = max{UR(k, x), UA(k, x)}
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We prove a lemma that will be useful later.
Lemma 6 Given that all other agents invest if and only if their signal is above k, there
exist two functions k∗1(k) and k
∗
2(k) such that an agent strictly prefers not investing if her
private signal x < k∗1(k) and strictly prefers investing if x > k
∗
2(k). k
∗
1(k) and k
∗
2(k) are
given by
k∗1(k) = inf
{
k∗ : UR(k, k∗) ≥ − s
1− t
}
,
k∗2(k) = sup
{
k∗ : UR(k, k∗) ≤ − s
1− t
}
,
Both k∗1(k) and k
∗
2(k) are weakly increasing in k.
Proof of Lemma 6. The Left Dominance Region assumption in Definition 2 and Limit
Dominance in Assumption 3 make sure that the two function k∗1(k) and k
∗
2(k) are well
defined. By continuity of UR(k, x) in x, we have
UR(k, k∗1(k)) = U
R(k, k∗2(k)) = −
s
1− t
,
For any x < k∗1(k), U
R(k, x) < − s1−t , U
A(k, x) = (1 − t)UR(k, x) + s < 0. Therefore,
U(k, x) = max{UR(k, x), UA(k, x)} < 0, the agent will not invest if observing x < k∗1(k).
On the other hand, for any x > k∗2(k), U
R(k, x) > − s1−t , U
A(k, x) = (1−t)UR(k, x)+s > 0.
Therefore, U(k, x) = max{UR(k, x), UA(k, x)} > 0, the agent will invest after observing
signal x > k∗2(k).
Since UR(k, x) is weakly decreasing in k, we can easily show that both k∗1(k) and k
∗
2(k) are
weakly increasing in k.
With Lemma 6, we can prove the uniqueness of equilibrium by iterated deletion of dominated
strategies. Denote the investment strategy by a(x). We want to show a strategy survives n
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rounds of iterated deletion of dominated strategies if and only if
a(x) =
 0, if x < ξn,1, if x > ξ̄n,
where ξ
0
= −∞, ξ̄0 = ∞. ξn and ξ̄n are defined inductively by ξn+1 = k
∗
1(ξn), ξ̄n+1 =
k∗2(ξ̄n).
Since k∗(ξ) increases in ξ, ξ
n
and ξ̄n are increasing and decreasing sequences, respectively.
As n→∞, ξ
n
→ ξ and ξ̄n → ξ̄. Therefore, ξ = k∗1(ξ) and ξ̄ = k∗2(ξ̄). ξ and ξ̄ must both be
the solution to
UR(ξ, ξ) = − s
1− t
.
Let l = 1− F
(
ξ−θ
σ
)
, the equation can be written as
∫ 1
0
π (ξ, l) dl = − s
1− t
(A.55)
By Strict Laplacian State Monotonicity in Assumption 3, the left hand side is continuous
and strictly increasing in ξ. Also,
∫ 1
0 π (θ, l) dl < −
s
1−t ,
∫ 1
0 π
(
θ̄, l
)
dl > 0 ≥ − s1−t , there is a
unique solution to the equation above, ξ = ξ̄ = ξ∗. Notice ξ∗ is independent of σ. Then by
iterated deletion of dominated strategies, it is the unique investment cutoff in equilibrium.
Given the investment cutoff, we can solve for the private signal x such that UA(ξ∗, x) =
UR(ξ∗, x), or equivalently UR(ξ∗, η∗(σ)) = st . Let η
∗(σ) be the maximum value that satisfies
UR(ξ∗, η∗) =
∫ θ̄
θ
1
σ
f
(
η∗ − θ
σ
)
π
(
η∗, 1− F
(
ξ∗ − θ
σ
))
dθ =
s
t
. (A.56)
For any signal x > η∗(σ), an agent strictly prefers investing and not participating in the
intervention program. Notice when x > ξ∗ + σ, UR(ξ∗, x) = π(x, 1) > st , therefore, η
∗(σ) is
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well-defined.
Since UR(k, x) increases in x, and UR(ξ∗, ξ∗) = − s1−t ≤
s
t = U
R(ξ∗, η∗(σ)), therefore,
η∗(σ) ≥ ξ∗. It immediately follows that limσ→0 η∗(σ) = η ≥ ξ∗. Next, we prove η = ξ∗ by
contradiction. Suppose η > ξ∗, take σ → 0 in the left hand side of (A.56), we have
lim
σ→0
∫ θ̄
θ
1
σ
f
(
η∗(σ)− θ
σ
)
π
(
η∗(σ), 1− F
(
ξ∗ − θ
σ
))
dθ = π (η, 1) ≥ π(ξ∗, 1) > s
t
Contradiction to (A.56). Therefore, lim
σ→0
η∗(σ) = η = ξ∗.
Proof of Proposition 16. According to Definition 2, a partial-participation program
with target ξ∗ should satisfy the following conditions
1. π(θ, 1) < − s1−t
2. π(ξ∗, 1) > st
3.
∫ 1
0 π(ξ
∗, l)dl = − s1−t
As long as the government offers (s, t) given by
(
− π(ξ
∗, 1)∫ 1
0 π(ξ
∗, l)dl
+ 1
)−1
< t < 1, (A.57)
and
s = −(1− t)
∫ 1
0
π(ξ∗, l)dl, (A.58)
the three conditions listed above are satisfied. First, by assumption, π(θ, 1) ≤
∫ 1
0 π(θ0, l)dl <∫ 1
0 π(ξ
∗, l)dl = − s1−t . Second, (A.57) can be written as π(ξ
∗, 1) > −1−tt
∫ 1
0 π(ξ
∗, l)dl = st .
Finally, the third condition directly follows equation (A.58).
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